


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Clinton found it suitable to pick for this difficult task a team of four Jewish diplomats. They are Dennis Ross, Dan Kurtzer, Aaron Miller, and Martin Indyk. So that the Arabs will not feel overwhelmed by this select group, Secretary Christopher asked Ambassador Edward Djerejian to join the delegation after the conclusion of the guidance committee meetings of the multiparty negotiations in Moscow. Perhaps his presence, along with the "gang of four," will brighten the cloudy political atmosphere in the area, following the collapse of the peace negotiations and the Middle East crisis entering the realm of the unknown.

The big question for the Arab diplomats in Washington concerns Clinton's ulterior motives, referring to his determination to leave the whirlpool of bilateral negotiations and to enter into shuttle diplomacy. It appears that he has wagered on this line since the beginning of his term of office, since he has asked Dennis Ross to continue his job as controller of the peace talks. He is the most senior Republican official asked to stay in the Democrat administration. Previously he was director of the foreign policy planning committee under Secretary James Baker. He was helped in this task by Daniel Kurtzer with whom he sponsored the dialogue with the PLO, which was discontinued after a short while.

Dennis Ross, who was supposed to revive Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, is considered to be one of the strong elements who served former President Reagan. He was borrowed by George Bush to write most of his speeches on the Middle East question, after he was convinced of his success in the National Security Council as a consultant. Although he is one of those opposed to the unification of Jerusalem and considers it an indivisible capital, he suggested turning Israel into a NATO garrison. His friend Defense Secretary Les Aspin adopted this proposal and ordered the expansion of the port of Haifa in order to be able to receive U.S. aircraft carriers.

As for his assistant Daniel Kurtzer, he is an enigmatic and controversial character. He belongs to the Jewish orthodox community and performs his religious rights without embarrassment, even during his political activities. He graduated from Yeshiva University in New York, then joined the University of Columbia to write his masters degree dissertation on the Algerian revolution and the means France adopted in order to combat it. He then obtained his doctorate with his dissertation about Palestinian violence and the methods Israel uses to repress it. In the dissertation summary he opposed the use of the method of power and force by Israeli forces to suppress the intifadah. He suggested opening a dialogue with the intifadah leaders that could lead to further understanding and bringing the security situation under control.

The Arabs are divided in assessing the role Ross and Kurtzer have played. Some Arabs laud the sound line the two men established between Washington and the PLO, while others say that they conducted the dialogue in Tunis so meticulously that the dialogue was eventually killed. Regardless of the results, Clinton pins hopes on

them and expects their method to expedite the peace process more than the method of bilateral direct negotiations did.

The WASHINGTON POST wrote an article in its 28 October 1992 issue saying that Dennis Ross, who is a Jew, is considered one of the strong supporters of Israel, and that the Star of David is always displayed on his desk. Replying to this accusation, he said that it was his son who had put the star on his desk and that in his work he refuses to be biased in favor of one party over the other.

Apparently the task to which he has been assigned will be the more difficult test to confirm or refute this claim. He believes that the Israeli Knesset decision to cancel the ban on Israelis meeting with PLO members will provide him with opportunities for dialogue and negotiations, particularly if he can cancel the U.S. ban as well. Such success, if achieved, will help him to continue the talks between Abu-'Ammar and Rabin, and not just between the Palestinian president and Abie Nathan. This breakthrough will be difficult to achieve following the failure of the bilateral talks, or even to revive Kissinger's role after 20 years. Christopher Warren is expecting the "gang of four" mission to open new political channels that could lead to convincing the parties to the conflict of the need to go back to bilateral talks in Cairo, Amman, Beirut, or Jerusalem. And since summer is imminent, the presumed development will postpone the talks until early fall. And until the Arab world reaches that day, the policy of scorched earth will have burnt and blown out the bridges of peace. [as published]

Support Israeli Interests

93AE0533B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 5 Jul 93
p 13

[Article by Mahir 'Uthman: "Limits of American Bias"]

[Text] Although the Palestinian delegation to the bilateral negotiations with Israel in Washington did not disclose the text of the "ideas" or the U.S. "document" that was presented to the Palestinians and Israelis before the end of the 10th round of negotiations, the Palestinian negotiators observed that the U.S. proposals leave no room for doubt that the present U.S. Administration's handling of the Middle East conflict and the Palestine problem is such that the Arabs and Muslims cannot accept it.

Though the Americans say that what they offered is only ideas that are open to alterations and changes, it appears that the main principles in their weak document are points that are not open to alteration, or even to a slight change or substitution of one word with another. Briefly, the American side, which is supposed to be an honest sponsor and full partner in the peace process has chosen to be biased in favor of the Israeli concept of the peace process and its outcome.

This bias, of course, has its reasons. The most obvious of these is that Clinton's administration has from the beginning been dominated, or indeed deeply infiltrated,

by Zionist elements that absolutely support Israel and are more devoted to their own interests than to those of the United States itself.

It has become obvious that planners of U.S. national security policies are led by that gang of pro-Israeli elements who believe that any solution to the Middle East conflict should not come as a result of exerting any pressure on the Jewish State. These people also believe that, since Israel has reached a level of military might that enables it to fight a destructive war against the Arab neighbors, a maximum amount of concessions should be extracted from the Arabs who, in the view of these same people, have no cards to play for compromise or resistance.

Consequently, the American side, acting on the advice of those same national security planners, dared to adopt Israeli terminology by referring to the "territories" and not the "occupied territories." It also ignored the question of Arab East Jerusalem, which is an indivisible part of the Palestinian land Israel occupied in 1967, and which is subject to Resolution 242. The U.S. "document" also adopts the Israeli idea that says there should be no linkage between the transitional and final stages with regard to the final status of the Palestinian territories and the option of self-determination for the Palestinian people.

The containment of Iran and Iraq has now become a priority policy. Was this policy, that is somehow an extension of the U.S. peace initiative in the Middle East, in fact born at no other time than during the Gulf crisis?

Whatever the answer to this question may be, it must be borne in mind that former President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker did put the peace process in motion, and their declared intention was to bring it to a conclusion on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338, but things began to go wrong following Bill Clinton's assumption of office.

The U.S. stand as we perceive it has reached its nadir. If Clinton wants to improve his standing he must first listen to the demand, which was made by four Israeli ministers to the head of their government Yitzhaq Rabin, that negotiations take place directly with the PLO. President Clinton must also learn that, regardless of the electioneering promises he made to Israel—Jerusalem occupies an exceptional and precious position not only for the Palestinian people but also for the entire Arab and Islamic nation.

Suspension of Negotiations

93AE0533C London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 4 Jul 93
p 20

[Article by Jihad al-Khazin]

[Text] By calmly and objectively observing the peace negotiations in Washington one would see that it is better to stop the Israeli-sponsored negotiations with Israel.

These negotiations could only end with an Arab catastrophe. They are being held in an atmosphere of total U.S. and Israeli domination, and facing it is a total Arab weakness and division. The result, should there be any, will reflect the tremendous difference between the two negotiating parties, the U.S.-Israeli and the Arab.

The call for halting the negotiations does not mean withdrawing from them or breaking them completely. The United States and Israel are waiting for such a situation in order to accuse the Arab side of refusing peace. Rather, it means withholding the signing of any agreement, because it is going to be against the interests of the Arab nation. After all, the problem has been in existence nearly half a century without a solution being achieved. It is better for the Arabs to wait another half a century than solve the problem on the U.S. and Israeli terms.

American Jews constitute less than three percent of the population, yet they constitute a great majority among U.S. officials responsible for the negotiations. They constitute 100 percent of the delegation sent to the Middle East to follow up the capitulation rather than the peace process. Is it conceivable that less than three percent suddenly becomes 100 percent when the matter concerns Israel's interest? Tomorrow some American official will protest against such "anti-semitism." Or, he might say it is wrong to say 100 percent because the percentage of Jewish officials in the delegation is low—it is this or that. He will come to a low figure by adding the names of the secretaries and the drivers, for example. But the fact is that the decisionmakers in the delegation are pro-Israeli American Jews. Some of them have a background in the lobby; that is their experience is to put pressure on the U.S. Administration itself at the expense of U.S. interest.

There is nobody to defend the Arab interest. And why should anyone care to do so as long as its own people are not defending it and do not know what this interest is.

We have no wish here to discuss the mistake every one has made by entering the multilateral negotiations, or the mistake of the Palestinians by going back to the 10th round, when they had in the question of the deportees a legitimate excuse for suspending the negotiations at the ninth round. Rather, we are content with making a painful remark—that every Arab party looks after its own interest. If the choice is between remaining in power and or not forsaking their rights, the Arab would choose the first every time. For this reason the Americans exploit the Arab man's weakness. Thus the 10th round of negotiations has come to an end with the territories—which at the beginning were occupied and in fact were so considered in every resolution the Americans have approved since 1967—becoming in the recent American "ideas" disputed lands. As for Jerusalem, there is absolutely no mention of it, which gives the Israelis the right to say that, if the Arabs did not mention it during two years of negotiations, then they are implicitly accepting its "Israeli character."

However, the reader should not feel depressed, since the case is not yet lost, as I might have suggested to him. The Americans have sent a delegation to the area in order to find ways to give momentum to peace. The delegation is headed by Dennis Ross and includes Martin Indyk and the rest of the moderate American officials who have brought the negotiations to this advanced stage. Why then negotiate if the negotiations are in these trusted non-Israeli hands?

ALGERIA

U.S. Aggression Against Iraq Criticized

93AF0734A Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
28 Jun 93 p 1

[Editorial by Faycal B. Medjahed]

[Text] Feelings of insecurity and a sense of invincibility can both lead to arrogance against a real or imagined adversary. To some extent, Bill Clinton calls to mind Belaid Abdesselam with his use of television to sugarcoat his message to his fellow citizens and mask his totalitarianism with a tone that is populist—not to be confused with popular—and a “human face.” The savagery of the latest attack on Baghdad by the United States, striking like wolves at 0300, confirms that state-sponsored terrorism is alive and well. But, while the progressive movement for worldwide peace and justice seems at a low ebb, history proves that might is not always right. The lessons of a not-so-distant past, of oppressed classes and colonized peoples challenging the powerful, are there to show that sooner or later the oppressor will be unseated. The 23 Tomahawk missiles hit much more than the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence, their supposed target. As always, there were civilian casualties. But what of it? To the “free” West, they were only Arabs. The pretext for the attack, according to what is called the White House although red with blood, was the assassination attempt against George Bush, even though the presumed would-be assassins have officially been arrested. Instead of allowing the legal process to take its course, the United States preferred to attack a martyred Iraq. This is said not to defend the Iraqi regime or Saddam Husayn, but to point out the ignominy of the “double standard” applied by the former coalition partners. Israel, Iran, Sudan, and the Serbs can sleep undisturbed. Just how far will the jesters of “human rights” go? We will not know until the peoples of the Third World have rid themselves once and for all of the corrupt systems that govern them and that incite them to assassinate their best sons. That is also our way of recalling the “Boudiaf option” against any mafia parading as a government or religion.

Speculation on Cabinet Reshuffle Reported

93AF0758B Algiers EL WATAN in French
19 Jul 93 pp 1,2

[Article by Tayeb Belghiche: “Major Reshuffle in the Next Few Days”; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] Belaid Abdesselam remains at his post, and there will be a major government reshuffle. It could be announced in the next few days. This is what we learned yesterday from a reliable source.

According to a communique published yesterday, the HCE [Higher State Council] held a working meeting with the prime minister. Apparently, the purpose of the meeting was to clarify the role of both parties. Until now, citizens were under the impression that the Algerian government was two-headed.

Actually, at times the government advocated a policy that was in total contradiction with the HCE policy. So much so that high-level official sources mentioned the imminent departure of Mr. Belaid Abdesselam, pointing out that his behavior strongly irritated the country's leading officials. The prime minister's speech on 23 June, parts of which were viewed as provocations and led to the belief that he was in open rebellion against the HCE, strengthened the belief that his dismissal was imminent, all the more so as it aroused the anger of President Ali Kafi, who at the time was in Cairo.

Now, following changes in the army staff, things seem to have quieted down. Mr. Abdesselam is going to the south of the country.

We note that he has lost some of his arrogance, and even paid a thorough tribute to the HCE president.

Is everything back in order now that he has decided to water down his pretensions? According to our sources, he is about to announce a major reshuffle of his cabinet, to be marked in particular by the appointment of a minister of economy, a portfolio that he is currently holding. Many ministries will get new ministers.

The ministers of interior and communication will “most certainly” leave, according to our source. The Ministry of Interior could be entrusted to a military. The minister of education, Mr. Djebbar, would leave, too, but at his own request. Too many obscurantist forces prevent him from introducing the reforms required to modernize our school system.

As the transition period is nearing, it is urgent to settle the problem of cohesion among the political leadership, we were told.

This will require a strengthening of the decision center. There can be only one such center, and it is the HCE. In order to achieve the desired cohesion, there is some talk of creating the structure required to prevent more mistakes like those that have been observed until now.

The problem of communication must also be reviewed. Until now, some media in the public sector did not hesitate to convey the fundamentalist message, thus coming into conflict with the HCE program and creating unbelievable diversions.

Finally, a decision was also made to open the debate on economic and social issues so as not to allow an individual or a small group of individuals to have a monopoly in this respect. Hence the creation of a Ministry of Economy.

According to our source, the HCE is determined to carry out its program. It will strive to create the conditions required for the success of the national conference scheduled for September. However, it might cancel the conference if it meets with many obstacles, which would also lead to the cancellation of the planned referendum. This would not in the least entail the cancellation of the three-to-five-year transition period that is scheduled to start next year.

This period, it was pointed out, is a "vital necessity." It is out of the question to organize, for instance, a presidential election, as it would amount to committing suicide, considering the country's present situation. The next few days will shed more light on the objectives of the political leadership.

Impact of Economy, Information Code on Press

93AF0758A Paris LE MONDE in French
7 Aug 93 pp 1,6

[Article by Algiers correspondent Catherine Simon: "Threats on the Algerian Press"; first paragraph is LE MONDE introduction]

[Text] While journalists are the victims of terrorism, economic and political obstacles are multiplying.

Only three years ago, when the party-state was on the wane, the stereotyped language of a press dependent on the public sector or directly affiliated to the National Liberation Front (FLN) was the only one available at newspaper stands. That amounted to a good dozen publications, in French or in Arabic, which people would read without believing much of what they read. "I did buy a newspaper once in a while. But it was always the same: except for the date, nothing in it was true!" an Algerois sniggered. His joke is now obsolete.

The new information code adopted on 19 March 1990, on the initiative of Mouloud Hamrouche's reform government,¹ put an end to the state monopoly that had been rigorously enforced since 1965. The new code was the result of the storm of October 1988, that rattled the single-party regime and, in 1989, kindled the first strikes in the press. This code, which disgruntled people would equate to "a second penal code," nevertheless marked "a genuine revolution in the Algerian press history," Professor Brahim Brahimi, assistant professor at the Algiers University, noted in a study published in the fall of 1991 in REVUE ALGERIENNE DE COMMUNICATION.

However, the experience of the "leaden years," when the art of censorship was more important than the quest for information, left its mark on minds and pens. You can't get gagged for 30 years and come out unharmed. "To write an article and manage either to say nothing, or to say it 'between the lines' is a test in stylistic composition.

We had to have a lot of talent! And so had the readers! That was a good school... Those who could not 'decode' were completely lost!," a former journalist of the public sector commented with an ironic smile."

The censors' vigilance, then, knew no bounds. "Once, on a day when a central FLN committee was scheduled to meet, they censored the weather forecast so as not to announce 'gray weather' or 'cloudy sky,'" Aziouz Moktari, president of the recently formed Algerian Journalists Association (AJA), recalled. On another occasion, he said, it was the outcome of a soccer match that they chose to alter: "The club of Annaba—the home town of President Chadli Bendjedid and General Beloucif, who was holding a post at the time—had lost 0 to 1; but they announced 1 to 1 so as not to make trouble."

A former contributor to the French-language EL MOUDJAHID and the weekly REVOLUTION AFRICAINE, the AJA president is nevertheless one of the first to denounce the notion that the "pre-1990" press was entirely monochord.

"I experienced my best moments of freedom, as a journalist, at REVOLUTION AFRICAINE. No FLN trend managed to have the upper hand in the editorial offices. Thus, we had the benefit of a sort of *modus vivendi*," Aziouz Moktaris assured.²

Of the tens of men and women who left the rotting ship of the state press, not all agree with him. "If I compare 'before' and 'after,' it's like night and day," the editor of the daily EL KHABAR, Cherif Rezki, stated. "Otherwise, ECH CHAAB (one of the oldest Arab-language dailies, created by the FLN) would not have gone bankrupt while EL KHABAR succeeded!," he added triumphantly.

"Gone bankrupt" may be excessive. ECH CHAAB, with a circulation that just about reaches 24,000 copies, according to statistics for the month of May, available at the Ministry of Culture and Communication, may not deserve such a murderous judgment. Nevertheless, it shows a marked decline compared with the circulation of "private newspapers" like EL KHABAR (close to 52,000) or the recently suspended EL DJAZAIR EL YOUM (over 54,000).

The same is true of all the publications dating back to the "leaden years." The slow death of the state press—which has produced the battalions of journalists that have rallied the private press—has considerably benefited the new dinosaurs of the "independent" press.

"Within three or four years, our circulation dropped by two-thirds," the editor of EL MOUDJAHID, Mohamed Abderrahmani, acknowledged frankly. Compared with those who, only a few weeks ago, were his main rivals in the private sector, namely LIBERTE (154,000 copies) and LE MATIN (115,000), EL MOUDJAHID, with its 85,000 copies, does not look too good.

As for its editorial staff, it has suffered what amounts to a hemorrhage, losing "nearly three-fourths" of its members within a few months.

In spite of the recent upheavals, EL MOUDJAHID, the first issue of which was printed in Tunisia and published in 1956, during the first years of the liberation war, still remains one of the reference newspapers. Not because of any wealth of information in its articles, but because it reflects the official position, fully and rigorously. After being the organ of the FLN for over 30 years, EL MOUDJAHID, like all its "cousins" in the public sector, is now answerable to the Ministry of Culture and Communication.

The Ups and Downs of Distribution

The granddaddy of the Algerian press, however, which for a long time served as a school for journalists from "brother countries" on the African continent, did not just inherit a reputation. Its material resources preserve it from many dangers. In fact, contrary to its "brother enemies" in the private sector, EL MOUDJAHID is not just a newspaper, but also a press publisher—which publishes and prints. Some 30 publications in the private and public sectors, dailies and periodicals, are printed on its presses. Enough to make for a secure future.

For most Algerian newspapers, that is not the case. Those in the provinces are particularly disadvantaged by the limited number of printing houses.

There are four of them for the whole country: one in Oran, one in Constantine, and two in Algiers. But the number-one problem remains, by far, that of distribution. It is at the focus of the current polemic resulting from the fact that, since the end of July, LE MATIN, LIBERTE, and the weekly RUPTURES have vanished from newspaper stands.

These three private French-language publications, which often were hard on Belaid Abdesselam's government, were asked by the Algerian Printing Company (SIA), a state-owned company, to pay amounts that should have been paid by their distributor, the National Press Distribution Company (Enamep), it too a state-owned company. Enamep, which suffers from a chronic deficit, enjoyed a monopoly on distribution until 1990.

Although considerably weakened (it owes an estimated 110 million dinars, i.e., about 30 million francs, to publishers), Enamep still possesses one of the strongest and most extensive distribution networks. Was that a sufficient reason to choose it as a partner?

Many private newspapers, with more modest circulation figures, such as the French-language EL WATAN (81,000), chose to deal with private distributors, not as efficient technically but financially more reliable.

Will the problems experienced by LIBERTE, LE MATIN, and RUPTURES be temporary? The interested parties, who feel they are the victims of a "political settling of scores," claim that the government knowingly engineered a fake commercial conflict, the better to silence them. Putting forward their "excellent financial position," LE MATIN and LIBERTE inveigh against the

state press, whose small circulation figures, they say, do not warrant the generosity with which the government treats them.

They have a point. And we must hope that the courts' wisdom will lead to a quick settlement in order to dispel any doubts as to the government's determination to maintain pluralism of the press.

Benefits of the Welfare State

Meanwhile, the readership lost by the three suspended newspapers will certainly not be lost for everybody. Publications are likely to draw the lessons from this case and decide to set up their own distribution companies. The managers of EL WATAN and EL KHABAR are already considering such a move, as are those of the powerful weekly ECH CHOURROUK—a giant of the Algerian press with a circulation of some 350,000 copies. This prospect appeals to some people in high places. "Now is the moment of truth: until publishers get involved, there will be no efficient distribution organization," an official source explained, thus pointing in a sibylline manner to the failure of Enamep and the reprehensible casualness of some press barons.

For the private press, it has become a dangerous acrobatic feat to benefit quietly from the welfare state's generosity while writing column upon column on the law of supply and demand. That is because, paradoxically, the "independent" press could not have achieved such development without the—quite considerable—help graciously provided by the authorities.

Not without ulterior motives, the authorities have provided the independent press with the legal as well as the financial and logistic means to take off. For instance, in 1990, the journalists who wished to leave the public sector were offered two and a half years of salary. The pooling of these sums made possible the frantic emergence of a multitude of publications, some 20 of which have already vanished.

Other exceptional "favors" to the private press include placing premises at their disposal, helping with printing costs, special rates on paper purchases, etc.

Spearhead or guinea-pig for a fledgling private sector, the "independent" press—and with it the right to freedom of speech—is now paying the price for these ambiguities. The lack of a legal status for journalists or press publishers, the lack of a law on advertising, the lack of an organization similar to the OJD [Circulation Control Office] (to publish circulation figures) weigh heavy on its future. The moment of truth is also likely to see the victory of the strongest. Mergers are possible. They are even wished for: "We find ourselves with some 20 dailies, with a market that is just big enough for six!," official sources deplored.

Vulnerable, but flourishing, the new landscape of the written press now represents an example unique in the Arab world, through its freedom of expression and the variety of its publications (about 80, all trends together).

Subject to the hazards of political struggles, this fragile mirror of Algerian society also reflects its divisions.

Until now, the only victims of the muted struggle that opposes the proponents of the public press and the adventurers of the private press have been publications.

But other wars, spelling real deaths, loom on the horizon. The assassination of writer Tahar Djaout, co-founder and editorial writer at RUPTURES, at the end of May, and that of Rabah Zenati, a public television reporter, on Tuesday, 3 August, now awfully echo each other.

Footnotes

1. The information code was completed by law 90-07, passed by Parliament on 3 April 1990. This law allows "associations of a political nature" and "natural persons or legal entities organized under Algerian law" to create newspapers.

2. It was in the Algerian Journalists Movement (MJA), which no longer exists, that dissidents started to question the establishment, already in late 1987. This protest wave, that developed rapidly following the events of October 1988, was at the origin of the first journalists strikes, early in 1989. Some MJA leaders helped draft the information code and were accused of "playing into the government's hands."

Arms Trafficking; Morocco Said Transit Point

93AF0734B Algiers EL WATAN in French
27 Jun 93 p 2

[Article by Bachir Lamri: "Terrorism: The Israeli Channel"]

[Text] Over the last three years, Algeria has seen a sharp rise in illegal arms sales. Arms trafficking networks have been set up, with a growing number of channels, including an Israeli channel, bringing in weapons highly sought after by terrorists and gangsters the world over. Their appearance in Algeria has caused serious concern.

To date, 17 weapons (nine Scorpio and eight Uzi submachine guns) have been seized, according to sources in the National Gendarmerie. The Uzis were used by terrorists in the attack on the Bougezhoul barracks and in the shoot-out in the La Faience district of El-Harrach.

The 9-mm Uzi compact submachine gun is manufactured exclusively by the Israelis at their Israel Military Industries (IMI). The 7.5-mm Scorpio submachine gun was originally designed in Czechoslovakia in 1961. It has been manufactured under licensing by Zastava Arms in Belgrade since 1984.

Who introduced these weapons into Algeria and which route did they take? There are two possible answers: either the manufacturer (Israel) or the sponsors of international terrorism (Iran).

To take the first hypothesis, Israel has a history of fostering fundamentalism in the Middle East in the firm belief that

fundamentalism can be an effective instrument of destabilization and decline. The fundamentalists, oddly enough, have placed greater priority on liberating Afghanistan from a pro-Soviet regime than on liberating Jerusalem. Kabul is considered "holier" than Al Qods.

In fact, thousands of Arabs have died fighting with the Afghan rebels, but not one fundamentalist, much less an Algerian fundamentalist, has put his life on the line to free the true holy land, Jerusalem.

There were rumors, it will be recalled, of a military coup at the end of Ramadan. The propaganda mill run by the banned FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] quickly circulated the rumor throughout Algeria. In reality, it was Israeli radio that broadcast the first report of a coup, later echoed by the Franco-Moroccan station "Medi I" and by "France-Info." The hand of Israel is always present in one way or another. As for the Iranian connection, Rabah Kebir was carrying an Iranian passport when he was recently arrested in Germany. In the month of Ramadan, he and Oussama Abassi and other FIS activists took part in a meeting held in a barracks in Tehran, reputedly the meeting place for international terrorist leaders.

Plans to step up terrorist action in Arab countries, particularly in Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt, were discussed at the meeting. Naturally, Iran was to provide the financing and the logistic means to carry out this "jihad." It will also be recalled that the Iranians made available the modest sum of 3 million dollars. It was after the "gift" was made that Israeli arms began to appear in Algeria. It is also known, as was revealed during the Irangate scandal, that the Iranians acquired thousands of Uzis during their war with Iraq.

Another fact: In international arms sales, a purchaser of weapons is forbidden by the manufacturer from reselling the weapons without the manufacturer's prior consent. This means that the Iranians had Tel Aviv's consent in providing the Uzis to Algerian terrorists. Where did these weapons enter the country? The security services see three possibilities: the Algerian-Moroccan border, the Algerian-Libyan border, or through a western port. In all three cases, the weapons could have been smuggled in without the knowledge of the neighboring country's authorities.

But there are certain facts that raise suspicion and require closer attention. Morocco has become not only the transit point for Algerian fighters in Afghanistan but also the hub for arms and drug trafficking.

In order to prevent the spread of fundamentalism in their own country, the Moroccan authorities decided to work with the fundamentalist leaders in Iran. In 1991, Moroccan intelligence signed an agreement with its Iranian counterpart making Morocco a transit hub for fundamentalists from African countries.

In exchange, Tehran agreed not to support terrorism in Morocco. Since the agreement was made, several Algerian fighters in Afghanistan have managed to return to Algeria clandestinely across the Moroccan border, which has become so porous in recent years that trafficking of all kinds is possible. Were the Uzis and Scorpions brought into Algeria across the Moroccan border? While the security services continue their investigation into the network, will Maghnia continue to be supplied with these powerful weapons of urban guerrilla warfare?

FIS Newspaper Banned in France

93AF0734C Algiers *LIBERTE* in French 28 Jun 93 p 4

[Text] Less than a month after it banned the Islamist newspaper *LE CRITERE*, the French Government has banned its successor *RESISTANCE*, confirming an intention to put an end to Islamist activity on French soil.

In an order published in the "Official Journal" on Sunday, the French Interior Ministry banned *RESISTANCE*, a newspaper affiliated with the now-dissolved FIS [Islamic Salvation Front]. The reason cited in the order is the danger posed by the newspaper "to public order, by its virulently anti-Western and anti-French tone."

In addition, the order states that there was "an urgent need to ban the publication that, in both content and format, was an intentional reproduction of a previously banned publication."

RESISTANCE was found to be identical in all but name to the journal *LE CRITERE*.

The similarity between the content and format of the publications was evident in the section entitled "News of the Jihad" devoted to terrorist operations in Algeria. The French authorities had to wait until a link between the two publications was established before they could apply the press code, which states that "a publication cannot be revived, even under a different name."

The recent visit by Algeria's head of foreign affairs, Mr. Redha Malek, had some bearing on the decision. It is thought that during his visit, he asked the French Government to take action. The decision by the Interior Ministry confirms the French Government's intention to adopt a new approach in dealing with Islam on French soil. It also offers concrete proof of the French government's willingness to help Algeria in its fight against terrorism. Following the French president's decision early this year to reconsider his position on the suspension of elections in Algeria, relations between the two countries improved markedly. The rapprochement between them has been confirmed since the right wing came to power in France, granting loans to Algeria and providing assistance to the fight against terrorism.

EGYPT

Columnist: U.S. Somali Policy 'Tarnishes' UN

93LD0020C Cairo *AL-AHRAM WEEKLY* in English
17-23 Jun 93 p 7

[Article by Salamah A. Salamah]

[Text] The air strikes carried out by American bombers on behalf of the United Nations in Somalia, in which a radio station and a number of arms warehouses belonging to General Mohamed Farah Aidid were destroyed, raise several questions about the role the United Nations is supposed to play in returning Somalia to normality. Is it a political role or a military role? And why didn't the United Nations try political means before resorting to punitive retaliatory measures which have caused casualties among Somali civilians and kindled feelings of hostility between the Somali people and the United Nations?

The main reason for the UN's downfall in Somalia would seem to be the way in which two things have been muddled together: the world leadership role the United States wants to assert and hold on to, and the delicate task which the United Nations has to perform in pacifying the situation in Somalia and ending the civil war among its various factional leaders and tribes which has caused tens of thousands of its people to die of starvation.

The United Nations almost total reliance on US military power for its peace-keeping operations has clearly made it a hostage to specifically American interests and motivations, and even more clearly evident in Bosnia. In Somalia the United States decided to broaden the role of UN forces to include acts of vengeance, using the same method of short, sharp air strikes as it used against Iraq, to punish the Somali militias led by General Aidid following their attack on the Pakistani UN contingent and the killing of 23 of its soldiers.

Because the task seemed easy, self-contained and assured of success against barefoot Somali militias armed only with ancient rifles, the American bombardment has been interpreted as an attempt to restore President Bill Clinton's credibility and strengthen his personal prestige in the midst of what has been looking like a crisis of American leadership, and a tendency for the United States to abandon its role as world leader, in view of the hesitant, weak stance it has adopted ever since the conflict in Bosnia.

This interpretation becomes all the more convincing when we bear in mind that it was America that first decided to intervene in Somalia, when it embarked on what George Bush called at the time "Operation Restore Hope" by sending in more than 38,000 US troops. But the Americans gradually withdrew their troops without achieving the basic mission which the intervention was intended to accomplish, that of disarming the warring Somali militias, leaving the United Nations to keep the peace in Somalia. The American forces were supposed to finish disarming the militias so that the work of finding

a political settlement and restoring normality could begin under UN supervision. But the rapid pull-out of the American troops, under Clinton, made it seem that Operation Restore Hope had been more muscle-flexing on the part of the Americans, subsequently leading to "Operation Lose Hope" of rectifying the situation in Somalia.

What is certain is that the American bombing of Mogadishu brings back memories of Washington's unwarranted eagerness for intensive bombing raids against Iraq because of an incident on the border with Kuwait. It has also set the United Nations and the Somali people at odds, which may well render their task more difficult. This does not mean to say that General Aidid and his massacre of the Pakistani troops should necessarily have been allowed to go unpunished, but confusing American interests with the demands of the international situation will only create unnecessary complications. The UN's image will certainly be tarnished as a result, its reputation damaged, and its role in peace-keeping operations undermined in many of the world's troublespots—as events in Bosnia testify.

Egyptians Seek Compensation From Iraq

93AF0723A Cairo AL-AHRAM WEEKLY in English
24-30 Jun 93 p 6

[Article by Ghadah Rajab; square brackets as published]

[Text] Sa'd 'Abd-al-Bari has already found the piece of land which he intends to buy with the \$5,000 he argues is owed to him as compensation by Iraq after he was forced to flee Kuwait with his family following the 1990 invasion. From newspapers, 'Abd-al-Bari learned that according to the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), he falls into Category A which includes those who fled Kuwait and Iraq between 2 August 1990 and 2 March 1991.

While 'Abd-al-Bari, a driver at a textile factory, dreams of building a house and repaying the debts he accumulated when he was unemployed, his employer, whose company is owed money for its share in a barter deal with Iraq, is less optimistic. "We [the companies] were told, by both the UNCC and the government, that we should seek good legal advice, that the burden of proof would be on us and that our compensation depends not on any concrete criteria but on how we state our case," the businessman said, preferring to remain anonymous.

His pessimism is not unfounded. Three years after the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, this businessman and his fellow claimants in all six UNCC categories are still waiting for their compensation. The future does not look very promising either. The fund itself will not have a reliable source of financing until Iraq begins exporting oil again, a prospect which seems caught in an international political stalemate. Even if funds start coming in, the UNCC has decided to give priority to Category A, compensation for those who were forced to flee. Category B, compensation for injuries and death and Category C, compensation for loss of property not exceeding

\$100,000. So, ironically, 'Abd-al-Bari's prospects seem much brighter than those of his employer.

Should the money continue to accrue from Iraqi oil exports, the UN would then start to compensate claimants in Category D, for loss of property valued over \$100,000, and the Category E which concerns those companies which took part in countertrade deals and incurred commercial losses. Even then, proving their legal rights to compensation seems an uphill battle for many Egyptian companies. Their plight is often the result of interrupted barter deals between Egypt and Iraq, in which Egyptian exporters delivered their share only months before the invasion and waited in vain for the Iraqi side to deliver in order to collect their payment from the public sector company executing the deal. The Iraqis never delivered and the exporting companies were never paid.

Egypt, if only by sheer force of numbers, is considered the country worst hit by the Gulf war. So far, Egyptians have filed claims worth about \$1.2 billion in Category A and about \$493 million in Category C.

Representatives of private and public sector companies, including hotels and tourist companies seeking compensation for business lost due to the war, met with UNCC delegates last week. After the meeting, the businessmen said they felt their rights now depend totally on "whether their lawyers are smart enough," as one of them put it. But the UNCC delegation explained that it will not pay compensation for "pre-war debts" or "damages due to the embargo imposed on Iraq." Company owners will have to prove that their claims are a "direct result of the invasion."

Businessmen described the language of the UNCC as "confusing and illogical" and argued that almost all claims, if the wording is twisted, can be proven a pre-war debt or a result of the trade embargo against Iraq. "It seems that the U.S. and its Western allies tailored the fund for their own benefit," said one angry businessman who is owed about \$4 billion. "I'm sure their lawyers will be able to read the fine print and get around the legal jargon."

The UNCC told the company representatives that to support their claims, they would have to satisfy the board of commissioners that their losses were a direct result of the invasion. These companies will have to review and complete their applications and present a statement documenting their legal argument. The companies have until 31 July to submit their applications and until 30 September to submit their statement of claim. This, they were told, would be their last and only chance to ask for their money. The commission, however, will not start to review the applications before June 1994.

Faced with the possibility of a long wait, some businessmen vented their frustration on the Egyptian government itself, arguing that because the countertrade deals were government-guaranteed, the government should either secure their compensation from the UN

fund or pay them itself for the price of their goods. "The government gave Bank Misr one billion pounds to take over the Bank of Credit and Commerce Egypt and pay off its depositors," said Ahmad 'Arafah, chairman of the investor's division at the Federation of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. "It should also help out these industries which have been waiting for payment for their exports for three years. The government should realise that supporting industry is the only hope for the economy after the decline of tourism," he added.

But the Egyptian government is itself a victim of the war and together with a number of governmental agencies has filed for compensation under Category F. Its claims include compensation for indirect damage to the economy in general as well as direct damage to its interests in Kuwait. After the Gulf war, the Egyptian government said that almost half of some 200,000 workers in Kuwait and about 800,000 in Iraq had fled the Gulf region. But the impact of the war went beyond just a massive return of labour. In an official report released after the crisis, the government estimated that there was a \$4.5 billion deficit in foreign currency earnings in 1990-91, an increase in the fiscal burden by about LE647 million and that it would need some \$4.5 billion to create jobs for the returnees.

However, even the claims of the Egyptian government will have to wait until Iraqi oil exports begin flowing again. After the Geneva-based UNCC was established as part of the ceasefire conditions in 1991, it was decided that Iraq would have to pay 30 percent of its oil sales toward the fund until all compensations were paid. Iraq first refused to export oil under these conditions and then later requested a five-year grace period before the commission starts to receive funding from its oil exports.

Analysts say that oil exports represent the guaranteed and continuous source of funding for the commission. Although Security Council Resolution 778 permitted the fund to make use of Iraqi assets frozen by various governments at the outbreak of the crisis, most countries are saving these assets in case they are forced to use them to compensate their citizens and companies.

Iraq, on the other hand, continues to express annoyance. Earlier this year it complained to the Security Council arguing that instead of filing claims through the UNCC, many individuals and companies are resorting to their national courts. In a letter to the Security Council, the Iraqi Foreign Minister said that if its assets are used to pay compensation, Iraq would actually be paying much more than just 30 percent of its oil revenues. This, Iraq said, would jeopardise its ability to provide the basic necessities for its own people.

Before the invasion, Iraq produced about 3.2 million barrels per day (bpd). Now it produces only about 450,000 bpd for domestic consumption and for export to Jordan. Analysts say that the resumption of Iraqi oil exports—the only hope for the thousands who are awaiting compensation—depends mainly on US willingness to support such a decision and on OPEC allowing

Iraq to resume its oil exports given that this could create a possible slump in oil prices.

Scholar Discusses Motives Behind Bombings

93LD0020A Cairo AL-AHRAM WEEKLY in English
8-14 Jul 93 p 9

[Article by Nabil 'Abd-al-Fattah]

[Text] It has been suggested that the latest wave of terrorist bombings could be the work of a new Islamist group, or possibly an old one, that believes in denouncing society and state as un-Islamic.

The rationale behind this theory is that in the 1970s al-Takfir waal-Hijrah carried out a number of indiscriminate attacks at a theatre in Cairo, and that this style of operation is in line with its belief system, which holds it lawful to kill token individuals on the doctrinal grounds that, according to Islamic law, Egyptian society as a pagan society, and people's beliefs and behaviour are all paganistic too. Hence both society and the state are tantamount to infidels or unbelievers, and beyond the pale of the community of Muslims. Their unbelief is "manifest," so it is lawful to take their lives, honour and property, among other consequences.

However, there are several indications that al-Takfir waal-Hijrah has died out or dissolved itself, and its members have joined Al-Jihad in prison, following their bloody confrontation with the state over the killing of Shaykh Muhammad Hasan al-Dahabi, the former Minister of Awqaf (Religious Endowments) and the execution of Shukri Mustafa and a number of the group's leaders in the 1970s.

There are also indications, however, that some elements of al-Takfir waal-Hijrah (and the splinter group al-Muslimun) have re-emerged, whether under the same name or new ones, or that some of them may have merged with Al-Tawaqquf wal-Tabayyun. It may be that the incorporation of members of al-Takfir waal-Hijrah (i.e., the Muslimun group) into the Jihad organisation, and hence al-Jama'at al-Islamiyah, took place in such a way as to leave it intact, and some of its members have retained their ideological outlook even within Al-Jihad. Or else there has been a rebirth of Takfir waal-Hijrah thinking, and it has returned to violence once again, with the aim of putting itself firmly on the radical Islamist map as a powerful and effective force, on the grounds that the weight of any Islamist group has come to depend on its ability to carry out violent action, and the scale and political impact of that action.

This perhaps also raises a possibility that Safwat 'Abd-al-Ghani, one of al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah's leaders, has frequently mentioned, which is that Al-Shawqiyoun (a breakaway group of the Jama'ah) has been carrying out these acts of random violence in order to establish for itself a position of parity with the Jama'ah.

All these possibilities are the subject of speculation, and help to reinforce the air of mystery surrounding these incidents.

A third possible scenario is that foreign hands are secretly at work in town. This type of scenario is a familiar one in Egyptian and Arab political thinking and analysis, based on the idea of an external conspiracy. Egyptian political groups and parties have become pretty much content to think that there is a perpetual foreign plot against Egypt; any internal unrest is therefore generally attributed to the secret workings of foreigners who stir up trouble and hatch plots from outside and inside Egypt.

The conspiracy theory is a comfortable one, and it is always easy to find arguments to support it, so it tends to serve as an all-purpose theory, covering all occasions and providing easy answers for everything. It has nevertheless been discussed a great deal among intellectuals and writers following the latest acts of random violence, so we ought to discuss the elements of this scenario.

One suggestion is that Israel is behind the latest bombings, the argument for which goes as follows: First of all, the Islamist movement could not have been behind them, since the killing of innocent citizens in this way would create public outrage against it, which would not be in its interests. Secondly, there are foreign parties with an interest in stirring up sources of socio-political instability in Egypt, so that it remains paralysed and unable to play any active role in the region, with regard to finding a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict or anything else. And thirdly, Israel and its intelligence agency Mossad carry out this kind of operation, and have carried out similar bombings in important places in the past, it was alleged in the Lavon affair.

Israel's aim would be to paralyse Egypt's security forces and political institutions so that they would step up their repressive measures against the radical Islamist opposition and the Muslim Brothers, both of which it sees as being vehemently opposed to moves towards a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict out of ultra-religious ideological considerations.

Israel, the argument goes, seeks to obstruct Egypt from playing a prominent regional role in the Middle East order currently taking shape on the ruins of the so-called Arab order. It would like Egypt to have its hands tied at home, so that Israel can shape the Middle East order to its own political advantage.

An increase in the level of violence might also force Egypt to agree to cooperate with Israel in the area of combating "religious terrorism," political Islam, and radical Islamist groups. The United States has been calling on Egypt to coordinate policy with Israel on combating the wave of hardline Islamism in the region, but Egypt tends to reject this type of political demand, and according to sources in opposition newspapers has already done so.

Some people think the Israel scenario overlooks the core problematics of religious-related political violence in Egypt, which are that the system producing the violence is wholly Egyptian in character, and the religious violence has specific political objectives, while other forms

of random violence are the product of structural flaws in the social and political orders; and the way to solve the problem of the violence is to try to trace its domestic sources and the mechanisms providing it with fresh motivation. It would not be in Israel's interests to sponsor acts of violence of this kind, because that would affect its standing in the region and internationally.

Others, meanwhile, reject this argument, accusing it of representing a Western, US-slanted and hence pro-Israeli viewpoint. Ruling out Israel as a suspect, they say, shows a lack of real understanding of radical Islamist groups, as well as of the nature of the new dangers facing Egypt, citing in evidence the acts of espionage by Israel that have been uncovered.

An alternative theory is that American intelligence is responsible for the bombings. According to this scenario, the CIA might have penetrated the Islamist groups and be using agents within them to disrupt the situation in Egypt, in order to reshape the political system and redraw the political map to suit its own political interests.

Those in favour of this theory offer the following circumstantial evidence: First, the United States wants political changes in Egypt which the Egyptian regime is refusing to accept, for several reasons including considerations of sovereignty and Egypt's position of leadership in the region. The United States is also said to want to escalate the conflict with radical Islamist fundamentalism, so as to force the Egyptian administration to make changes in the direction of greater political and economic privatisation, and greater political openness to moderate Islamist forces.

Second, American intelligence sees political Islam and radical fundamentalism as the new enemy of the United States and the West generally, and part of its new job is combating this fundamentalism from within existing regimes in these countries, starting with Egypt.

Third, the United States has established a dialogue with al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah, which is now out in the open, and continues to harbour Sheikh 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman, the spiritual guide of the Jama'ah, in order to plant its own operatives around him and so infiltrate the radical Islamist movement, since he acts as a magnet for extremist Islamist cadres both in the United States and elsewhere. It is also exploiting 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman's presence in New Jersey, where it can keep an eye on him, as a means of leverage in its relations with Egypt, and the recent wave of violence introduces elements that could help the United States secure its political interests and demands both in Egypt and, through Egypt, elsewhere in the region.

There is also another theory being put forward by some people almost by way of a bad joke, pointing in caricature fashion to certain internal forces, headed by certain circles within the regime, with the aim of heightening the confrontation between the regime and the entire Islamist movement, radicals and Muslim Brothers alike. They note that the security forces have arrested Brotherhood

cadres in a number of governorates, as a message to the Brothers that they are being watched everywhere.

This caricature of a scenario depicts the regime as gaining advantage from these random bombings because they have the effect of drawing various social groups into opposition to terrorism, thus enabling the government to recover some legitimacy in the eyes of the masses in its campaign against the violence and the Islamist movements, which would represent a new development in the struggle. It may also be able to exploit the furore arising from the violence and its media, political and security measures to combat it, as a smokescreen behind which to push through the sale of the public sector without the Egyptian public noticing.

Taking all elements of the picture together, it becomes clear that certain instances of random violence can be excluded from the areas of ambiguity, because they follow the style of Islamist violence practised by radical Islamist groups. In the Nasr City incident, for example, the aim was to ambush policemen, which meets one of the political objectives of the religious-related violence; likewise the incident in which a police sergeant was killed and another wounded, together with an officer, in Assiut.

Mystery still surrounds incidents like the Wadi Al-Nil cafe bombing, though—was it an accident, a transition point for Jama'ah members on the way somewhere, when the device suddenly blew up the person carrying it? Or was it part of the same mystery attached to all the other incidents (Pyramids Road, al-Qullali, al-Khazandar in Shubra, Zakariyah Ahmad Street near Rose Al-Yusuf, Sheraton Heliopolis, etc.)?

Another possibility is the involvement of several parties in the various bombings. There could be, for example, an Iranian intelligence element—or Iraqi, as some have suggested lately—on the grounds that Iran wants to create disruptions to security and political unrest in Egypt, seeing it as the weak link in the chain of the Damascus Declaration project, so as to undermine any chance of it playing an active role in maintaining Gulf security, by damaging Egypt's image and making it appear unable to control its own internal security situation. Iran is also said to have been able, in alliance with Sudan and other radical Islamist forces, to penetrate al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah and use some of its members for its own ends, or else recruit players on the Egyptian political scene to act on behalf of Iranian intelligence interests.

A more likely version of this idea that is being put about by some people is that of Sudan playing some role in the bombings, especially as there are indications of Sudanese cooperation and support for the radical Islamist movement, together with the possibility of elements of the National Islamic Front (NIF) in Sudan being dispersed among the over four million-strong Sudanese community living in Egypt.

Whatever the truth of these various hypothesis, we are clearly seeing a qualitative shift in the pattern of political

violence, and we should not rule out certain elements of the scenarios involving foreign players, even though they belong more in the class of the traditional conspiracy theories so beloved of political thought and analysis in Egypt, and even though we always hate such simplistic analyses.

However, the absence to date in the literature of al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah or Al-Jihad of fatwas (authoritative rulings on matters of Islamic law) permitting and justifying such acts should make us wary of automatically linking these bloody acts of indiscriminate violence with al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah as the media are doing, despite the important role of the fatwa in politico-religious violence and for the groups who practise it.

On the other hand, Egyptian society has grown so complex that it is fair to say that violence has become a part of everyday life, as a result of the build-up of longstanding political, economic and social crises. Egyptians have grown accustomed to living with violence without it necessarily leading to the breakdown of the state's political structures and institutions. Meanwhile, the Egyptian personality has suffered something of a shift away from its old, peace-loving nature, and there have been changes in the psychological and ethical make-up of the national character type.

The reference by Safwat 'Abd-al-Ghani, the military leader of al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah, arrested in connection with the assassinations of Rif'at al-Mahjub and Faraj Fudah, to the need for dialogue between the state and the Islamist groups, and his assertion that this would not mean any diminution in the sovereignty or prestige of the state, could perhaps suggest a key to understanding this puzzling and mysterious picture.

Is this an attempt to take advantage, in the short term, of these acts of random violence so as to put pressure on the government, in the hope of eventually finding a way of calming the situation between the state and security authorities on the one hand and the Jama'ah on the other? Or is it a bid to create pressure on the state, by means of this series of acts of random violence in quick succession, to resume dialogue with the Jama'ah and Jihad? Or are there indeed foreign hands at work, secretly setting off bombs and explosives around town and spreading rumours and panic in daily life?

The ambiguity of the situation is breeding other rumours too, suggesting, for example, that this random violence has been carried out by agents inside the country, but outside the framework of the radical Islamic movement. Then there are mysterious rumours that point to Coptic citizens and priests. All of these rumours are bred by a lack of information, and by the unknown—the missing factor that seems to be the master of this series of indiscriminate attacks.

Commander Discusses Air Defense Network

93LD0020D Cairo AL-AHRAM WEEKLY in English
8-14 Jul 93 p 2

[Interview with Maj. Gen. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman Abu-Talib by Jalal Nassar; place and date not given]

[Text] As the Air Defence Forces celebrated their 25th anniversary, their commander, Maj. Gen. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman Abu-Talib, disclosed that the whole of Egyptian airspace will soon be covered by a protective modern air defence network, based primarily on early warning as well as command and control systems. Speaking to AL-AHRAM WEEKLY, Abu-Talib said that two phases of the five-phase system have already been implemented.

Abu-Talib said the network includes:

- an electronic air reconnaissance system.
- a large number of ground radar stations of various types and frequencies.
- airborne radar (also known as early warning planes).
- air observation points that rely on human eyesight and are effective against low-flying aircraft.
- jetfighters and anti-aircraft missiles, guns and machine guns.
- an extensive network of command posts that are linked together and also linked with subordinate units by a multi-channel network of wire and wireless communication.

"All these systems, by working together in concert, make up an effective air defence network," Abu-Talib said.

The conditions of modern warfare, in which a huge amount of information must be processed in a very short time has underlined the need to modernise the air defence network, Abu-Talib said. "It became necessary, therefore, for the Air Defence Forces to advance from a manually-operated command and control system to an electronic system that employs a network of computers," Abu-Talib said.

The computerised system makes it possible to flash the latest information about the situation in the sky at the very same time that intruding aircraft penetrate the national airspace, he said.

Another computerised system for combat control assists the commander in assessing the situation minute by minute and suggests several options so that the commander may take the decision he considers appropriate, Abu-Talib said. The outcome can be displayed and analysed in a very brief period.

The importance and effectiveness of this command and control system has been proven in combat situations by providing accurate information speedily to the various military corps, Abu-Talib said. Citing the Gulf war as an example, he said that electro-magnetic and light sensors were used to track targets and flash information to the

various local commanders. Information about enemy forces and their activities, as well as friendly forces, was constantly updated and an assessment was made of friendly losses, he said.

Asked about the challenges facing the Air Defence Forces, Abu-Talib said Egypt, which has a pivotal role in the region, is surrounded by rapid regional and international changes. Weapons are being developed and upgraded constantly in view of the great scientific and technological advances taking place. To cope with these challenges, Egypt is focusing on:

- the individual soldier who will always remain in control of combat operations and will always harness machinery for his own service.
- maintaining the condition of weapons already in the national arsenal while acquiring new and advanced weapons and equipment from a variety of sources.
- improving the working conditions of the commanders by providing them with a modern command and control system.

Reviewing the history of the Air Defence Forces, Abu-Talib said the first anti-aircraft battery unit, equipped with 3-inch guns, was established in 1938. Until the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, anti-aircraft artillery units were part of the field artillery corps. But the defeat underlined the need for a separate air defence corps which was established in 1968. The Air Defence Forces proved their effectiveness shortly afterwards by building up the so-called "missile wall" for the protection of the Suez Canal cities in June 1970. They also played a key role in the victory of 1973, he said.

In addition to Soviet-made SAM missiles, the Air Defence Forces are also equipped now with Western-made Hawk, Hawkeye and Crotales missiles, the European Skyguard system which has been renamed Amoun after Egyptian amendments were introduced to it, 23mm anti-aircraft guns, TPS 63 radars, and E2C early warning planes.

South's Tradition of Militancy Reviewed

93LD0020B Cairo AL-AHRAM WEEKLY in English
8-14 Jul 93 p 3

[Article by Diya' Rashwan and 'Imad Jad; editor Mirfat Diyab]

[Text] The unique social structure of Upper Egypt or al-Sa'id, though it has helped promote the growth of Islamist groups, has ironically remained largely unaffected by their influence. In fact, much of the violence attributed to Islamist agitation can be traced to the workings of Saiidi society.

Two types of social ties are prevalent in Upper Egypt: the extended family, or bayt (household), consisting of small family units going back three or four generations, and the 'a'ilah (family), which can include many bayts and stretches back up to ten generations. The 'a'ilah is the backbone of Saiidi society, with many villages having

only two such units of up to several thousand members each, and each of which vies with the other for prestige and political privileges. Being of pure Arab stock is one of the main features of the most influential 'a'ilahs, a trait reflected in the strict rules governing inter-marriage.

In my own case, the first attempts made by Islamists to revive the moribund activities of the Muslim Brotherhood can be easily traced. It was in 1978, only a few months after the late President al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem that the first Islamist made his appearance in our city in the governorate of Qena.

He was a student at the university whose father was a local trader. Basing himself in our city he easily spread his contacts among young people of the other main bayts there and among the minor members of 'a'ilahs in villages bordering the mountains.

By the time of President al-Sadat's assassination three years later, there were three persons from that city among the three hundred accused of the conspiracy in the assassination.

Ten years later, by which time the Islamists had extended their activities throughout, al-Sa'id, our tiny centre had eighty represented among those on trial by the government.

However, though an understanding of Saiidi society shaped the activities of the Islamists, rivalry between the 'a'ilahs has meant they were accepted in some villages while being rejected by others. The fears of losing political privileges has kept many families from getting involved with Islamists, while others, given their tight structure, have joined the movement en masse. Ancient rivalries have thus been accentuated.

The concept of vendetta is deeply ingrained in al-Sa'id. It simply states that if someone is killed from a given family, his relatives are obliged to kill someone of similar standing from the rival family or at the very least a relative. Vendetta is an age-old custom and, though violent, is not considered a challenge to government authority.

It is in this context that many assassination attempts against police and security personnel should be seen. Thus, when the interior ministry pursued a policy of collective punishment to be carried out by police in al-Sa'id, many police officers were killed in retribution and in accordance with custom and not according to some longer-term political purpose.

It is worth mentioning that Islamists familiar with the Saiidi concept of vendetta always avoided sparking off the anger of influential families by using physical force to coerce people to join the movement. Peaceful persuasion was seen as the only way of moving people, particularly when Islamists came to realise that some 'a'ilahs were quite prepared to turn in members to the police when sufficient pressure was exerted.

The fact of the matter is that Saiidi society has proved resilient to the intrusion and appeal of Islamist groups or

jama'at. Within Islamist families the same sort of blood ties have been adopted and inter-marriage is still as tightly controlled except in the very rare case of a totally Islamist bayt which has abandoned all the old ways.

Thus, though it seems that government authority is being challenged, the authority of leading families which control governmental bodies is not. The concept of the family has not been replaced by that of the cell of jama'at, and the traditional leadership of the 'a'ilahs remains unchallenged and unchanged.

Sectarian strife is a new phenomenon in Upper Egypt, one that is clearly associated with the rise of Islamist militancy in the country's poorest and most economically depressed region. In fact, it was the self-same traditional ties of family and clan that in the past mediated relations between the Muslim majority and Upper Egypt's sizeable Coptic minority, and contained inter-religious disputes by resorting to such methods as the informal councils of family and clan elders, whose decisions would be strictly respected by all.

As a minority, the Copts of Upper Egypt represent a higher percentage of the population than anywhere else in the country. They are a large minority in the governorates and cities of al-Minya, Asyut, Sawhaj and Luxor. There are villages where the Copts form the majority of the population, and indeed, some which are totally Coptic, lying adjacent to predominantly Muslim villages.

It was only in the '70s that the hitherto stable structure of Muslim-Coptic ties in Upper Egypt began to show the signs of what were to become deeper rifts. The late President Anwar al-Sadat, in his attempt to confront what he deemed a leftist threat—then coming mainly from the left-wing student movement throughout the country—pursued a strategy of encouraging the formation and activities of Islamist groups. The main testing ground for the new strategy was Assiut University, in which the then governor of Asyut, Mohammad Osman, played a key role in fostering Islamist militancy.

By the end of the decade, the Islamist groups in Asyut had become a dominant force in the university and a considerable power in the whole city. Their attacks, initially directed against leftists, were expanded to include students engaged in such cultural activities as theatre, singing or dance; any co-educational activities; and Coptic students, both on campus and in the university residence. A new generation was coming to adulthood in Upper Egypt which was fast losing the ties of cordiality that linked their parents and grandparents, irrespective of religion. Coptic students gradually began to stay away from the university residence and find housing elsewhere, particularly in special housing provided for them by a number of churches and Coptic societies.

It was perhaps inevitable that the climate of religious intolerance which had taken root in the university should spread outward, particularly as waves of new graduates embarked on their various occupations full of hatred for the 'other'.

Meanwhile, local state bodies appeared reluctant to become involved in the intensifying sectarian strife, sometimes triggering the fear, among members of the Coptic minority, of complicity between some of these bodies and the militants. In any case, the rise in the power and influence of fundamentalism and Islamist militancy was rapidly eroding state control in many walks of life, particularly the school system and other public institutions.

For their part Copts began to draw closer to the Church, the only organisation which seemed to offer them solace and protection in the face of rising hostility, thus in their turn intensifying the sectarian polarisation of the community. The Church not only provided, through its religious teachings, a certain solace for persecution, but acted to rehabilitate victims of attacks and as a major link between the Copts and the local and national state bodies.

Thus, a process which began purely in political terms began to threaten to separate Upper Egyptians into two closed and mutually exclusive communities, interacting only to the minimum degree. The traditional structure which had previously acted as a hindrance to community fragmentation, may now be made to act in an opposite manner, fostering polarisation. The extended family or clan structure helps transform individual or minor incidents into wide-scale confrontations pitting hundreds of members of extended families against one another. Such a danger becomes particularly relevant as more of Upper Egypt's large Muslim families come to include Islamist militants among their members.

ISRAEL

Background on Direct Talks With PLO Reported

93AA0135C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 16 Jul 93 pp 6-7

[Article by Na'omi Levitzki]

[Text] Anyone who sees Shim'on Peres these days has to sense a change in the man. The gloomy expression that was permanently engraved on his face, and was practically his trademark, traded places with exhibited satisfaction. A little action around him, and the brightest minister in the government suddenly turns into a walking adrenaline bomb.

After many months of frustration, of sitting in the wings, on the sidelines of the political process, Peres finally feels that he is again in the center of things, just as he loves. In the talks in Washington, alarming pages of protocols have piled up on the table, and, in the meantime, secretly, Peres has inflated his own test balloon: an improved version of "Gaza first."

Rabin agreed, Peres started the ball rolling, and positive messages arrived from the PLO leaders. We are prepared to listen, they said. And when the carrier pigeons exhausted their ability to deliver messages, Peres found a secret channel for talks with the PLO elite. This, too,

with Rabin's knowledge. "This could be path breaking," Peres said in the innermost chambers.

The beginning of this story is in a series of meetings that Peres held with Faysal al-Husayni. The time was the great freeze following the expulsion of the Hamas [Islamic Resistance Front] activists. In any case, Peres was a little discouraged from the course of talks in Washington, and they stopped then, too. The protocols that occurred convinced him that there had to be new blood in the business. Both on the Palestinian side and the Israeli side.

By the first meeting with al-Husayni, Peres began to sense that Washington's "Babylonian" had to be abandoned, and they should change to secret talks in the field. He very quickly understood that it would be impossible to close a deal with the Palestinians in the territories. "They would not move a fork on the table without 'Arafat's approval," he said.

From meeting to meeting with al-Husayni, and there were about five of these, Peres became more and more convinced that salvation would not come from the talks in Washington. Even after al-Husayni, himself, joined the Palestinian delegation and conducted the talks, not much changed. Anyone who studied the protocols would have his hair stand on end.

There were fiery speeches about the holiness of Jerusalem, useless conflicts in the best tradition of Yosi Ben-Aharon, refined propaganda. It was hard to tell when al-Husayni was talking and when Elyaqim Rubinstein was talking. It was clear to Peres: Peace would not come out of this.

In contrast to this, in the secret conversations that were carefully conducted, Peres found in al-Husayni an "effective and constructive partner." He learned what was really important to the PLO and what is presented as bargaining chips; he began to understand which of the disputes could be bridged, what was really pressing. From Peres' viewpoint, the meetings with al-Husayni were in the realm of the first buds for building trust between them.

It was not easy to obtain Rabin's approval for the "Gaza first" route. The appraisals received by the prime minister from authoritative elements maintained that the course was not realistic, that the PLO would never agree. From the viewpoint of the Palestinians, these elements told Rabin, going with "Gaza first" would be as if they had relinquished the West Bank.

Under pressure by Peres, who also mobilized Yosi Sarid for the matter, Rabin softened and agreed to try. Somewhere in the third or fourth meeting with al-Husayni, Peres began to roll the idea around. Not really a state, he said, but something more than just autonomy. Al-Husayni transferred the message to 'Arafat.

At approximately the same time, another track of talks with the PLO was conducted. An academic track, which began before the law of meetings was nullified, and it was

accelerated. Yosi Alper, director of the Center for Strategic Studies, and Shlomo Gazit, go to meetings every few weeks with the PLO's defense elite.

Alper tells that a few months ago, they began speaking of "Gaza first." "Their initial reaction," Alper says, "was harsh." "You want Gaza first—so leave there and we will come in," they told us. Slowly, they softened and they were willing to discuss this. They even joined us in the innermost thoughts.

"They fear that the people of the West Bank will blame the people of Gaza, who are leading the entire process, of abandoning them and a conflict will result. They fear that King Husayn will tell the leaders on the West Bank: 'Look what the people of Gaza did to you, come back to me and I will take care of you.' And thus was born the idea of linkage—Gaza, and another point on the West Bank."

But the real push, and perhaps even a certain turnaround, took place about four weeks ago. Following certain meetings, in the course of the multilateral talks, with a Palestinian who is extremely close to 'Arafat, the opportunity opened to construct a channel for secret talks between Peres and his people and the PLO elite.

Peres had awaited this moment. And he wove the thread with great caution. Peres knew that without Rabin's approval, he would have a lost motion. And he also knew that Rabin is not an easy customer, certainly not when speaking of the PLO. Therefore, he prepared the background carefully, concluded a matter or two himself, and came to Rabin with something prepared in hand. Rabin gave him a green light to continue.

This was one of the most guarded secrets in the state. Even the people of Rabin's bureau did not know anything that was happening, and they did not tell the Americans, either. Very quietly, Peres sent his subordinates to meetings in Europe and Egypt. Uri Savir and 'Oded 'Eren, for example, were entrusted with the economic plane.

According to Peres' perception, everything will either fall or rise over economics. If there are no investments, if there is no employment, there is no chance for an arrangement. That is the equation. He sent Savir and 'Eren to meetings with Palestinians close to the PLO who had become rich in the Diaspora. Obtain investments, he told them, and here, too, the preference was for Gaza. They are working on it. Even this week, Savir has been roving around a number of European capitals for this purpose.

At precisely the same time, 'Usmah al-Baz, the adviser to Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, mediated and passed messages from Peres to 'Arafat and from 'Arafat to Peres, and thus, one of the central axes in this puzzle, which is constantly expanding and branching out, was created. Peres—Al-Baz—'Arafat. You could not have found a more convenient intermediary for all of the parties. Al-Baz is polished and experienced, very acceptable to Peres, Yosi Beilin, and 'Arafat, as well.

Last week, at the time of Peres' visit to Egypt, matters reached a real climax. According to most authoritative sources, Peres met secretly with Mahmud 'Abbas (Abu-Mazan), 'Arafat's deputy, and the one in charge of the Israeli file on the PLO's executive committee. Peres reached Egypt on an Arqi'a plane with a distinguished entourage, including reporters. The following day, early in the morning, the plane was to fly the precious cargo to Alexandria for a meeting with Mubarak.

So, how is a secret meeting arranged? Here is one method. 'Amr Musa, the Egyptian foreign minister, a polite man, proposed that Peres give up his seat on the Arqi'a plane and join him for the journey on his own plane. But what? Musa's plane is a small plane and there is no room for his entourage. Not even for the bureau chief.

Luckily, 'Amr Musa's plane also took off about an hour after the Arqi'a plane. In Peres' bureau, they deny, as expected, that Peres met with Abu-Mazan, but Peres, himself was very particular not relate to it. He has even already given the bruising response. "I want to be most clear," he said, "in everything touching of meetings with PLO men—obtuseness must be maintained."

Rabin, according to the same sources, was very aware of this meeting, and gave it his approval. Everything was good and nice, until the business began to leak. Yareah Tal of HA'ARETZ was the first. Rabin was worried. The level of nerves around him rose to new heights. The familiar murmurs could already be heard. If there were meetings, the prime minister's people said, it was without his knowledge.

But, Rabin, too, quickly perceived the advantage of vagueness. By the next day, the midday newspapers were covered with conflicting reports. One wrote that there were no meetings, in another they wrote that there were semimeetings, and, in a third they wrote that the Foreign Ministry was conducting contact with the PLO, with the prime minister's approval. Now, go figure what is right and what is not. Rabin, it must be said, knows something about combat vagueness.

A certain obtuseness also accompanies the movements of Dr. Nimrod Nuvik, once Peres' assistant, then one of the "blazers", and, today, a private businessman. He serves Peres as a sort of emissary for special matters. Rumor says that Peres sent Nuvik to Tunisia for talks with the PLO leaders.

Again, in Peres' bureau they deny it, but Peres, himself, is not responding. Obtuseness, did we say? It was impossible to locate Nuvik, himself. In his office, they told me that he was in Macedonia (formerly part of Yugoslavia), at the Tourist Hotel. At the hotel, they said that Nuvik had already left.

"Look what has already happened here in one year," says Yosi Alper, "and you will understand where all this must lead. Not long ago, if Faysal al-Husayni were photographed with 'Arafat, he would have gone straight to prison here. Now there are contacts with the PLO in all

levels of government. Members of Knesset are meeting, senior officials are meeting, and even ministers are meeting. Unavoidably, this will bring about, within a short time, an established integration of Tunisia in the negotiations."

In the meantime, both Rabin and Peres object to that. They both think that, just now, the secret channel with the PLO is preferable, and this channel works. Both Peres and Rabin received a clear message from the PLO: The PLO leaders are ready to go with "Gaza first," but only on the condition that they also get some holding point on the West Bank. The linkage must be maintained. 'Arafat proposed Jericho, and also explains that his proposal fits in well with Alon's. Peres is not opposed. From his viewpoint, this matter is all too marginal.

The PLO people will stay in Gaza, they will conduct affairs, they will practically have a state, and they will have a small annex on the West Bank. So what, he says. But, Rabin hesitates. True, he gave his approval to Peres' proceedings, but it is hard to say that he is really happy with them. The matter of Jericho frightens him even more. He fears that the PLO people will actually chose to remain in Jericho, half an hour travel time from Jerusalem. And he wants them farther away, in Gaza.

Ephraim Sne met briefly with Nabil Sha'at. Take what you are offered, argue about the rest later, he advised the man. They did not buy the proposal in the PLO. Rabin was angered. This is because there is such babble here, he said in ire. The political situation here, the different opinions, they confuse them, too. It is impossible to conduct negotiations this way.

Dennis Ross and his people landed in this cauldron. Through the Americans, the talks returned to being conducted via the Palestinian delegation. Ross and his friends found that even some of the delegation members had softened somewhat. The American document, for example, is no longer not to be touched because of its loathsomeness. They only want to put corrections in it. Peres proposed that Ross go with a shorter, less complicated, less comprehensive and overburdened version. "Let us start with skim milk, and later change to whole milk," he said.

In the last meeting with the Americans, the "Gaza first" matter was raised. Rabin said that, on the subject of Gaza, he is prepared to be more flexible, to go farther. Peres told Ross that the level of the talks must be raised. The talks were at a critical stage now, he said, time must not be wasted. We must sign something brief immediately and move on. From Peres' viewpoint, the Washington channel is dead, and, if it is not dead—it must be killed. These rounds of talks are depressing, nothing comes out of them. Peres wants to focus on the secret channel. This he likes.

I asked someone in the Foreign Minister's bureau this week why they are not concentrating on the secret channels of talk and advancing the subject of "Gaza first," and I received the following answer: A man came

to a pig sty and saw a strange pig there. A piece of leg was missing from it, and a section from the loin was also cut off. What is this strange pig, the man asked the owner of the pig sty.

Ah, said the pig sty owner, this is a special pig. Once, he saved an entire coop full of chickens from wolves, and once he saved my son from death. This is a wonderful pig.

So why is half a leg and a piece of his loin missing, the visitor asked. Because you do not eat such a wonderful pig all at once, was the answer.

Implications of Jewish Majority in Jerusalem

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p B3

[Article by N. Sherga'i: "The Seam of the Soft Stomach"]

[Text] By chance or not, following the two harsh terrorist attacks that occurred in Jerusalem within four days, the deputy mayor of the city arose and announced that, for the first time since 1967, a Jewish majority has been achieved at this time in the suburbs annexed to the city from the south, north, and east of the old borders of jurisdiction.

Before the Six-Day War, one of the popular lookout points was on the wall of the Old City in the Yamin Moshe neighborhood. Inside it was the Sefer neighborhood, beyond which was a mine field and Jordanian legionnaires. Now it is one of the luxury neighborhoods of Jerusalem, whose apartment prices have greatly gone up. In the past years of the intifadah, in a sort of mocking of history, Yamin Moshe has returned to being a lookout point over the Old City and its walls, especially for kindergarten and elementary school children, whose teachers or parents have asked to keep them from taking trips into the Old City, out of fear of Arab terrorism.

This week, terrorists stabbed Batsheva Halel, an employee of the guest house Mishkanot Sha'ananim, in Yamin Moshe. In the wake of the incident, fear has permeated and penetrated further into the territories adjacent to Yamin Moshe, which are termed "the seam." Kindergarten children did not visit there this week, and what has occurred during the intifadah to the lookout at the Intercontinental Hotel, which is on the Mount of Olives, occurred, for at least a few days, in Yamin Moshe, as well. Ever since the increase of stone throwing in the center of the village of al-Tur, as you come to the Mount of Olives, most tourists have been passing over the lookout at the Intercontinental in preference to looking from the domes, in the mosques and towers of old Jerusalem, rather than from Mount Scopus.

This week's attack, adjacent to Mishkanot Sha'ananim, is not just an attack in Jerusalem, which has already known many terrorist attacks in recent years. The point that the terrorists attacked this Monday is situated exactly on the seam that is between the east and west of the city. The bronze lion fountain, whose jaws discharge water, and the small pool that surrounds them, in which children from the east and west of the city splash

together, was, perhaps, the last remnant of what was termed within Jerusalem "coexistence." Even in the hardest times of the intifadah and terrorism in Jerusalem, Jews and Arabs from east and west continued to come to this recreation site and to the adjacent grassy area of Bloomfield Garden. In the evening, orthodox couples meet on the grassy area for their first get-acquainted meeting. A few dozen meters from here is the Cinemateque, in which the international film festival was held this week, and a little below this, on the slope, there is a little museum alongside of which is Moses Montefiore's restored carriage, enclosed in armored glass. (The original carriage was protected only by an iron grid, and was set afire during the first days of the intifadah.) The tourists who frequent the spot hear the chronicles of Sir Moses Montefiore and a bit about the Zionism of the start of the century, actually from the Arab guard who holds the key to the tower of the windmill that Minister Moses put up. Gardeners of the municipality of Jerusalem, primarily Arabs, are responsible for the beautiful garden expanse. After the stabbing, even this suburb of the seam is liable to be torn open.

Not far from this week's stabbing site, on the other side of the Valley of Hinnom, at the start of the ascent to Mount Zion, Sholomi Kohen, a resident of the old Qatmon suburb, a soldier in the regular army on a furlough from the army, who strolled to the other side of the Western Wall in the afternoon, was murdered a few years ago, by a knife stabbing. Since then, the region has been quiet, and, aside from the single incident of stone throwing at the No. 4 bus, the intifadah had not reached here.

The seam, in the past year, has turned into Jerusalem's soft stomach, where terrorism has struck again and again. In the first years of the intifadah, the attacks of Jews actually focused on East Jerusalem, and in its second phase, it has been characterized, among other things, by the penetration of Arab knifermen and arsonists to its western side. Now, most attacks and intifadah events are occurring right on the seam, from Neve Ya'aqov in the north to Gilo in the south, on the points in which the almost daily contact between Jews and Arabs continues.

Yehezqi'el Mizrahi was stabbed to death in February of this year, at the joint Jewish and Arab bus stop at the Bra'zni-Shlomo Ben-Yosef intersection, in the Armon Hanatziv suburb. The attack by the Hamas [Islamic Resistance Front] cell on bus 25, which was traveling from Neve Ya'aqov to the center of town, also began at a joint Jewish and Arab bus stop at the French Hill intersection, and the youth who was stabbed in the back a few months ago on the promenade of Armon Hanatziv was attacked right on the seam. The last two shooting attacks in the Gilo suburb occurred out the suburb's outskirts, in the regions bordered by Bayt Jalah.

The closure of the territories drew not only a line of a political border, which the Government of Israel wished to stretch between the municipal border of Jerusalem and that that is on its other side. The closure drew, or is

now redrawing, the line of terrorism, as well. Israel, within the Green Line, is now more secure. Jerusalem is less secure. Here, the closure has an open meaning. Jews and Arabs travel freely throughout the city, and no one would seriously consider changing this situation, lest the ground be lost by the Jewish demand for one, whole Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty. On this background, there were such strong reservations to the demand of residents in Armon Hanatziv, four months ago, to build a fence between them and their neighbors from Jabal Muqabar. Teddy Kollek opposed the residents' request in the beginning, but, in the end, it was granted. For the same reason, municipality administrators and police officers, in the past two weeks, have hastened to the Gilo administration and to the committee of the Tzameret Habirah suburb, in an attempt to appease them, provided that they withdraw their demand for a fence with their Arab neighbors. This refers to a fence on Shayis Street, on the southern border of the suburb, adjacent to Wadi Bayt Jalah, from where, according to conjecture, the last two shooting attack operations on suburb residents originated. In Tzomeret Habirah, there was talk of a partition fence with 'Iswayah, from where flocks of sheep and Arab shepherds descend into the Jewish suburb. Many instances of attacks on cars and Jewish property have been recorded, and on the walls of the neighborhood school, nationalist slogans in Arabic have been drawn.

Perhaps it was by chance, perhaps not, but actually following the two harsh terrorist attacks that occurred in Jerusalem within four days, Kollek's deputy, Avraham Kehila, who is designated to be his number two [as published], arose in the middle of the week and threw his own sort of bomb, a demographic bomb, whose waves will echo in the political debate over Jerusalem from now on. At a time when, in Washington, the Palestinians are going back and demanding a discussion of "Jerusalem now," Kehila informed the local planning committee that, at this time, for the first time since the Six-Day War, there is a Jewish majority in East Jerusalem, too. And so that they do not misunderstand his words, Kehila stressed that he does not mean the massive Jewish majority that the Jews already have in all parts of Jerusalem (approximately 72 percent, as opposed to 28 percent of Arabs), but to a Jewish majority that has been created for the first time in sections that were annexed to the city in 1967, to the south, north, and east of the old borders of jurisdiction.

Kehila spoke of approximately 155,000 Arabs as opposed to 160,000 Jews, who live today in a chain of new suburbs that Israel has built in East Jerusalem within the past 25 years. These are the suburbs in which many residents live on the seam, Jerusalem's line of attacks in the past year. The knowledge of the Jewish majority that has been created for the first time in the eastern part of the city, as well, was published in HA'ARETZ on Tuesday of this week, and was published the next day, with a certain astonishment, in the foreign press. For anyone living in Jerusalem, this not sensational news. This turning point was expected, and the

process has been described more than once on these pages. A large number of children living in Gilo, in the suburb of Armon Hanatziv, in Ramot, on French Hill, and other new suburbs do not recognize at all the reality of the small Jerusalem of before the Six-Day War. Only after the names of these suburbs come up in their political context is it obvious to them that, at least according to the Arab side's definitions, they live in East Jerusalem.

The Jewish majority that has now resulted in East Jerusalem, as well, is meaningful from Israel's point of view, as well as from that of the United States. According to Meyron Benbenishti this week, ever since Camp David, the United States has treated the demographic facts in Jerusalem with increasing weight, and it influences their outlook regarding the city's position. In contrast, the Arab side gives no consideration to the new reality that has been created over the years in Jerusalem. They do not recognize the lines of jurisdiction that Israel drew in 1967. From the Palestinian viewpoint, there is no difference between Gilo and Ramot, and between 'Ofra and Beyt El. The first are settlements and the latter are settlements, and, in all, there are 280,000 settlers, not 120,000 (that is, within the territories alone), according to Israel's version.

Rami 'Abd-al-Hadi, a city planner from Ramallah, wrote a document entitled "A Master Plan for the Palestinian State," in March 1992. The booklet was published on behalf of "The Project for Arabic Studies, Center for Planning," and it is one of the layers for the work being prepared this year by the professional teams on behalf of the Palestinian delegation to the negotiations with Israel. And 'Abd-al-Hadi wrote the following in the residential clause: "In the matter of residence for the Palestinian population—a large number of apartments, according to estimates, between 50,000 to 70,000 residential units, were established by Jewish settlers in more than 150 settlements. The moment that they are turned over, in the wake of the territorial arrangement between the Palestinians and Israel, the residential units in some of these settlements could, perhaps, be directly transferred to the reservoir of available apartments of Palestinian cities and villages, as in the case of Gilo, Pisgat Ze'ev, Neve Ya'aqov, Ramot Alon in Jerusalem; Pisgot and Beyt El near Ramallah-Al-Birah, Alon More near Nabulus, and Qiryat Arba' and Giv'at Haharsina near Hebron. This reservoir of apartments, in some of the settlements being turned over, could contribute to the absorption of some of the Palestinians who return from the Diaspora to the new state..."

The Arab side, therefore, does not accept facts determined in the field as political facts. And we are speaking of political facts: Israel established the new settlements in East Jerusalem as political settlements. The 160,000 Jews, approximately 38 percent of Jerusalem's Jewish residents, now live in territories annexed to the State of Israel 18 days after the Six-Day War. From an area of jurisdiction comprising 38,000 dunams, Jerusalem cut

its territory to about 110,000 dunams. Under the initiative of the Labor government, about 17,000 dunams were confiscated, upon which the suburbs of Ramot, Gilo, Neve Ya'aqov, Ramot Eshkol, Sanhedriya Hamurhevet, Giv'at Hamivtar, Armon Hanatziv, and, in recent years, even the largest suburb of them all, Pisgat Zahav, whose rapid population rate is what started, in the recent months, the demographic revolution for the benefit of the Jews in the east of the city, as well.

Jewish Settlements Under Arab Rule Viewed

93AA0135A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
4 Jul 93 p 3

[Commentary by Aharon Maged]

[Text] Willingly agreeing to the destruction of homes, the uprooting of orchards, the blotting out of sown fields and gardens from the face of the earth as part of any peace agreement—this is a monstrous Israeli invention unlike anything in the world, and there has never been anything like it. Such a vandalistic deed not only opposes the basic Zionist ethos, which was based on the conquest of the desert, turning the desert into a blossoming garden and the like, but it is also a degradation of the natural human emotion, which views the "tree of the field" as a living creature (and accordingly, the mind cannot bear the destruction of homes and the uprooting of trees as a sort of collective punishment for terrorist attacks, something that contradicts Jewish morals, which maintain that "man will die for his sins").

Only politicians who have lost all connections with the land, all relations with those who work it, with settling it at all, could be capable of including, in the peace agreement with Egypt, the blotting out of settlements at the opening of Rafah, their houses and blossoming gardens, without leaving a remnant of them; and only heartless cynics quietly sitting in their offices dealing with political considerations, who have never tasted the taste of sorrow and joy that there is in living in that place and in the view, could be capable of so righteously imploring the settlers of the Golan Heights and the Jordan Valley, Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, to uproot themselves from their settlements, to destroy them, to leave "scorched land" behind them and to turn toward the coastal plain; and only one who is devoid of all spiritual connection to the culture and history of this land would be capable of writing in scorn and biting hostility about those who persist in remaining in settlements that they built and became rooted in.

Any peace agreement that is signed, on the basis of compromise—with the Palestinians and the Syrians—must include within it, as an imperative condition, leaving the Jewish settlements in place and the guarantee of their civil rights, their security, and their well-being. For thousands of years, Jews have been living in all countries of the world, and have always claimed their right to live in them; there is no justice for them no longer living in territories that comprise their historic land, the birthplace of their religion and culture, their ideal for generations.

Just as hundreds of Arab settlements are found in the State of Israel, which has guaranteed their safety, thus it is possible for a few dozen Jewish settlements to be situated beyond its border, and which would be guaranteed to have no evil befall them.

And this must also be said to the people of these settlements, themselves: Jews have lived in the land of Israel for hundreds of years under foreign rule, and not only did the devoted among them not leave, they also created their best cultural creations in it—the Mishnah, the Jerusalem Talmud, commentaries and liturgical hymns, and the like, of that time; and the beginning of the new Jewish culture of this time, under British rule. If, indeed, the commandment of settling the land of Israel “outweighs all precepts of the Torah” in your eyes and “man will dwell in the land of Israel forever, even in a city that is predominantly foreign,” and [?Gentile], there is no reason that you should not uphold this commandment even under non-Jewish administration or rule; all the more so when, at your rear, truly beyond the lines of separation (which can also be common lines), there is a strong Jewish state that will not sever ties to you and has the power to defend you and to deter anyone who would dare to plot against you.

Instead of trying to stop the peace process, which is necessitated by the complicated reality in which we live, be brazen in your will not to abandon the places that you have taken hold of and built, and which forever will be the land of Israel.

Return of Jewish Population to Europe Discussed

93AA0141A Tel Aviv *POLITIQA* in Hebrew
July 1993 pp 42-45

[Article by Uri Elitzur: “The Cholent Question”]

[Text] A.B. Yehoshu'a used to say that Ireland is the example. For the Protestants are nothing but British settlers, and the day is near when the British will become sick of the need to spill blood for them. When that day comes, the Protestant settlers will emigrate from the place where they are a foreign implantation back to the place from which they came, and only then will the Irish problem be solved.

And I am inclined to agree, despite several important differences, that Ireland is a good example. After generations of war they made a territorial compromise there and also established the Palestinian state, which is Free Ireland. Most of the Protestant settlers left the places that are densely populated by Catholics, for beyond the Green Line, where there is a Protestant majority. The sane Protestant majority even gave up the irrational attachment to the torn and divided capital city, Dublin, and agreed—for the sake of peace—to build its own capital within the boundaries of Shenkin and Tzavta of the Protestant city Belfast. In that way, peace came finally to Ireland, and the land will be tranquil three years and perhaps even three and a half.

As is known, since then several tens of years of bloody war have passed in small Northern Ireland, which is in

the '67 boundaries. The Palestinians who oppose the solution were not satisfied with their independent state, and by means of the Catholic minority that remained on its land in the Protestant regions they brought the hell into the midst of Belfast. The territorial compromise did not remove the Irish Question from the international agenda, and after 70 years, foreign and clearly enlightened observers, such as A.B. Yehoshu'a, for example, speak comfortably about the removal of the entire Protestant entity.

There are, as was stated, several important differences that make our situation easier than that of the Protestants in Ireland, but the main difference works precisely against us: the Protestant settlers have lived in Ireland for 350 years already, many more than the Jews in Deganiya or in Tel Aviv, and they are still a foreign implantation. In the eyes of the world, they are again destined to emigrate back to the places from which they came, and the fact that it was not they who invaded, but the fathers of their fathers, does not help them. And among us, the Israeli elite is still arguing over the marginal Benevenisti question whether the settlers in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza have already become an unalterable fact, but the question that hangs over Eretz-Yisra'el is much more fundamental: is the entire Zionist invasion an unalterable fact.

At this time, this question is not on the international agenda, but a person must completely lack imagination so as not to understand that this is very definitely likely to change. Only a few years ago, it was not customary to think that the ground would ever tremble under the feet of the Serbian minority that has lived for several generations in Bosnia, or under the feet of the Russians who had settled in Moldavia (and even in the Ukraine!), or under the feet of the wrong group (and I already do not remember which it is) that has lived for only four generations in Ngorno-Karabakh. And all this without mentioning more than a million French settlers who were expelled from Algeria after 150 years of settlement, and without trying to guess whether there will still be, in another 30 years, a white population in South Africa. Not only the history books, but also the headlines of today's newspapers, teach that questions of this kind do not die, even if they are likely to slumber for tens of years.

Our existential question, the question of the very possibility of a Jewish entity in the Arab region, is not today on the international agenda, we have already said, but it is definitely not buried deeply, and in any event there is no doubt that in the Arab and Palestinian consciousness it exists with great strength. It seems to me that there is also no doubt that under certain circumstances, the collective Arab consciousness has the strength to put questions back on the international agenda.

One must be very naive to think that signing this or another document is likely to erase the question once and for all from the collective Arab consciousness. Feysal Huseyni was asked by Israeli Arabs what he thought is their role in the national struggle, and he said:

"You must strengthen the consciousness that the Palestinian idea is a successful idea, while the Zionist idea is an idea that has failed." In the opinion of Huseyni, that sanest of Palestinians, the success of the Palestinian idea is the failure of the Zionist idea, and the contrary. And further, in his opinion, history has not yet passed judgment on the question whether the Zionist idea has succeeded or failed.

I do not say this in order to speak against Feysal Huseyni; on the contrary, I agree with him. "Zion" and "Falastin" are two names for the same place. A temporary compromise may, perhaps, be found between the two interests, but there will be no compromise between the ideas, and in the end, one of them will despair and fall.

A developed imagination is necessary to see a possible reality in which the Zionist idea will fail and fall, and imagination is also necessary in order to see the contrary, that the idea of Falastin falls and disappears. In the present situation, it appears that these two ideas are already sufficiently established with no way back. But "the status quo" is not relevant for our discussion, for the diplomatic negotiations between us and the Palestinians are a move of the Gorbachev type.

And here is the place for two parenthetical comments, which I hope will not divert me too far from the direction in which I began to go. It is necessary to know how to differentiate between two kinds of great political decisions: the political act that closes versus the political act that opens. Inwardly, I call them the Kissinger move versus the Gorbachev move. Every political act is an agreement over new definitions for whose formulation "conditions have ripened" already, otherwise it would not succeed. But the first kind is a political decision, which comes to give a formulation and definitions to a situation that reality has already created. Its working assumption is that the fundamental processes and the big clashes have already occurred and have already been played out, and there is room for a political act because the matter remains open and bleeding "unnecessarily," only due to the strength of the blindness of habit and inertia.

The other move deals with the opposite situation. Here, inertia and habit check the processes, and there is room for a political act because tomorrow is already here, and only the definitions and frameworks of yesterday prevent it from developing. In other words: the Kissinger move deals with an open matter for whose closure conditions have already ripened, while the Gorbachev move deals with a closed matter for whose opening the conditions have already ripened.

As was said, the negotiations with the Palestinians are a move of the second kind. They are not intended to conclude and to define well the existing reality, but to breach an opening for the creation of a new reality. The great difficulty in such a move is the Cholent Question. You know what you put into the pot, and you do not know what will come out of it. Mikhael Gorbachev did

not imagine that following his moves, the Soviet Union would no longer exist in 10 years and he himself would be out of the picture. And we, too, today, as well, are still not capable of envisaging what else is likely to occur in the wake of Gorbachev's moves. Whoever approaches a Gorbachev move, must at least be equipped with a rich and developed imagination.

And that brings us, with your pardon, to the second parenthetical comment. I have a problem in developing my line of thought precisely in the present company. For the Left of the end of the 20th century is characterized by a stubborn, almost principled, lack of imagination. Perhaps correctly, as a balance in answer to its enthusiastic fathers from the beginning of the century, who soared on the wings of imagination to tremendous heights until they fell and broke their legs. In any event, the enlightened man of the left today is accustomed to the mechanical declamation of the holy mantras "the world is marching towards a new era (precisely now)," and "reality is changing completely (especially this year)," but aside from that, he refuses to imagine seriously something that differs from the existing reality by more than one step.

He regards using the imagination as an unwise and even irritating occupation. The Israeli left, for example, says: the world is changing completely and nothing will be as it was, and, therefore, you must already, damn it, accept exactly what I said 25 years ago and since then I have not changed my mind one bit. And look, for example, also at the cool to hostile reception to Meron Benvenisti, who took the mantra too seriously and proposed to use the imagination a little more and to assume that something has changed and that it is impossible to turn the wheel backwards.

And now I return to the main issue, and propose relating to the following imaginary scenario: due to the establishment of the Palestinian state, a Zionist-like enthusiastic wave of "return to Falastin" awakens. Four million Palestinians from the diaspora gather and come in the space of 10 years to the tiny state, and they are received with love and settle in transit camps, in conditions of rationing but with holy enthusiasm. The Hamas [Islamic Resistance Front] (like the Irish Republican Army in the 1930's) declares war on the partition of the country and on the submission to Zionism, and it flourishes and rises in the giant colonies of poverty and unemployment that stretch from Jenin to Hebron. The State of Israel finds itself pressed between two Gaza Strips, one in Gaza and the other in Judaea and Samaria.

The Palestinian state is unable to support its millions of inhabitants, and their eyes are turned to the rich Jews who sit below, each under his vine and his antennas, a spitting distance from Palestinian neighborhoods of poverty and suffering. Explosive devices go off in Tel Aviv, rioting breaks out in the Galilee villages, the Arabs of Israel are between the hammer and the anvil, the terror increases, the Likud government sends the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] on retaliatory actions, "Peace Now" responds with giant demonstrations, Iran threatens to

intervene, and the United States warns Israel. The CNN's cameras show Palestinian children who were killed by IDF fire on this side of the border, and on the other side another crew photographs Israeli police shooting Israeli civilians in giant disturbances in Um el-Fahem.

[United] State's Jewry demands from the administration immigration allowances for Russian Jews, who "for the time being" cannot be directed to Israel "due to the situation." A prestigious American research institute holds an international congress on the subject: "Israel's chances of survival." The Israeli right accuses the left of responsibility for the blood that was spilled, and an organization of "Mothers Against Holocaust" demands a reconquest and forcible transfer.

In the Palestinian state, disturbances inspired by the Islamic forces break out, and the pro-Iranian regime that arose in Jordan after the death of King Huseyn takes over the West Bank according to a four-way agreement that was signed in Syria between Syria, Jordan, Iran, and the fifth Palestinian government, and was recognized by the UN Security Council. Government in Israel passes, alternatively, from the left to the right and back, and the NEW YORK TIMES writes that there is in fact no difference between the two sides, and neither of them are able to solve the problems inherent in the very existence of a Jewish State in a land with an Arab majority, and whose division into two states is viewed as artificial by every rational person.

Writers and intellectuals in the West speak about the Zionist adventure that from the start was doomed to fail, as it was not more than a late tail of the colonial period. In the United States, young Reform rabbis found the movement "Babylon," which engages in far-ranging mobilization of investments to aid in the absorption of Israeli emigres.

I know how irritating this is. For I have not only not proven that this is the most possible scenario, I have not proven that it is possible at all. Moreover, with the same measure of imagination, it is also possible to draw the rosy and promising, but good, scenario, and, actually, for this we do not even need imagination, for we have Shim'on Peres. (Although it seems to me that the vision of the Middle Eastern common market in which Jews and Arabs will prosper and flourish together, in dignity, in freedom, and in friendship, has recently gone out of fashion. Perhaps in view of the discouraging news from the original common market.)

But anyway, I do not forgo this exercise for developing the imagination, for whoever approaches a move of the kind that releases forces and processes from their cages in order to mould a new reality, must study these forces well, must know that "the status quo" becomes very liquid, and must act on the basis of the thought that the more dangerous scenario is the realistic one. And here we return to the beginning: the Jewish entity in Eretz-Yisra'el is an invading one. For on this the entire struggle

is waged, and on this are being conducted the negotiations with the Palestians, on the infrastructure. And, therefore, the relevant question is the question of the infrastructure: whether a given arrangement with the Palestinians takes us away from Ireland or pushes us there. Are the processes that will be released to act operating in a direction that strengthens or weakens the differences between us and the Protestants in Ireland or the French in Algeria or the whites in South Africa.

In my opinion, there are two big differences between the foreign Jewish entity in the Middle East and all those other foreign entities, one demographic and the other ideological. The demographic difference is very simple—as of now, we are the majority. In the geographic unit called by us "Eretz-Yisra'el" and by them "Falastin" (and it does not matter for our purpose whether it is partitioned or not partitioned on the map), in this common country, precisely the invading entity is the majority. From this viewpoint, we are similar to the white invaders in Australia or in North America, and only if this situation changes for the worse will we be similar to the white invaders in South Africa.

The second difference is what is called in Jewish Halakha "possession without assertion." Whoever admits that he is an invader, even possession for generations will not help him. The French invaders in Algeria lived there longer than the Jewish invaders in Tel Aviv, as did the Protestants in Ireland and the Serbs in Bosnia, and, nevertheless, when the day came, the right of possession did not exist for them, and for us it will, perhaps, exist. Because we did not just invade, we came to the inheritance of our fathers.

And that is a tremendous difference, because it is possible to drive the French from Algeria, but it is impossible to expel the French from France. A diplomatic arrangement that is founded upon contempt for this matter of the inheritance of our fathers, which is founded on the assumption that the primitive link to the soil of the homeland is idol-worship, and that ancient sentiments and religious feeling for holy places are an unfair and irrelevant matter, such an arrangement leads us to Ireland. When Shulamit Aloni mocks the grave of Yosef and Jericho, she brings Tel Aviv two steps closer to Belfast.

David Grossman reports in "The Yellow Wind" that he was asked by residents of 'Ofra why, from the moral viewpoint, it is forbidden for Jews to live in 'Ofra but permissible for them to live in Talpiyot. And he answers that he can be responsible for his own unjust acts, but not for those of his fathers. It is precisely on this that history says, like the Halakha, that possession without assertion is not possession. If you are not certain that it was permissible for the Zionist movement to come here, but you say that this has already passed, and that now we are here, and that is that. If that is the situation—tomorrow we will not be here, and that is that. Look under "Algeria" (and also "Bosnia," "Ireland," "Moldavia," and "South Africa," etc.).

From all of what has been said, it follows that in an arrangement with the Palestinians, that concerns the infrastructure of the Zionist and the Palestinian matters, attention must be paid mainly to two great forces that are supposed to be released into the arena, and regarding which a mistake is liable to be fatal: the processes of migration and the flows of consciousness.

Judaea and Samaria stand at the center of both. Judaea and Samaria of today (as opposed to the Gaza Strip) are thinly populated areas. The 1 million Palestinians who live there are a very big problem for us, but—objectively—1 million persons on 6 million dunams are very few. In contrast, if 4 million Palestinians will live there, there will be an Arab majority in Eretz-Yisra'el, we will have a Gaza Strip in front and in back, and the dividing lines that are drawn on the map will be no more than sketches on paper. Every commentator and foreign observer will then be able to explain to us that these lines will not last over time, and that from the beginning it was clear that they are artificial.

The second critical question is what we say to our interlocutors at the table regarding Nablus and Hebron, Bet-El and 'Anatot and Bethlehem, our ancient birth-right, the stage of our history and the place where our fathers are buried. If we speak about this logically, we have lost. If we go to an arrangement that will cut us off from all that, that will deepen among us and among them the consciousness of "end of the conquest" and of the withdrawal of Jews from a country that is not theirs, we are releasing from the cage a tremendously powerful process of delegitimatization of the Zionist invasion. For it becomes clear that it is not more than possession without assertion, and like the Protestant invasion—rich in a past and poor in a future—of Ireland.

And after all this, I still think that it is possible to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement with the Palestinians. But it will not be attained "within six to nine months;" it will not be achieved out of a deep rift within Jewish society in the country; and it will not be attained as long as the Palestinians have not despaired of the intifadah and the terror as a means of imposing an arrangement.

I am worried, but I am not pessimistic. For I see too a high probability that the Labor-Meretz government will not succeed at arriving at an arrangement, and will in that way contribute to the understanding—among us, among the Arabs, and in the world—of these three noes. Such an understanding, when it comes, will make possible a turn to a new path with prospects.

Defense Industry Layoffs, Competition Problems

93AA0132C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Jul 93
p C1

[Article by A. Ben: "The Aircraft Industry Has Lost Its Ability To Compete"]

[Text] From the beginning of the year, the blows have descended in a chain: The Defense Ministry halted the development of the "central project," the American Government canceled a transaction with the Third World for

the renovation of Skyhawk aircraft, a large deal to upgrade MiG aircraft in Romania was taken from the aircraft industry to Albit, and the expectations for a recovery in the civil aviation market proved wrong.

Those visiting the aircraft industry's pavilion at the aviation show in Paris last month saw an impressive marketing demonstration. Defense ministers, generals, and industrialists from dozens of countries crowded into the pavilion's narrow corridor, on their way to business meetings with the heads of aircraft industry. The products were presented with spectacular pictures and a light and sound presentation, and the MiG-21 aircraft was stationed in the courtyard, with an electronic system made in Israel, as an expression of aircraft industry's capability to upgrade combat aircraft.

But this was only a performance, whose job was to conceal the series of business failures and incorrect forecasts. The aircraft industry has not been awarded any transaction to upgrade combat aircraft since 1989, and since the beginning of the year, a chain of blows has descended: The Defense Ministry halted the development of the most advanced and leading "central project in the aircraft industry's development and handed over the development of the alternative project to Albit; the American Government canceled a transaction to upgrade Skyhawk aircraft in the Third World; a large transaction for the upgrade of MiG aircraft in Romania was taken from the aircraft industry and given to Albit, and the expectations for a recovery in the civil aircraft market also proved wrong.

When the aviation show finished, the smiles changed places with cries for help. The director-general of the aircraft industry, Moshe Qeret, announced the formation of a new recovery program, in the center of which were the immediate layoffs of 1,500 of the 16,100 company employees, and the reduction of salary costs by 12 to 15 percent.

"If the work force is not reduced quickly, a dangerous decline in the company's business state will occur," Qeret warned. The aircraft industry ended 1992 with a loss of \$148.6 million, \$60 million of which was an operational loss. In the first five months of 1993, the aircraft industry has lost, according to the administration, \$17 million.

According to the aircraft industry administration's official estimation, its turnover of sales this year will amount to \$1.5 billion, \$100 million less than forecast. The anticipated 6-percent reduction in sales was enough to collapse the company's cash flow. The aircraft industry's great doubts have already been figured with the difficulties in the collection of payments.

Company heads are now demanding that the government direct aid to the extent of \$400 to \$500 million in the coming years to the aircraft industry, in order to put it back on profitable tracks by 1994. The requested aid includes financing the cost of severance pay for laid-off employees, state guarantees for the creation of a cash flow, and investments in the development of civilian products.

Six years after hiding away the dream to manufacture the Israeli combat plane, the Lavi, the aircraft industry has again reached a determining point in its future. Tomorrow, Prime Minister and Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin and Finance Minister Avraham Shohat will discuss the company's new recovery program. The entire economy will be influenced by the decisions that they make: The aircraft industry is the largest industrial company in Israel and the largest exporter in the state. Its sales turnover last year amounted to \$1.57 billion, \$1.204 billion of this in exports.

The company management and the senior administration in the Finance Ministry and Defense Ministry want to exploit the current crisis for a fundamental change in the business profile of the aircraft industry. The focus of the discussion tomorrow will be the demand for political backing to cancel the collective labor agreement, which has been standard in the company since the end of the 1970's.

The management says that changes in labor relations in the aircraft industry are essential for adapting the company to market changes. Cancellation of the labor agreement, which makes it difficult to lay off permanent employees, would grant the managements of units and plants flexibility in the management of personnel, and would make it possible to give more authority and responsibility to middle managers. In the future, the management says, the company will be reorganized into profit centers, and the extent of employment and wages in each unit will conform to its business results, instead of the existing link to wages in the nonmanufacturing public sector. In the military industry, such a change has already been achieved in the framework of a recovery program.

In the Finance Ministry, they are demanding that government aid be given on the condition of a more drastic change, and that the aircraft industry be dismantled into subsidiaries that would operate under the management of the concern. Finance people see the successful recovery of the Kor concern before their eyes, and are proposing to conduct similar recovery steps at the aircraft industry—at the head of which is the cancellation of the mutual guarantees between company units and the end of the "crossed subsidy," in which the profitable plants carry the burden of the losing ones. The establishment of autonomous business units will prevent future occurrences of the current situation, in which losses in some of the programs endanger the future of the entire aircraft industry.

Still in the beginning of the crisis, last year, people in the defense system and Finance said that the aircraft industry is suffering from chronic illnesses, and that a light decline in sales was sufficient to present the problem in all of its severity. Unlike the military industry, which suffered from a decline in orders for its munitions products, the aircraft industry benefited from an impressive technological capability and an advanced basket of goods. But the outdated, centralized structure and rigid labor agreements make marketing and sales cumbersome, prevent flexibility, and hurt the profits and cash flow. Even when there are orders, they cause losses.

In a finance committee discussion two weeks ago, Nir Gil'ad, the deputy appointed over the budgets in Finance and a director in the aircraft industry, said that the company "has lost its ability to compete." In Finance, they claim that the aircraft industry marketing people "come up against Albit's announcement everywhere: We were here." Senior management officials in the aircraft industry reject the claims and state that, since the start of the year, the company has signed \$750 million worth of new contracts, and the comparison to Albit is not fair. "We are many times larger," they say in the aircraft industry.

In its press releases, the aircraft industry emphasizes the global crisis in the weapons and civil aviation industries as a primary factor for the difficulties. They tell of orders that were canceled after the aircraft industry invested in costly groundwork. They show that even the giants in the United States and Europe are laying off thousands of employees, and the European governments are supplying the defense industries with generous aid.

The current difficulties arose, they explain in the aircraft industry, because the management anticipated a positive change in the civil aviation market as early as the start of 1994, and held onto employees in anticipation of orders. When it became evident that the depression would continue, they decided to adapt the manpower to sales and to go out in the current wave of layoffs.

At the end of 1992, the government authorized the first recovery program at the aircraft industry, at the center of which was the reduction of the work force by 1,500 people by the end of the current year and a reduction in wage costs by 7 percent. In return, the aircraft industry received a \$100-million state guarantee for cash flow and aid in financing severance costs. They were also promised \$35 million in investment in the development of civilian projects.

Execution of the recovery program came up against difficulties: The committee and management are divided among themselves over the layoffs of 400 permanent employees who were defined as expendable. Management claims that not one of them has gone; the committee claims that 200 have already been severed. Either way, the Finance Ministry halted the transfer of aid to the aircraft industry and claims that the old program failed because it did not offer a real solution to the crisis. Finance is delaying the financing of civilian projects, such as the new executive aircraft, Astra-4, and demands that they be managed by independent subsidiaries, in order to guarantee that the investments reach their proper places and will not be swallowed up by the giant company.

The aircraft industry management hopes that a successful recovery will march the company to the end of the century with a new and profitable basket of goods. The realm of military aircraft, which the aircraft industry took pride on in the past, is changing. Large upgrade transactions will be completed within two years, and they will be replaced by technologies such as unmanned aircraft, satellites, antimissile missiles, and projects in civil aviation.

After the cancellation of the Lavi' and the "central project," the aircraft industry has no leading product on the concern level, and each unit is specializing in its own products. The decentralization of the organizational structure will make marketing and sales easier for the units. Management also hopes to accelerate the specifying processes, at least of parts of the company.

Now, they are preparing, in the aircraft industry and Finance, for the anticipated confrontation with the organization of workers, if the ministers authorize the cancellation of the labor agreement. Workers' representatives say that they are not militant, and that they are prepared for the refreshing of manpower in the aircraft industry if workers' rights are preserved and the prior commitments of the management are honored.

"They still have not informed us of the cancellation of the agreement," says the chairman of the workers' organization, member of Knesset (MK) Ya'akov Shefi, and hints of the following: The aircraft industry is an excellent plant, and because of the \$100-million decline in sales, a large crisis is not needed to dismantle the labor agreements and to cause the workers to strike. "Threats in the air have already been heard of going into official receivership if the workers do not participate in the recovery program.

Drop in Kibbutz Industrial Exports Reported

93AA0135B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
4 Jul 93 p 23

[Article by Shlomit Tana']

[Text] The recovery trend, which characterized the kibbutz industry in 1992, is not continuing this year. In the first five months of 1993, the rate of exports declined by 11 percent, in comparison to the same period last year, and sales in the domestic market have also begun a significant decline.

So said Mikha Hertz, director-general of the Kibbutz Industrial Association, in a note published in the TEQEM [United Kibbutz Movement], KIBBUTZ, before the association's annual conference to be held tomorrow at Qiryat 'Anavim's guest house.

Hertz said further that only 25 of 360 kibbutz plant have been certified to date as upholding the international quality standards. According to him, if the kibbutz industry's level of quality does not go up immediately, its ability to compete in international markets will be damaged.

Hertz characterizes the kibbutz industry as "a failure in exports, rich in capital, the least amount of work, and, especially, the least amount of technical knowledge." Its presence in such branches as electronics, biotechnology, and plastics engineering is meager.

In order to execute the gradual transition to advanced technologies, a real turnaround in the kibbutz educational system is required, according to him. "The kibbutz youth has, indeed, been born with the computer, but he lacks the education for technology and excellence."

Hertz stated further that the percentage of academicians employed in kibbutz plants is one-third smaller than their percentage in all kibbutz industries. In many kibbutz plants, there are no departments of research and development, and this places their chances for survival in doubt.

Hired workers currently constitute about one-third of those employed in kibbutz industries. The director-general warned that, if the trend of a steep rise in hired labor continues, then within two years, most employees in kibbutz plants would be hired. Such a state is liable to cause a decline in the work ethics of workers who are kibbutz members.

[Box, p 23]

Hakibbutz Ha'artzi: Every Member Has Personal Property Worth 158,000 Shekels—and Every One Owes 71,000 Shekels

The debts of Hakibbutz Ha'artzi, at the end of 1992, reached 3 billion shekels, which is 71,400 shekels per person in the movement. Despite this, every member of the movement, from age zero, owns property worth an average of 158,000 shekels. This arises from their issuing company's report, "Issuing Standards for Industry," for the stock exchange.

Banks have specific drought trust liens on only 40 percent of the debt. The movement's financial assets, in cash, savings plans and provident funds, total 445 million shekels, which is 10,600 shekels per person in the movement.

The sum of the kibbutz manufacturing and inventory assets totals 6.2 billion shekels, which is 147,600 per person. Seventy percent of the output from Hakibbutz Ha'artzi kibbutzim comes from industry, and only 23.5 percent of the total income results from agriculture. An additional 6.5 percent results from services and other sources. From the data, it arises that the total output of Hakibbutz Ha'artzi is 2.860 billion shekels, and 36 percent of the industrial product is directed toward exports.

Hakibbutz Ha'artzi includes 86 kibbutzim and 42,000 people. In all, the movement has 123 industrial plants, and the largest industrial branch is plastics, with 25 plants. [End box]

LEBANON

Hasan Sabra on Jews, U.S., Israeli Views of Peace

Vitriolic Attack on Jews

93AA0131A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic 21 Jun 93 p 3

[Article by Hasan Sabra: "Citizens, Teach Your Children How to Hate Jews"]

[Text] In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. "Ye are the best of Peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God." [Koran 3:110].

Its name is Palestine, not Israel. The enemy is the Zionist enemy, not the Government or State of Israel. The conflict is the Arab-Zionist conflict, not the Mideast

problem, not the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, not even the occupied territories issue.

The rights are the full Arab rights to all of Palestine, not the legitimate rights to Palestine. In this world, every right becomes legitimate with the passage of time. There can be no illegitimate rights in order to make a distinction between Arab rights to Palestine—characterizing some rights as legitimate and demanded by some people and characterizing other rights as illegitimate and kept under wraps.

Every Jew in Palestine is a Zionist until he leaves it, and every Jew who has built a home in Palestine without the approval of its owners is an occupying usurper, even if he is a leftist and even if he writes rationally about the Arabs.

Every penny that goes to the Zionist enemy is a stab in the back of all Arabs.

Every Arab who goes to the territories occupied by the Zionist enemy in 1948—an occupation that was expanded through the 1967 aggression—is a traitor who deserves to be stoned, beginning with Anwar al-Sadat and ending with any other ruler who sends to Jerusalem in the name of pilgrimage misled people who “are given the choice” of either committing treason in Palestine or being executed in their country. An Arab who does not go to Palestine, either as a commando, as a prisoner, or as a lover of its soil, and every Arab who is not willing to die on this soil in pursuit of either victory or martyrdom is also a traitor, the same as the aforementioned.

The Arab homeland will continue to carry this name. We will not relinquish the name and call it the Arab world, and we will not agree to have it called the Middle East. Israel will continue to be an intruder and an occupier. This homeland has continued to carry the same name, even during the 200-year Crusader invasion whose states and colonies in our Arab homeland disappeared gradually.

Jerusalem, the first of the two qiblahs [direction to which Muslims turn for prayer] and the third holy place, will continue to be holy for Arab Muslims and Christians, even if the Jewish fait accompli has imposed on it the Zionization of policy and administration. Geography is firm, like the present and the promising future.

We recall Jerusalem when we read in the noble Koran the words of God, may He be praised and exalted, Who addressed Muhammad, His Arab apostle, may God's peace and prayers be upon him: “We see the turning of thy face (for guidance) to the heavens Turn then thy face in the direction of the sacred Mosque” [Koran 2:144]. This is the origin of the name of Jerusalem and of al-Aqsa Mosque, which is the first of the two qiblahs, considering that it was the first direction to which the Muslims turned their eyes.

It was to Jerusalem that the Arab apostle, the noblest of apostles, ascended. Addressing the apostle on the occasion, God, may He be praised and exalted, said, “Glory to (God) Who did take His Servant for a Journey by night from the Sacred Mosque to the Farthest Mosque, whose precincts We did bless” [Koran 17:1].

History, geography, and national education books will continue to carry the name of Palestine.

If there are those among us who teach their children to memorize the noble Koran, then after teaching their children Surat al-'Alaq, which says in part, “Recite in the name of thy Lord who created” [Koran 96:1], they should teach them to study, memorize, and understand the meaning of God's words, may He be praised:

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate: “Strongest among men in enmity to the Believers wilt thou find the Jews and the Pagans” [Koran 5:85].

The Jews have occupied Palestine and now they want to seize the Arab homeland's will in the name of “peace.”

Let each father, mother, brother, sister, teacher, and educator among us be intent on telling the rising generation that the Arab prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, expelled Jews from Medina and then from the entire Arab Peninsula after he had survived several ambushes in which they tried to kill him, to spread sedition among the Muslim ranks, and to collude with the polytheists in numerous conspiracies to bury heaven's orthodox message.

God commands us to embrace what the apostle instructs us to embrace and to refrain from what the apostle has prohibited. Is there a more eloquent lesson than to confront the Jews in the same way that God's apostle confronted them when they tried to kill him and to spread sedition among his followers?

In the event that the Jews among us enter into trade or if they send to us their manufactured goods or packaged agricultural products, then let us incite the people to reject it because it would be illicit trade. The goods are extracted from a usurped land. Let us tell our children that we refuse to take what belongs to others and that the law punishes the thief and the party that buys stolen goods. The goods of the Jews among us are stolen, whatever these goods may be. Divine law, as well as positive law, provides punishment for them.

If the positive law is frozen, or if it is applied in a distorted manner, then the divine law cannot be frozen. God's mill grinds slowly but surely. It may move slowly but it will not stop.

This vocabulary must be perpetuated and entrenched in the dictionary of our Arab political life: If we used this vocabulary spontaneously in the past by reason of our education and of the pan-Arab and Islamic climate that prevailed in the era of Arab independence, then we are in greater need of this vocabulary these days. The era of independent will has passed, because rapprochement with the Jews and appeasing them has become a requirement for pleasing the West. O sons of this generation, you who have experienced this nation's aspirations with joy and its setbacks with grief, teach your children how you experienced the stage of confrontation with the Jews and how you have experienced their treachery, malice, and racism. Teach them that there is no safety and no peace of mind with the Jews. Teach them that their occupation of Palestine was a prelude to their usurpation of all of the nation's rights and to preventing its

generations from learning and advancing so the Jews can invade their markets, schools, books, and information media and so they can dictate their tastes and values which are mentioned in the venerable Koran, namely enmity to the values of what is right, just, and beautiful.

American 'Evil Empire' Assailed

93AA0131B Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic 28 Jun 93 p 3

[Article by Hasan Sabra: "It Isn't Settlement But Redrawing of Arab Homeland's Map"]

[Text] What goes on in Washington is not a settlement of the Arab-Zionist conflict but an absolute U.S. drawing of the map of the Arab region and the surrounding area, meaning Iran and Turkey, and perhaps even more. It is a drawing with which the Arabs have nothing to do, except at the moment of signing when approval is given without reluctance or debate.

Any settlement in this world means that there is no victor and no vanquished. But the most that can be achieved for the Arabs will make them losers, not because they do not know how to negotiate and not because they, or some of them, are inclined to make advance concessions, as Anwar al-Sadat did, but because the logic of force predominates in an age in which all values have tumbled. The only value left is that of brute force. Is this not an indication of U.S. domination of the world? Is the rise of the United States as the sole dominant force not an indication that brute force is the single dominant value? Are the negotiations not being held under the shadow of an extremely significant lack of balance of power between the Arabs, or some of them, and the Zionist enemy?

An accord that permits Israel to enter 14 million square km that are the area of the Arab homeland is not a settlement, because this accord is a victory for Israel and a defeat for the Arabs. Even if Israel withdraws from all the occupied territories after, or even before, such an accord, it will enter all the unoccupied Arab territories. This is the tragi-comic paradox. This is:

An accord that permits Israel to interfere in Arab educational curricula in the Arab countries—first in the frontline states and then in the other states one after the other—and to object to the presence of Koranic verses that denounce the Jews;

An accord that permits Israel to eliminate from history books the battles of Muhammad, the Arab apostle, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, against Jews;

And an accord that permits Israel to object to the word "enemy" if it is intended to mean Israel.

This is not a settlement but a devaluation of all of Arab history and of Islam's role in the formation of the Arab nation and the transmission of the message to all parts of the world. Again, this is not a settlement, because it has a victor, namely the Jews, and a vanquished, namely the Arabs. With this in mind, how can we call it a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict?

It is an accord that gives Israel "legitimate" control over Arab water or water received by the Arab countries. This is not a settlement but a defeat signifying [Arab] inability to control even underground water. Perhaps a time will come when Israel has U.S. technology that enables it to divert even rainwater to the areas it occupies before it falls on the countries it has not yet occupied.

This is not a settlement, since settlement means there is no victor and no vanquished. What should we call a situation under which Israel becomes owner of Arab water, while Arabs are not entitled to enjoy their water, even their underground water or their rainwater?

An accord that dictates that the Arab countries open their markets to Israeli products only, to the exclusion of all others, in order to destroy the manufacture of Arab products is not a settlement. The victor in this case is Zionist industry and the vanquished is Arab industry.

It is an accord that dictates that the Arab countries abolish their economic, cultural, and social boycott of Israel at a time when all kinds of boycotts against Arab countries and inter-Arab boycotts are intensifying.

Some Arab countries ban the entry of Arab citizens and approve of the entry of Jews!

Some Arab countries do not send their pilgrims to other Arab countries, but do send them to Israel!

Some Arab countries do not purchase the goods of other Arab countries but have no objection to buying Israeli goods!

Can such a settlement be without a victor and a vanquished? Or is it a settlement which has one winner, namely Israel, and a number of losers who are, inevitably, the Arabs?

An accord that permits Israel to keep the 200 nuclear warheads it is rumored to possess—rumors spread by Israel either for intimidation or as a reflection of the truth—and which are enough to destroy 200 Arab cities from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf, while the same accord stipulates that the Arabs disband whatever armies they continue to have and shut down their weapons factories; that deprives them of spareparts sources; and that punishes any country that still dares to send a rifle, a rocket, or any equipment to any Arab country, even if it is thousands of kilometers away from occupied Palestine—such an accord is not called a settlement, but an acknowledgement of defeat, in which the victor is Israel and the vanquished is the entire Arab nation. Rather, it is a redrawing of the Arab homeland's map according to American criteria. It is worse than the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement and than the 1917 Balfour Declaration in which he-who-does-not-own (Britain) gave to him-who-does-not-deserve (the Jews) a place in Palestine. Such an accord is worse than the 1948 usurpation of Palestine, because it is tantamount to usurpation of the will of the entire nation. Moreover, we can say that such an accord is the result of all the evils committed by the West when it occupied our countries, once in the name of the French and British empires early in the century and a second time in the name of the American empire late in the century.

Just as France and Britain declined as powers and awe inspirers, and empires in the burning Suez waters in 1956, when the will of the Arab nation stood behind Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, shouting "we will fight; we will not surrender," the evil American empire will inevitably fall on this land if the Arab will to follow the path of Khalid Ibn-al-Walid, Saladin, and Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir is revived.

Perceptions of U.S., Israeli Views

93AA0131C Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic 12 Jul 93 p 3

[Article by Hasan Sabra: "Some Land for Arabs and All Peace for Israel"]

[Text] So that nobody may continue to be under the illusion that the Washington negotiations for settling the Arab-Zionist conflict discuss solely the issue of withdrawal of the Zionist forces from the occupied Arab territories in return for peace with Israel—that is, the theory of land for peace—we hasten to say that the Americans' and Israelis' perceptions of the peace and land concepts are totally, and necessarily, different from the Arab negotiators' and Arab citizens' perceptions.

In the concept of withdrawal from occupied land, Israel and the United States speak of territories, not the territories. This concept does not include Jerusalem in the withdrawal, all of the Golan as documented, or the entire occupied West Bank. Israel and the Americans seek to impose a treaty that is worse than the 17 May agreement with Lebanon.

So what about peace? This is the dilemma.

Israel, with definite American support, is not concerned with whether the Arabs give it peace on its borders or not. It has enough military and nuclear capabilities to protect these borders with force. Rather, the matter has reached the point where it is the Arab states who need peace on their borders for fear of Zionist aggression. All Arab-Zionist wars began with a Zionist aggression. This fear encompasses not only the frontline states but all the Arab countries from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf. When Israeli aircraft can get to Annaba in Algeria, then it means that they can get to Sanaa and Bahrain also.

The Zionist's "peace" is not geographic. Rather, it means total political, economic, agricultural, trade, industrial, cultural, informational, and artistic inroads into Arab life. It also means prohibiting whatever is revealed against Jews in the venerable Koran.

Zionist "peace" is no longer just a normalization of relations. Rather, it is an intrusion into every special Arab characteristic, be it pan-Arab or national. Israel has normalized its relations with Egypt, but it has not been content with this normalization. It is waging a real battle to become a natural organ of the Egyptian body. It started with politics and its developments are embodied in the mutual visits and delegations. It then emerged strongly in agriculture, "thanks to" the policy of Yusuf Wali, the ruling party's deputy secretary general, and it is lost in the cement that is manufactured in Egypt so Israel can use it to build the settlements that usurp occupied Palestine.

Israel's objective is penetration and normalization, followed by supremacy over everybody so that it in effect remains capable of subjugating Arab life from within, in the interest of the West, led by America, now that it has succeeded in imposing subjugation from outside with war.

The Washington negotiations have succeeded in establishing four tracks for the settlement with Israel, namely the Palestinian, Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian tracks.

However the most serious track is the track of peace that Israel wants.

The tracks on Israeli withdrawal encompass conditions that the Arabs cannot approve, unless they are willing to make more humiliating concessions. To date, no Arab breakthrough has been made in the interest of Zionist withdrawal.

What is harder is that Israel has successfully made more than one inroad via the "peace" track:

The first inroad was embodied in a Zionist minister's participation in an environmental conference held in an Arab country, namely Morocco. News of the event was treated as ordinary by the Arab and Western media.

The most serious inroad occurred when a Libyan delegation went to Israel on the instruction of Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, Libya's ruler. This is the most serious normalization since the visit of Anwar al-Sadat, the former Egyptian ruler, to the Zionist enemy. News of the event passed with mild denunciation, as if the event were an ordinary event that could recur without any accountability.

The other inroad has been embodied in Kuwait's decision to end the Kuwaiti boycott of companies that deal with the Zionist enemy. Yet another inroad occurred when Tunisia—Tunisia, not Egypt—expressed its willingness to host an Israeli-Palestinian conference in its territory.

Jonathan, an Israeli, went to Libya and spent three days there. His passport is now stamped with the seal of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah, with its eagle of the Falcon of Quraysh (Saqr Quraysh), and with the dates of his entry into and departure from the Arab Libyan territories.

Israel has made a new inroad with the Yemeni Jews issue, demanding that they be evacuated to occupied Palestine.

Prior to that, the ruler of Eritrea—most of whose population and the Arabs proclaim it to be an Arab country that has the power to make an Arab sea—visited the occupied Palestinian territories and found no country other than Israel to treat his malaria. This is a sign of another Zionist inroad made into an Arab country that is gaining its independence.

These are samples of the peace that Israel wants. It wants people to make their pilgrimage, with the approval of an Arab ruler, to Israel and not to the venerable Mecca. It wants people to seek treatment in its hospitals, not in any Arab land, especially if the patient is an Arab ruler or is likely to be an Arab ruler.

It wants to summon Jews, even if they happen to be Arab citizens, to occupied Palestine in order to eliminate the legitimacy of their presence in their native countries and

also to eliminate the legitimacy of any Arab ruler who has Jews in his territory and does not permit them to go to the "promised land."

So, there are Arab-Zionist tracks for discussing the subject of breakthroughs, but in which no Arab breakthroughs have been made to date.

There is an Israeli peace track through which Israel has made a number of inroads to date. Perhaps the condition for the success of the Arab breakthrough for the realization of Israeli withdrawals is for all of the Zionist breakthroughs into the Arab countries to be accomplished one after the other. After "Camp David," all breakthroughs "are easy!!!"

MOROCCO

Journalists Union Elects Officials

93AF0670A *Journalists Union Elects Officials*

[Article by Hatim al-Batiwi: "New President for Moroccan Journalists Union; Two New Chambers Established To Organize Work"]

[Text] The Moroccan Journalist Union has been restructured. It now has two chambers. The first chamber includes the chief editors, while the second includes the journalists. The restructuring took place in a general meeting held on 29 and 30 May. The meeting resulted also in the election of Muhammad al-'Arabi al-Masari as secretary general to replace the outgoing secretary general Mr. Muhammad al-Yazghi.

Mr. Yunis Mujahid from AL-ITTIHAD AL-ISHTIRAKI was elected first deputy secretary general. Mr. Muhammad Ujar, Editor of AL-MITHAQ AL-WATANI, was elected second deputy secretary general. Mr. 'Abdel Latif 'Awad, Editor of ANWAL was elected treasurer. Mr. 'Abdallah al-Baqali of AL-'ALAM, was elected deputy treasurer.

The chamber of the editors includes Mr. 'Ali Ya'ta, editor of both AL-BAYAN and BAYAN AL-YAWM; Mr. Muhammad Ujar, Mr. Abdel Latif, Mr. Mustafa al-'A'awi of AL-USBU' AL-SIYASI; Mr. Muhammad al-'Idrisi al-Qaytuni of AL-RA'Y; Mr. 'Abdel Hamid Al-Khatir of AL-NIDAL AL-DIMUQRATI; and Mr. al-'Idrisi al-'Alami of MAROC SOIR.

The journalists' chamber includes Mr. Muhammad al-'Arabi al-Masari, Mr. Yunis Mujahid, Mr. 'Abdallah al-Biqali, Mr. Hasan 'Abdul Khaliq, Mr. Muhammad al-Bukili, Mr. Tali' Sa'ud al-'atlati, Mr. 'Abdul Rahman Fadli, Mr. al-Bashir al-Zinaki, Mr. Jamal Hijam and Mr. 'Ibrahim Kamil.

The general meeting of the union was held under the motto of "Enhancing the Position of Journalism and the Dignity of the Journalist." Its inaugural session was attended by Minister of Interior and Media Mr. 'Idris al-Basri who listened to the report of Mr. Muhammad al-Yazghi on the financial and literary position of the union in which he reviewed the union's activities and achievements during the last few years.

Other speakers who commented on the report pointed out that it did not give due attention to the activities of the union in other governorates. They highlighted the importance of including them in the future, as well as reconsidering the procedures of electing officials in the regional offices. They also stressed that the changes that have taken place in Moroccan journalism will lead to the introduction of a new generation of journalists eager to play an effective role in developing the media sector. These changes make it necessary for the union to reconsider its structure and trends. They regard the literary report as a response to many of the demands that were realized for the benefit of the media institutions, but not for the journalists themselves, whose social and professional conditions are still very low, their wages are below standards, and they have no social security or insurance.

The other speakers noticed that the financial report did not specify the nature of the income or the nature of the expenditures. It was expected to be more precise and to be prepared by specialists in the field. They pointed out that the union gives insufficient support to the governorates.

The outgoing secretary general gave his rebuttal and mentioned that the report did not include any self criticism. He denied that the union is affiliated with any particular party and indicated that the union is open to all newspapers. He attributed the fact that some papers or journalists are not members to the fact that they have never applied for membership. It is worth mentioning that three committees have been formed to study the working papers submitted by the preparatory committee. These three committees are: the Committee of the Charter and Code of Ethics, the Committee of the General Report, and the Committee of the Affairs of the Profession.

IRAN

Majles Speaker Views Tehran Municipality's Projects*93LA0126B Tehran HAMSHAHRI in Persian 6 Jun 93 p 3*

[Text] Urban Service. Yesterday morning Majles speaker Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Nateq-Nuri visited 15 large projects in the municipality of Tehran.

HAMSHAHRI's correspondent reports that the projects visited by the Majles speaker included the bridges, ramps, and loops on the Modarres Freeway, the Parastu and Darreh Punak bridges, and the Sarkheh Hesar Park.

Mr. Nateq-Nuri also visited the Barut Kubi Canal, which is an extension of the Sarkheh Hesar and Firuzabad canals at the southernmost point in the city of Tehran.

This important project, which is now in its final phases of construction, is the final phase of the great project to collect surface water in east Tehran.

Based on the same report, during this same visit, which lasted five hours, the speaker of the Majles also became familiar with and visited the final phases of the Lavizan and Azgol bridges and the new intersection along Ayatollah Sadr Highway, one of the final phases of construction on this highway, the Afsariyeh Canal, the complex of projects, bridges and roads at Afsariyeh Square, the Abasabad Canal, the Siman Bridge, the project to rebuild Damavand Street, the important Navab Tunnel, the bridges on the Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri Highway Extension up to Dr. Shari'ati Street, and the Madar fruit and vegetable square.

The same report states that during this visit Gholamhoseyn Karbaschi, mayor of Tehran, and the deputy mayor of Tehran for technology and development were also in attendance and provided the speaker of the Majles with the necessary explanations regarding these projects.

At the end of his visit Mr. Nateq-Nuri praised the Tehran mayor's office for its efforts and service.

It is worth stating: This year the Tehran mayor's office is carrying out 70 large development projects, including the construction of roads, bridges, tunnels, and administrative municipal buildings in Tehran's 20 districts, and the projects visited are a part of these programs, which will go into operation by the end of this year [20 Mar 1994] with credits in excess of 250 billion rials.

Value of Nonoil Exports Reached 195 Billion Rials*93LA0113I Tehran SALAM in Persian 27 Jun 93 p 10*

[Text] The value of the nation's nonoil exports last year increased more than 8 percent compared to the year 1370 [21 Mar 1991-20 Mar 1992], reaching 195 billion rials [Rls].

The public relations office of Islamic Republic of Iran Customs said that last year's exports increased 700,000 tons by weight, reaching 3.3 million tons.

Last year various types of carpets and rugs weighing 21.7 thousand tons and valued at more than Rls73 billion rials were the nation's major export goods, accounting for about 38 percent of the value of nonoil exports.

Likewise exports of various kinds of fresh and dried fruits weighing 543.7 thousand tons and valued at about Rls35.5 billion accounted for more than 18.1 percent of the value of the nation's nonoil exports.

He said: Copper and copper objects valued at Rls21.9 billion, various kinds of hide and leather and products valued at Rls6.2 billion, ground transportation implements valued at Rls4.7 billion and mining products valued at Rls3.9 billion were among the nation's other major nonoil exports last year.

The public relations official for Islamic Republic of Iran Customs said that Germany, Turkey, the emirate of Dubayy, Italy, and Switzerland were the nation's major nonoil export markets.

Mozhdehi added: Last year a total of 192,000 tons of nonoil goods valued at Rls49 billion were exported to Germany, 712,000 tons of goods valued at Rls23 billion were exported to Turkey, and 356,000 tons of goods valued at Rls17 billion were exported to the emirate of Dubayy.

According to him, last year a total of 21 million tons valued at Rls2,006 billion were brought into the country through customs, a decrease of about 25 percent by weight from the year 1370 [21 Mar 1991-20 Mar 1992]. Most of the nation's imports last year were industrial machinery, boilers, mechanical implements, electrical devices, cast iron, steel, iron implements and parts for vehicles.

The major sources for the nation's imports were Germany, Japan, Italy, England, and the emirate of Dubayy.

He said: Customs revenues last year reached Rls738 billion, an increase of 199 billion over the previous year.

Statistics on Machine-Made Carpet Exports*93LA0130G Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 16 Jun 93 p 13*

[Text] IRNA. In the year 1371 [21 Mar 1992-20 Mar 1993] the Kashan Industries Company exported 59,031 square meters of machine-made carpet.

The public relations office of the Iran National Industries Organization reports, these exports went to the Sudan, Kuwait, Sweden, the Republic of Azarbaijan, Bahrain, Hungary, Oman, Rumania, and the United Arab Emirates.

Likewise the Kashan Industries Company has predicted that this year its exports will be double the exports for the year 1371 [21 Mar 1992-20 Mar 1993].

The Kashan Industries Company operates under the mantle of the Iran National Industries Organization.

Minister: Country Needs 350,000 Housing Units

93LA0126F Tehran SALAM in Persian 7 Jul 93 p 2

[Text] The third special exposition for exports of construction implements and materials opened yesterday morning at the International Expositions site with speeches by Engineer Kazeruni, minister of housing and urban construction; Engineer Ne'matzadeh, minister of industries; a group of Majles deputies; deputy ministers; officials; specialists; insiders; and the producers of these items.

The public relations office of the Ministry of Industries reports that these ceremonies began as Engineer Hashemi-Taba, chief of the Iran Export Development Center, welcomed those in attendance. In view of the daily increasing need for housing, he expressed the hope that producers would use all their productive capacity to meet needs.

Then Engineer Kazeruni noted that this ministry's policies are aimed at developing the construction and housing sectors, mentioned the Ministry of Housing and Urban Construction's strategy to move the nation's population centers to points of low population, and he said the country now needs to produce 250,000 housing units.

Based on the same report, Minister of Industries Engineer Ne'matzadeh gave a talk in which he discussed the fact that a significant percentage of the nation's development budgets is spent to build installations and buildings, and he enumerated the programs of the Ministry of Industries to meet the nation's needs. He listed the most important factors in the development and advancement of production, including precision in production with attention to the needs of the consumer, the necessity for innovation, creativity and invention in this industry, increased research and education in the country, the use of statistical methods and teaching consumers to make better use of construction materials. He noted the willingness of the Ministry of Industries to welcome such new projects.

This report states that the above exposition was held by the Ministry of Industries with the cooperation of the Iran Export Development Center with the aim of displaying the nation's ability to produce construction materials and supplies and production machinery.

At this exposition 500 production units displayed their products in various categories of construction materials and supplies needed for building construction in a display area of more than 21,000 square meters including ten exhibit halls. The exhibit will continue until 19 Tir [10 Jul].

Report on Increasing Cost of Housing in Ardebil

93LA01130 Tehran SALAM in Persian 27 Jun 93 p 11

[Text] Ardebil—IRNA. The shortage of administrative space, the tendency of the offices to buy and rent residential housing, and, on the other hand, the slow process of transferring land to applicants lacking housing

have led in recent days to an increase by several percent in the costs of buying and renting housing in the Ardebil area.

According to the experts, the Ardebil area, which until some time ago did not have an acute problem with regard to housing and whose housing units could easily be bought, sold or rented easily and at reasonable prices, is now considered an area with housing rates equal to those in the major cities like Tehran.

A housing expert in Ardebil considers one of the important reasons for the major and sudden increase in housing prices in the area has to do with recent administrative changes in the area. He said: With the conversion of the municipality of Ardebil to a province, in recent days the city's various administrative offices and organizations have begun buying and renting residential houses to expand and develop their administrative organizations. This unwittingly led to increased housing demand in the region.

He added: There is no major transaction under way on the Ardebil housing market, but the prevailing view that in the near future the city's government organizations will be making numerous deals to buy and rent housing has led to a daily increase in the cost of housing in the region.

On the other hand some applicants to rent or buy housing in Ardebil do not consider the slow rate of land transfer by the Urban Lands Organization to be without effect on the recent increase in demand on the Ardebil housing market.

According to them, the Urban Lands Organization from 1369 [21 Mar 1990-20 Mar 1991] until now has made no kind of land transfer, and most applicants, although they have deposited money in this organization's account, are still waiting to receive land from the aforementioned organization.

These kinds of people, most of whom are also from society's worker and low-income classes, say that this indecisive condition has forced them to rent housing.

In an interview with IRNA's correspondent, the Ardebil urban lands official, while linking the recent high prices for housing rentals and purchases in Ardebil to the delay in transferring land by that organization, said that the major factors in the daily increasing price of housing in the area are the 9 percent growth in the population of the municipality of Ardebil, emigration from the rural areas and Ardebil's neighbor cities, and the conversion of the area to a province.

He also said that the high prices of construction materials and the increase in profit rates on bank housing loans from 12 percent to 16 percent were not without effect in the increase in housing costs in the area. Concerning the slow transfer of lands, he added: Since the year 1366 [21 Mar 1987-20 Mar 1988], about 1,000 hectares of land in various parts of the city of Ardebil have been taken over by this organization, and, after preparation, there are plans to turn these lands over to

applicants without housing in the second half of the current year [23 Sep 1993-20 Mar 1994].

He added: Executive problems with taking possession of these lands concurrent with changes in the regulations of the Urban Lands Organization, which was supposed to turn all the lands over to applicants after preparation, caused the delay in the transfer of the lands in the Ardebil area. When these obstacles are removed, the task of transferring land in the city of Ardebil will soon begin.

The Ardebil urban lands official predicted that with the start of the land transfer in the second half of the current year, housing problems will be solved for many people in the area.

At the same time Engineer 'Abdol'alizadeh, supervisor of the Ardebil governor-general's office, attended a meeting of the province administrative council in which he announced that if nothing stops the enormous increase in housing costs in the Ardebil area, there will be a great problem in the future for the area. He called upon the city's various executive organizations to make joint use of existing administrative buildings until buildings are constructed.

The supervisor of the Ardebil governor-general's office advised the private sector to build housing, commercial and administrative units with many stories and he said that this will alleviate the housing problem.

Housing Essential Element for Attracting Professors

93LA0124B Tehran SALAM in Persian 6 Jul 93 p 2

[Text] The minister of culture and higher education emphasized the need to create incentives to attract professors, and he mentioned giving them land and organizational houses along with the elementary resources of life as important factors for attracting them.

Dr. Mo'in spoke at a meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Universities of Tehran's Region 2, held yesterday in Arak. He said: The most important pillar of a university is its professors, who have the responsibility for teaching and doing the research.

He said: Although it may have the best classroom space and resources, if a university does not have enough professors it is just an empty space.

He noted: Currently, there is one professor in the country for every 21 students, and during the Second Five-Year Plan this figure will reach one professor for every 14 students.

He added: At the Arak Teacher Training University, this ratio is one professor for every 35 students, and this university must take the necessary steps to create an environment that is attractive to professors.

He discussed the fact that 79 percent of the faculty at Arak Teacher Training University is instructors. He said: According to acceptable standards, 30 percent of the faculty at universities should be instructors, and the

rest should be assistant professors and professors, and this figure is now 49 percent throughout the country.

The minister of culture and higher education discussed the deprivation of Central Province in the area of higher education. He said: Across the country, there are 1,200 students per 100,000 population, while there are only 400 students per 100,000 students in Central Province.

At this meeting Mas'ud Soltanifar, governor-general of Central Province, said: While this province has had regular growth in the area of industry, it has not had sufficient growth in other areas, despite its talents.

He added: In recent years about 400 billion tomans was spent carrying out large industrial projects in Central Province, and comparable investments must also be made in the areas of culture and education.

The fifth meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Universities of Tehran's Region 2, including Tehran University, 'Alameh Tabataba'i University, Al-Zahra University, Khajeh Nasiroldin Tusi University, the Polytechnic University, and the Tehran and Arak teacher training universities, met yesterday morning at Arak Teacher Training University attended by the presidents of these universities, the Friday Imam of Arak, and the Majles deputies from Central Province. During that meeting discussions and exchanges of views were held concerning the achievements and problems of that university.

ABRAR Interviews Agriculture Minister

93LA0114A Tehran ABRAR in Persian 8, 12, 15 Jun

[Interview with minister of agriculture 'Isa Kalantari at the Ministry of Agriculture, date not given]

[8 Jun pp 1, 4]

[Text] Economic Service: When one sits and speaks with Dr. Kalantari, the time slips away. I went to see him with high expectations and a mass of questions (which I thought would take him by surprise). Before going into the minister's room, I heard one of the employees in the minister's office say that cigarette smoking is prohibited in the entire ministry building by order of the minister! I said: What an arbitrary minister! The young office employee immediately said: You may smoke if you wish.... I said, yes, I want to!

He got up, beckoned and guided me to the floor above. I sat and smoked a cigarette. I asked another employee: Has the minister forced the smokers not to smoke? He said: No! There is no compulsion. Everyone in the building refrains from smoking in the ministry out of respect for the minister!

Once the interview began, I saw the humility in the minister's conversations with his underlings, most of whom he addressed by first name. The phrase "out of respect for the minister" took on meaning for me. Respect engenders respect, sincerity, sincerity.

Unlike many officials, he does not have a stack of papers filled with figures in front of him. He does not say "I want to do this and that." He speaks of "what they have done," and as the young people would say, he is unpretentious. If last year's agricultural output was unprecedented, he does not take credit for himself. He says: "What happened was done by the farmers." We have to pull out of him the few answers he gives which have a self-congratulatory quality. He does not "brag."

He does not say "I, I." When I asked him about livestock and agriculture, contrary to expectation, he spoke calmly about this deficiency. His calmness and humility calmed me, and my harsh questions automatically became softer.

I had intended to be with him for one hour, and said goodbye to him after about four hours.

What you will read below are selections from my four-hour interview with Dr. 'Isa Kalantari, minister of agriculture.

[ABRAR] Mr. minister! You have been in charge of the Ministry of Agriculture for about five years. What improvements have taken place in the nation's agriculture during these five years?

[Kalantari] You ought to answer this question, in view of the fact that you follow the nation's economic affairs.

[ABRAR] Recently you announced that the production of agricultural crops is ahead of the schedule in the nation's Five-Year Economic Development Plan. On what statistics was this statement of yours based?

[Kalantari] I'd like to say that... of course there are numbers and statistics, and...

[ABRAR] I will collect the numbers and statistics; you talk about the items.

[Kalantari] First of all, improving the agricultural situation is the task of the farmers. It is not my task.

[ABRAR] In any case, the work done by the Ministry of Agriculture and its management is not only not without effect, indeed it has great effect.

[Kalantari] In view of the fact that the necessary planning and the necessary assistance have been sufficiently carried out, there has been an increase in production putting it somewhat higher than the figures set out in the plan. Fortunately our dependence on food imports has decreased somewhat. One side is domestic production, the other side is the procurement and completion of public food needs with imports.

[ABRAR] A decrease in imports is no indication of an increase in production. Due to the high cost of food, people have reduced their consumption, for example the consumption of meat...

[Kalantari] This statement of yours is not true in all areas. With regard to wheat, for example, each person can have as much bread as he wants; there are no limitations, or we are forced to export grains. We export

potatoes. Fruit that has been produced is rotting. Last year we had a problem with increased production.

[ABRAR] Last year? In the last one or two years, what has been the percentage of change in our self-sufficiency with agricultural crops?

[Kalantari] In the year 1369 [21 Mar 1990-20 Mar 1991], the percent of self-sufficiency with wheat was 72 percent. Last year it reached 80 percent. In 1369 the figure was 88 percent for barley, last year it reached 96 percent. In the year 1369 the figure for rice was 61 percent, and last year it reached 72 percent.

[ABRAR] In what area has the level of self-sufficiency exceeded domestic consumption, with our country able to export agricultural crops?

[Kalantari] Grains, potatoes, onions...

[ABRAR] To what extent?

[Kalantari] For example, grains, which were 59 percent self-sufficient in the year 1369, went up to a striking 121 percent last year. In the year 1369 potatoes were 99.4 percent, and have risen to 105 percent. Onions were 101 percent, and have reached 109 percent, and there are other items for which I can provide statistics if you wish.

[ABRAR] What is the situation with the production of tea, sugar cubes, and sugar?

[Kalantari] We have also had production increases with these items. For example in the year 1369, we were 46 percent self-sufficient with sugar and sugar cubes, and last year this number reached 69 percent. Tea was 55 percent, and has reached 67 percent.

[ABRAR] What, in your view, were the factors causing these increases in production? Was it measures taken by the Ministry of Agriculture, or a good market for the purchase of crops?

[Kalantari] We cannot ignore government support in these few years. These infrastructure support measures, such as water delivery, drainage, increased budget and the labor of the farmer himself, have gone hand in hand and brought about increased production.

Livestock and Agriculture

[ABRAR] Mr. minister! As far as I remember, in all other countries, unlike in our country, agriculture and animal husbandry have a custodian. Recently when the International Conference of Ministers of Agriculture met in Tehran, the agenda included the study of agricultural and animal husbandry issues. According to regulations, only one minister could attend from each country. I don't know how you solved this problem. Essentially, in view of the close relationship between these two areas (agriculture and animal husbandry), doesn't this duality or having two custodians cause problems?

[Kalantari] This very thing is one of the weaknesses of our organization. Livestock is at least 10 to 11 percent dependent on pastures, but livestock cannot be separate from farming. It can be separate from natural resources,

but not from agriculture. Some countries have a separate minister of natural resources, but there is no country except Iran whose livestock is separate from farming or its agriculture.

[ABRAR] What steps have been taken to solve this problem?

[Kalantari] God willing, reforms will be made late this year [21 Mar 1993-20 Mar 1994], will be approved by the president of the republic in 1373 [21 Mar 1994-20 Mar 1995], and we will see suitable organizations. Right now our farmers are confused. Essentially, for the last 50 or 60 years the tie between animal husbandry and agriculture was 90 percent, while the link between animal husbandry and pastures and natural resources is about 10 percent.

[ABRAR] Mr. minister! There is a theory that says: Agriculture in Iran is a remnant of traditional methods and it is unable to adopt mechanized methods. Traditional methods are no longer economical and farmers have abandoned them, and because of the numerous problems, including shortages and high prices, especially since the unification of the foreign exchange rate, farmers have been unable to adopt mechanized methods.

[Kalantari] Forget the idea that traditional agriculture is not economical.

Mechanized agriculture is also a relative thing. To the extent that the operating units in our country are small units, they cannot be 100 percent mechanized. Even our large units, such as cultivation and private or government industries, cannot become 100 percent mechanized.

[ABRAR] Then you agree with this theory?

[Kalantari] No. Because of many issues, we must establish a fundamental way of looking at things in Iran. In general we have come to the conclusion that if about one horsepower is used per hectare, we have both a semi-mechanized agriculture and to an extent manpower is being used. Currently, if we also take into account the depreciation of the machine, we have more than one horsepower per hectare. We have a machine.

[ABRAR] Then where is the problem?

[Kalantari] The problem is that a number of the machines that are given to the agricultural sector (in practice for transportation) have been taken out of agriculture. Due to the unfavorable circumstances that the farmer has, we cannot expect the farmer not to use the machine for transportation.

[ABRAR] Why are the farmers doing this?

[Kalantari] The main reason is economic. When the farmer gets a tractor and sees that he has no means of transportation, he has no pickup truck, there is no passenger bus, then he uses the tractor to travel. It is more economical both for his own heavy implements and for hauling water.

[ABRAR] You mean using the machine for hauling water and travel is more economical than using it for agricultural work?

[Kalantari] For the Iranian farmer, yes! Why? Because our operating units are small. Let's assume that the owner of a 70-horsepower tractor has 10 to 12 hectares [ha] of land. This tractor is capable of servicing 100 ha of land, but this farmer services his own land, and instead of going and servicing another plot of land, he sees that it is more economical to use it for example to haul sand and water.

There are two problems here, first that it is not being used for agricultural work, second that the tractor is effectively being imprisoned. That is, a farmer owns a tractor, but he imprisons the tractor. This causes further damage, because the demand for tractors is double or even more. Education is also one of the problems. Fortunately, someone who gets a tractor learns how to maintain it. However this training and the money for the tractor is expensive if not used.

[ABRAR] Why does the farmer imprison his tractor, for which he has been trained and paid a significant price? Does this have any kind of economic justification?

[Kalantari] These are people who derive part of their income from agriculture. There are some for whom it is more economical if their machine is used in other areas, and in general this kind of use is a feature of a tractor, because this problem does not exist for a combine or other machinery.

[ABRAR] In your view, what should be done to prevent this? Should the nation's capital be wasted in this wrongful way?

[Kalantari] What we have done to prevent this is that we are gradually moving in the direction of making the work more economical. In past years we have been able to activate the mechanization service companies to such an extent that we gave resources and machinery, to be used only for agriculture, to the rural people who form these companies in order to prevent the imprisonment of national capital. Their work is to keep tractors and combines, which is considered a separate occupation. They serve only the farmer and collect the money, as in combine keeping. I think that with the unification of the foreign exchange rate and the resulting high prices for tractors and combines, we must form these companies. Perhaps a farmer who pays 5 to 6 million tomans for a combine and 1 to 1.5 million tomans for a tractor can no longer afford to imprison the capital, because it is a heavy investment.

[ABRAR] I think that the unification of the foreign exchange rate will automatically eliminate the imprisonment of agricultural machinery.

[Kalantari] Formerly a Rumanian tractor was even cheaper than a motor bike, and for this reason machinery was imprisoned.

[ABRAR] Does your ministry currently pay any subsidy for agricultural machinery?

[Kalantari] The ministries do not pay subsidies, the government pays them.

[ABRAR] Very well, doesn't the government pay subsidies for machinery?

[Kalantari] Currently, meaning this year, machinery (not implements) is distributed with competitive foreign exchange. In spite of all this, we are trying to establish tractor keeping and combine keeping in agriculture as an occupation.

[ABRAR] Currently, how much agricultural machinery do you buy?

[Kalantari] We no longer buy it. The farmer himself buys it. It has nothing to do with us.

[ABRAR] Meaning the farmer himself buys and imports it from abroad?

[Kalantari] The foreign representative comes here and...

[ABRAR] Meaning you have nothing to do with the purchase of agricultural machinery?

[Kalantari] When the foreign exchange rate floats, we cannot get involved.

[ABRAR] It is not the floating rate now, it is the competitive rate.

[Kalantari] This year is the last year for competitive foreign exchange.

[ABRAR] Do you make any purchases now?

[Kalantari] We have no imports.

[ABRAR] Who does the importing?

[Kalantari] Now, the farmer can import.

[ABRAR] The farmer does not go and import machinery. What I mean is, what organization or group imports the machinery? Does the private sector do it?

[Kalantari] The private sector does it. No one prevents them.

[ABRAR] Does it import now?

[Kalantari] It does not, but if it wanted to do so it would do so.

[ABRAR] Who does the importing now?

[Kalantari] Now the machinery that is already in the country is used.

[ABRAR] Meaning you have no imports?

[Kalantari] No. After all, tractors are produced domestically. Of course we need them. For example, we need combines. However, since production is now done with competitive foreign exchange and imports are done with floating foreign exchange, no one is buying, each person goes and buys whatever model he wants to buy. Of course we try just to supervise, to see that types and parts

of machinery and agricultural implements come into the country. That is, we must establish requirements, that every combine that is to be sold must have representation to give service and repair after the sale. Without service and repair, we do not allow the import. Machinery that is domestically produced is distributed at the competitive foreign exchange rate, and its quality is also quite high.

[ABRAR] The quality has increased, but the problem they have is that selling one item at a time, they cannot get their money back.

[Kalantari] Selling one at a time they cannot, but there is the Agricultural Machinery Development Foundation.

[ABRAR] The one that was dissolved?

[Kalantari] No, it was not dissolved. Its responsibilities changed.

[ABRAR] What are its responsibilities?

[Kalantari] Its responsibilities are to support domestic producers, develop mechanization and alleviate shortages. They themselves will not engage directly in commercial activity.

[ABRAR] Is the payment of subsidies for agriculture continuing?

[Kalantari] Yes, it is continuing.

[ABRAR] Subsidies involve selling machinery at competitive foreign exchange rates. Otherwise, most costs would be at the floating foreign exchange rate.

[Kalantari] No, you buy a domestic machine at 800,000 tomans, for example, the farmer does not have this buying power, he lowers the prices. Some of them are like this.

[ABRAR] Wouldn't it be better if we increased the purchase price of agricultural crops instead of doing this?

[Kalantari] The purchase of what?

[ABRAR] The purchase price of agricultural crops, wheat for example. Now the price has gone from how much to 22 tomans?

[Kalantari] From 15 tomans.

[ABRAR] How much wheat do we produce per hectare?

[Kalantari] The average wheat production is 3,200 kg. Four years ago it was 1,900 kg. From the years 1335 [21 Mar 1956-20 Mar 1957] to 1367 [21 Mar 1988-20 Mar 1989], according to international grocery statistics, we went from 1,300 kg to 1,960 kg. Since the year 1367 we have reached 3,200 kg.

That is, in 32 years, we added 600 kg, and in about four years we added 1,300.

[ABRAR] By changing the seeds?

[Kalantari] It was the same Central Wheat Project, changing the seeds, appropriate cultivation, developing mechanization, planting at the right time (because this is

very important), fighting weeds, fighting disease, fighting pestilence, and making production profitable. When wheat finds its own real price, our irrigated wheat will no longer be partially irrigated. The farmer stole his water. In the spring he gave it to another crop. Now he gives it to the wheat itself, he gives it more attention. We hope that by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan it will exceed 4 tons to reach 4,200 kg.

[12 Jun p 4]

[Text] Economic Service. Note: In the last issue, in an interview with Dr. 'Isa Kalantari, the minister of agriculture discussed problems and achievements in agriculture, the problem of the separate supervision of animal husbandry and agriculture, and the solution to providing means for agricultural machinery, and we reached the subject of production, especially the production and importation of wheat in the country.

In this issue, as the interview continues, we discuss the issues of bread and wheat.

[ABRAR] Saudi Arabia announced to farmers that it would buy their products at prices higher than international prices. With this policy, wheat production in Saudi Arabia, whose land is insignificant compared to Iran's, increased dramatically. Then when the farmers got started, they bought as much wheat from their own farmers as they wanted to import and spend in dollars.

You are now buying domestically produced wheat for 22 tomans, and imported wheat for 32 tomans, which with other costs will even reach 35 tomans. Don't you think that instead of paying subsidies it would be better to increase your purchase price?

[Kalantari] That is our policy.

[ABRAR] Why don't you implement it faster?

[Kalantari] We were entangled. There was a lot of commotion, and we were unable to do it.

[ABRAR] When you do something, you must not fear commotion. Mr. 'Adeli and Mr. Nurbakhsh are doing their work carefully to satisfy themselves. There was all this commotion concerning "foreign exchange," look what happened. Only...

[Kalantari] Look, the issue is that our producers must also consume. That is, about 3.5 to 4 million tons of our wheat is consumed by the rural people, they consume their own products.

[ABRAR] Yes, meaning they must sell their wheat, and then go and buy bread.

[Kalantari] The country does not yet have the ability to collect all the wheat and give bread to everyone. When you say buy wheat for 32 or 33 tomans, I agree also, but this must be done gradually, and what I was saying was that we ought to buy wheat at 20 percent more than the international price, meaning that we should buy it for 37 tomans now, but for this producer, whose bread costs 33 tomans, we cannot suddenly separate him from his own product. It is not physically possible.

[ABRAR] When the farmer is using the wheat he produces himself, he probably won't use it in the future, or he will make up for the difference in the price of its sale.

[Kalantari] Impossible! The average operation in our rural areas is about 2 or 3 ha of land, but of these 3 ha, only 1 is wheat, and from this 1 ha, we only harvest 3,000 to 3,200 kg. In the country's usual situation, his family consumes about 1,400 to 1,500 kg per year, he saves 300 to 400 kg for seed, and 1,000 kg is left with which to obtain the difference in "foreign exchange." This is not economical for him. We must gradually get service for him. We must also lower our subsidy on urban consumption. We sell bread to the people in the cities for 5 tomans per kg, while we charge the people in the rural areas 32 tomans. We are adding insult to injury for the rural people, and we are saying that since you are in the village, you are condemned to buy your bread for 32 to 33 tomans.

[ABRAR] You are not condemning, in spite of all this, you do not have the resources.

[Kalantari] In reality we are condemning him. It cannot be anything but this. At the same time we are increasing prices, we are also fixing the wheat subsidy. We must keep the urban subsidy at a fixed level from the very beginning. That is, when I buy for 32 tomans from a rural person, which was last year's price, I am obliged to pay 5 tomans. This year, when the price is 22.5 tomans, we should still pay 5 tomans.

[ABRAR] Haven't you done this?

[Kalantari] No, we have not.

[ABRAR] We have had bread price increases!

[Kalantari] No, that was to keep from hurting the baker.

[ABRAR] Yes. We see that it takes about five workers to produce a loaf of lavash bread for 15 rials [RIs].

[Kalantari] Yes, it is just so. For example, a baker bakes 500 kg of bread per day. Assuming he commits no abuses, does not steal, sells his flour at the free market price, ultimately he will get 4,000 tomans. He has at least four workers. Four times 700 is 2,800 tomans. Adding himself the total remaining is 4,000 to 3,500. There is also the electrical bill. He has the key money for his store to pay, the water bill, taxes, and a thousand other headaches.

[ABRAR] You left the path of violation open. Do you want him not to violate the law?

[Kalantari] No! I said if he commits no violations!

[ABRAR] Which he is forced to do!

[Kalantari] Yes, he is forced to violate the law. If he does not, there is no profit, none, he will even lose money. This is why we increased the price of bread, to prevent the baker from violating the law, but the foreign exchange difference is still in place.

[ABRAR] Why don't you explain to the people? Why don't you explain to the people that we have not

increased the price of wheat and flour. Rather, in order for the baker to be able to give you bread, so that you won't be detained all this time standing in line, it is for their wage that you must pay Rls5 more for bread.

[Kalantari] The appropriate organization should explain. The Grain Organization, being affiliated with the Ministry of Commerce, should explain. I want to say something else...

[ABRAR] Not explaining to them hurt you. It is hurting the nation's farmers.

[Kalantari] It is just so. We are being hurt because bread is cheap, and the damage is doubled. One is the producer, for whom it is not economical. He wants to finish 500 kg of bread in three hours. He does not give the bread time to rise completely. Our bread does not rise. One of our problems is that on the one hand they pour out the flour and knead the bread, and 15 minutes later they start cooking the bread, although it should be left for at least three hours. When the opportunity to rise is not given, the quality drops. One side is the dough, another side is the baking, this has to do with the baker. On the other hand, since it is inexpensive, the people buy two loaves when they want one, they eat the good part and the rest is wasted.

[ABRAR] The statistics on bread loss in Iran are frightening!

[Kalantari] Yes, they are frightening! Most of our losses are from imports. If we look at that side, it is a disaster. The cost of a ton of wheat is \$300, add in the energy that is expended and it becomes about \$500.

[ABRAR] You are both a member of the Council of Ministers and of the Economic Council. Why don't you raise these issues? This is a national injury, a disaster!

[Kalantari] It has been raised. Every year we lose \$400 to \$500 million on bread.

[ABRAR] That is no small amount! Do you know how many hospitals, schools, and universities could be built with that money?

[Kalantari] And how many dams could be built? Every year 500 megawatts of new electricity could be generated, and hundreds of hectares of land could be irrigated.

[ABRAR] What is the solution?

[Kalantari] This is a social issue, an educational issue. That is, they must justify it, that includes us, and the media, the cleric who stands behind the pulpit, and the student who goes to school must all say brother, these losses hurt the country.

[ABRAR] To save \$400 to \$500 million per year, if you spent 5 to 10 percent of that amount to mount a propaganda and justification campaign, it would solve the problem.

[Kalantari] Yes, these are things that unfortunately are the responsibility of another organization.

[ABRAR] What organization has the responsibility for this task?

[Kalantari] The Ministry of Commerce, the Grain Organization. Another problem is that it is not important to them whether grain is imported or produced. He says, I will supply whatever the consumer market demands. I will supply it whatever the price. Because if the government does not have wheat, it hurts its medicine, it hurts its military industries, it hurts education and training. It buys wheat. That is, since it does not have a hand in production (the Grain Organization) and it does not answer for the nation's production, they answer for the nation's bread. They say, buy it at whatever price. Import any difference. They may not be concerned enough about the kind of and quality of consumption.

[ABRAR] I have heard that you speak very directly. When you sit next to the minister of commerce on the Council of Ministers and the Economic Council, don't you discuss these problems together?

[Kalantari] Of course. If we are an importer of wheat, they give the responsibility for that to...

[ABRAR] Very well, you answer that this negligence is theirs.

[Kalantari] Yes, I say that, and I will say the same in the organizations. I say that if I am the producer and am responsible for importing any shortfall, on the other hand I also have the responsibility concerning consumption to...

[ABRAR] Have you said this anywhere?

[Kalantari] Yes, it has been discussed.

[ABRAR] Now, say it more loudly...

[Kalantari] Now don't start an internal fight before the elections!!

[15 Jun p 4]

[Text] In the two previous issues, in an interview with Dr. Isa Kalantari, minister of agriculture, we talked about the effects of unification of the foreign exchange rate on agriculture, the production and import of agricultural machinery, the production and purchase of wheat from farmers, the problem of dual decisionmaking centers in animal husbandry and agriculture and the bad effects of making separate decisions in the procurement, distribution and production of farmers. Today, you will read the final installment of this relatively long interview.

In the interval between today and the publication of the first installment of this interview (last Tuesday) we have had questions from many dear readers with regard to the Ministry of Agriculture, and God willing we will raise those questions with Dr. Kalantari on another opportunity.

[ABRAR] Very well, the prerogative of importing wheat rightfully should belong to the Ministry of Agriculture, but currently it does not. As for tea, for about two years

the purchase of tea has been out of the hands of the Ministry of Commerce and this is now being handled by your ministry. What improvements have been made in this situation?

[Kalantari] In these two years, we have given the necessary supports to the production of tea. Some years ago (7 to 8) the price of green leaf tea had risen from 7 toman to 10 to 11 toman.

Now, however, in these two years the price has gone from 110 toman to 50 toman. A motivation has been created for tea growers. The wage in the conversion factory has increased from 2 toman to 28 toman. A motivation to work in the tea industry has been created. It has become economical, both for tea growers and for the tea factory owner. Instead of using his old methods, the tea factory owner is rebuilding his factory. Since it has become more economical, the quality of the tea has found itself, and they are making quality tea. Since last year we have had 12,000 tons of tea in our warehouses.

[ABRAR] Meaning it wasn't consumed?

[Kalantari] Consumption has not gone down. The merchandise is still sold in abundance to the people at the subsidized price. Production has increased.

[ABRAR] Do you pay a subsidy on the difference between the price you pay to the tea grower and your sale price?

[Kalantari] Yes, the tea we buy from the tea grower for 50 toman ends up costing the government 320 toman, and we sell this for about 160 toman. A subsidy of about 50 percent is paid. Despite this, our imports are declining more and more every day. Production was thus supported, and the quality of domestic production also increased.

[ABRAR] If this procedure were adopted for bread and wheat, do you think the result would be the same?

[Kalantari] Yes, if the same thing were done for bread, the situation would be the same. You asked a question and I did not answer. You said that fertilizer and pesticides have increased 6 to 7 fold. Why have 50 percent of the prices increased? If a kilogram of fertilizer were used properly, it would have an average effect of 12 to 15 kg of wheat.

[ABRAR] For the benefit of our readers, how much (in rials) in fertilizer is used for each hectare of land?

[Kalantari] 300 kg per hectare

[ABRAR] How much is that in rials?

[Kalantari] Formerly it was 900 toman, now it has become 2,400 toman to produce a hectare of wheat. Pesticide consumption was 150 toman, and has now become 1,000 toman. For the 850-toman difference, our farmer must add 5,350 toman.

[ABRAR] Meaning each kilogram is 2 toman. How much did you increase the purchase price?

[Kalantari] Seven toman.

[ABRAR] Then why do you want to pay subsidies for fertilizer?

[Kalantari] The issue is something of a political problem.

[ABRAR] It is not a political question, the question is, you must pay an extra Rls70...

[Kalantari] I was speaking about two issues. One is that there are our consumers themselves, 3.5 million of whom are their own rural people. Meaning that the more they raise prices, the more they are hurt. That oppressed class is itself a consumer. They are hurt the most. This is one of the reasons.

[ABRAR] The payment of subsidies, the use of government foreign exchange, has caused enormous abuses in this country. The sooner we, that is, as of today...

[Kalantari] The second reason is that we have a series of goods such as vegetables, such as fruit, these are things that use more pesticides.

[ABRAR] A riding camel does not stoop down. The government's policy says that supply and demand must determine prices. If the price of vegetables goes up, it goes up. Didn't the government choose this policy?

[Kalantari] Yes, but this policy cannot be implemented all at once. Look at the agricultural sector. It cannot change its orchards in one stroke. Our fruit production is now greater than our consumption. On the other hand, there are restrictions on our exports, because the Europeans have imposed tariffs on our fruit, heavy tariffs. They are also the main consumers, the "market" is them, otherwise, the emirates taken as a total market are less than our city of Karaj.

[ABRAR] Meaning that with the tariffs they have applied, the tariff on fruit from Turkey is different than the tariff on fruit from Iran?

[Kalantari] Yes, it is different.

[ABRAR] The price of Iran's fruit is lower, how is it that Turkey succeeds in exporting, Iran cannot?

[Kalantari] Turkey has no tariffs. They have applied tariffs for us and they have practically blocked the way for our exports. Our struggle...

[ABRAR] Why don't we respond in kind?

[Kalantari] We should also respond in kind.

[ABRAR] When should that be done?

[Kalantari] This is an issue that has been raised, they are studying it, we announced to the Majles that the Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce should respond in kind.

[ABRAR] Will the result benefit them or us?

[Kalantari] They imported \$200 million from us, we import \$10 billion from them. The problem is that now we cannot talk to this class of producers about supply and demand. They cannot export. There is surplus production. They must either sell for 3 toman per

kilogram and take a loss of 7 to 8 tomans per kilogram, and lower production because of low consumption.

[ABRAR] Economically, this explanation of yours is not acceptable. If we want to defend one part for the sake of the whole, then how much are our total fruit exports?

Assume the exports are zero. I can say there is a portion, of the fruits of ours that were previously exported, 5 percent is still exported. Now assume it is zero, we have no exports.

Our production in this area is in excess of production. The export market is also small, and the purchasing power is also low. If we raise the finished cost of fruit too much, in view of the new economic policies, before long, two or three years, however long it takes, the public's purchasing power will fall and then consumption will also fall. Who is hurt here? The producer as long as he produces in excess of consumption, supply, and demand which receives no answer.

[ABRAR] Here a conversion industry automatically comes into existence. Isn't that so?

[Kalantari] One thing is that a conversion industry comes into existence, another is that production decreases, and supply and demand are here. We cannot decrease production, but gradually he himself sees that it will be left on his hands, and he lowers it.

[ABRAR] Then from where will we bring oranges? Will the stores fill up with foreign orange juice?

[Kalantari] Most oranges are domestic. Citrus fruits have been left in the hands of the orchard owner, you see that they buy rice well. The government guarantees it. Ten years ago we applied pressure, telling people not to convert the rice farms to orchards.

Citrus fruits either ought to be grown in the foothills in the north, or in the southern part of the country. Rice was not supported at that time. The market for citrus fruits was good. They said you have nothing to do with this. Now that the situation has reversed, supply and demand is gradually being achieved.

However, there is a problem that cannot be ignored in the orchard sector, which is a permanent sector. He is converting his orchard to a rice field, which is quite natural. However, we cannot deprive him of his possession all at once. That is, if citrus fruits consume 60 kg of pesticides, instead of him paying 700 to 800 tomans, or 2,000 tomans, he must pay 120,000 tomans for pesticides. He harvests 15 tons of citrus fruits, and the cost of pesticides for each kilogram is 6 tomans. However, it sells for 3 tomans. This falls apart immediately. It is true that economic issues are important, but it needs time.

We do not have such a problem with our farming. If there is a loss this year, the next year he plants a guaranteed crop. Next year there will be supply and demand for plums, cucumbers, melons, and watermelons. However, it will be expensive, and it should be. This is supply and demand. Then the production of wheat, beets, barley, rice and grains will increase, but the

movement is the proper movement. Policy will impose the type of cultivation on us.

We have not been able to do what we have been seeking to do. Neither legally nor by force have we been able to stop him and tell him to plant rice instead of melons, to plant wheat instead of cucumbers, to plant sunflowers with oily seeds instead of sunflowers with dry seeds. He himself will act at the correct time, over two to three years.

In the orchards, however, we cannot do this. We have 1.1 million workers in the orchards. To bankrupt them suddenly, to deprive them of their possessions, would create an economic and social problem. We cannot suddenly cut off a subsidy, but we pay subsidies of 15 to 20 percent annually. On the other hand, indirect supports must also be given to the rural producers, and we must also reduce urban consumer subsidies. Everything must be based on supply and demand.

[ABRAR] By when?

[Kalantari] I think that the elimination of agricultural sector subsidies will necessarily have to take three years.

[ABRAR] Will this haste intensify possibly, after the elections for president of the republic?

[Kalantari] No, it will remain at the same rate of speed as the last year or two.

[ABRAR] I wrote a note about the price of the chemical fertilizer that is imported. The price they announced is much higher than the real price, even higher than the floating foreign exchange price. Have you investigated this?

[Kalantari] No.

[ABRAR] Why?

[Kalantari] No, because what you wrote at the first of the year was based on last year's purchases by the Ministry of Commerce. Then it was the Ministry of Commerce doing the buying, now it is the Ministry of Agriculture.

[ABRAR] Who produces?

[Kalantari] The Ministry of Commerce bought from abroad, the Ministry of Petroleum bought domestically.

[ABRAR] It is not such a complicated task to produce chemical fertilizer!

[Kalantari] That is correct. We have two types of fertilizer, one is phosphate, one is nitrogen. We produce about 65 percent of our nitrous fertilizer. Since consumption is high, our petrochemical industries are inadequate. Until the Khorasan Petrochemical Plant goes into operation and we become self-sufficient, we will be importing 400,000 to 500,000 tons of nitrous fertilizer per year. All phosphate fertilizer is imported, because we have no phosphorous, its raw material. The Ministry of Petroleum produces 200,000 tons of it, for which it also buys, imports and converts the raw material. It may not even be economical for us to do this anymore.

[ABRAR] What about nitrous fertilizer? How much did you say is produced domestically?

[Kalantari] About 1 million tons of nitrous fertilizer is produced domestically.

[ABRAR] For what price do they sell it?

[Kalantari] Last year the price was subsidized, this year it is sold at the floating rate.

[ABRAR] Did someone set the price, that the floating rate should be this much?

[Kalantari] Yes.

[ABRAR] At how many places do you pay subsidies?

[Kalantari] At the first of the year it was undetermined. It was sold at an unregulated price. Then it was decided that the price should be set based on the floating foreign exchange rate and the Ministry of Commerce's average purchase price last year. The average purchase price of phosphate fertilizer was \$250. We set the price at \$220, but our purchase price was \$173 from Marrakech. We ourselves set the price again based on \$173, then we set the price of nitrous fertilizer based on \$140. Then we saw that the finished price was again too high. The government came and paid a small subsidy, meaning the government absorbed the bank's 18 percent profit rate. A small amount of money was left from last year, and we added that as well, so that phosphates came down to 24.5 toman.

[ABRAR] Concerning the guaranteed prices for agricultural crops, are these prices, which were set for agricultural crops, in the interest of the farmers? That is, is that something that makes the farmer happy?

[Kalantari] Of course the Ministry of Agriculture's recommendations were somewhat different from these prices, but the Economic Council approved these prices. These may not be the prices that were wished for by the farmers and the Ministry of Agriculture, but the interests of agriculture are still in this, although not to such an extent that we wanted it. Especially at the beginning of the new year, we tried to raise our guaranteed prices so the farmers could endure the pressure and they would have more cash for next year. Very well, however, even now they will not be hurt by these prices. It is just that the profit we expected for the farmers will not be there.

[ABRAR] Is there no program to revise the guaranteed prices for next year?

[Kalantari] Next year's guaranteed prices will be announced in the month of Shahrivar [23 Aug-22 Sep]. This year they were announced somewhat late because there was uncertainty. We did not know on what basis the price for our foreign exchange would be set. We were expecting the Majles Plan and Budget Commission to approve it, but we did not know if it would be the floating, competitive or the government rate. Now that it has been approved, fortunately we are prepared to announce the guaranteed prices for the year 1373.

[ABRAR] Mr. minister! Thank you very much for giving us your time and for patiently answering our questions. As the final question, we have heard that every day you receive members of the public from 0600 to 0730, before the administrative day starts and you look into their problems on the spot. Why haven't you reported this important fact to the press?

[Kalantari] I also thank you for listening patiently to my troubles, and as for the answer to the final question, if news is worthy of the name, then reporters should gather it, rather than it being given to them.

Over \$400 Million in Food Products Ruined Yearly

93LA0122E London KEYHAN in Persian 6 May 93 p 4

[Text] At the first meeting of food industries managers and specialists from the Iran Society of Food Industries Specialists, Hojjat ol-Eslam Dari Najafabadi, chief of the Majles Plan and Budget Commission, said: Due to the lack of the necessary resources and needed food industries, as well as the lack of appropriate transportation and technology, every year more than \$400 million of the nation's agricultural crops, such as sugar beets, milk and dairy products, and fruit and vegetables, is ruined.

Dari Najafabadi discussed the problems in the agricultural sector and food industries. He added: To improve the quality of food and to gain maximum presence on international markets, more attention must be given to conversion industries, packaging, cold storage, and the transportation and preservation of agricultural crops. Of course, for its part the Majles is paying more attention than in the past to the above areas. In our society, since industry has not grown up from within society, the manpower employed in it absolutely does not have good productivity and efficiency, and no suitable system has yet been devised for making use of the aforementioned industries and their manpower.

In conclusion, the chief of the Plan and Budget Commission emphasized the need to devise an "industrial strategy" for the country and said: Some time ago the Supreme Industrial Council was charged with devising a suitable industrial strategy and submitting it to the Majles, but so far it has done nothing about this. Therefore the Majles, using the views and recommendations of industrial insiders and owners, will compile this strategy and implement it in the Second Five-Year Plan.

Wheat Production Up in Gorgan, Gonbad

93LA0113U Tehran SALAM in Persian 28 Jun 93 p 14

[Text] Since the onset of the season for buying wheat in excess of the needs of farmers, 377,000 tons of wheat has been bought from the farmers in this area.

The amount of wheat bought in east Mazandaran compared to the same period last year shows an increase of 247,000 tons.

Engineer Zanjir, chief of the Gorgan and Gonbad Rural Cooperative Organization, gave an interview yesterday

to IRNA's correspondent. He said: The purchase of wheat in Gorgan and Gonbad is done by 79 mobile and fixed purchasing stations in this region.

According to him, so far of the amount of wheat purchased, 292,000 tons was given to the Grain Organization and the remaining 85,000 tons is at the purchasing centers.

He discussed the increased amount of land under cultivation and the wheat yield and predicted that this year more than 520,000 tons of wheat will be purchased from farmers.

While emphasizing the need to overcome the shortage of currency in the banks available for paying wheat loans to farmers, he added: In view of the existence of 1,600 combines in the area and the rapid increase in the wheat harvest, it is necessary to build special storage facilities for keeping the harvest and to build landing places for distribution of the freight near the wheat fields.

Engineer Zanjir also said with respect to the farmers' interest in making wheat available from the wheat fields to the buying centers, it is necessary to reevaluate the limitation on the time available to market and buy wheat in the area.

Date Palms Successfully Produced in Laboratory

*93LA0130D Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI
in Persian 20 Jun 93 p 8*

[Text] Successful experiments have been conducted producing date palm saplings using laboratory test-tube tissue grafting procedures.

With the successful results from these experiments, as of this year the Physiological and Biochemical Department of the Sapling and Seed Research and Modification Institute in Karaj has taken on the responsibility of producing 1 million tissue-grafted date saplings, 200,000 per year over a five-year program.

Dr. Ahun Manesh, deputy minister of agriculture for research, propagation and training, gave an interview to IRNA. He said: In this program, after going through various stages the saplings produced will gradually be transferred from the test tubes to planters and after a period of care they will be transferred to the damaged date orchards in the province of Khuzestan.

He added: The production of 1 million saplings would take at least 100 years using traditional methods, and this period is reduced to five years by growing the date palms in test tubes.

In addition to that, the sapling produced in the test tube will definitely bear fruit, while with the planting of a date sprout in the ground using the traditional method, one does not even know if the tree will bear fruit in 10 years or not.

Engineer Eslam Majidi, director of the Physiological and Biochemical Department of the Agricultural Research Organization's Sapling and Seed Research and Modification Institute, also discussed the laboratory procedure

for cultivating saplings. He said: The laboratory task begins with separating the ends of the date sprouts.

He added: After the sprouts grow, several cells are separated from each sprout and after they grow through stages of cell division, the cells are placed in test tubes in a damp, warm environment with artificial light, and with the addition of special hormones, the cells become plants.

After the cells grow roots, stalks and leaves, the saplings are moved from test tube to planter and the growing period begins so that they can gradually be moved to Khuzestan.

Restoration of Palm Groves To Be Completed This Year

93LA0113S Tehran SALAM in Persian 28 Jun 93 p 14

[Text] Of the 6 million date palms in the war-stricken areas of Abadan and Khorramshahr, 2.7 million were destroyed by the war.

The public relations office of the Ministry of the Reconstruction Crusade reported that there are 21 million date trees in the country, for which the province of Khuzestan ranks first with 9 million trees.

This report adds: In the year 1368 [21 Mar 1989-20 Mar 1990] the Central Reconstruction and New Construction Staff for the nation's war-stricken areas turned over the job of rebuilding the date groves of Abadan and Khorramshahr to the reconstruction crusade, and the reconstruction crusade began this task in the framework of 12 important projects.

The public relations office of the Ministry of the Reconstruction Crusade reports that more than 353,000 cubic meters of dams and flood breakers were built by the end of the year 1371 [21 Mar 1992-20 Mar 1993] at a cost of 9,557,065 million rials [Rls], while 2.4 million date trees were pruned, and 18,000 date saplings were planted.

Other measures by the reconstruction crusade in the four years of its activities revitalizing the date trees in Khorramshahr and Abadan include the construction of 1,380 motor homes, 390 bridges, 1,140 km of roads, the campaign against wild grasses in the date groves over an area of 1,100 hectares [ha], cleaning up about 15,000 ha of date groves, the distribution 557 motor pumps valued at Rls490 million to date growers, and the payment of Rls6.5 million in damages to date growers.

According to this report, the Khorramshahr and Abadan Date Grove Reconstruction Staff carried out other secondary activities, such as dredging the 3,600 km of the Tavisheh River, 6,000 km of the 'Arayez river, the construction of underground tunnels for transferring water from the Arvand River into the date groves, the formation of a fire brigade in the date groves, putting water pumping stations into operation using mobile floating pumps for emergency irrigation of the date groves, and dredging the mouth of the Bahmanshahr River.

This report states that the reconstruction of Khorramshahr's date groves was to have been completed last year, but due to the failure to procure the necessary credit, it was decided that it would be completed by the end of the year 1372 [20 Mar 1994].

It is to be noted that if attention is given to suitable production and packaging of the region's date crop from at least 3 million date trees out of the province of Khuzestan's 9 million date trees, annual revenues of Rls100 billion can be earned. If only 60 percent of the crop produced is exported, revenues of 6 billion tomans can be earned, and this amount is equal to the province of Khuzestan's development budget for the year 1372 [21 Mar 1993-20 Mar 1994].

Wheat Harvest Begins in Abar Kuh

93LA0130E Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian
15 Jun 93 p 11

[Text] Abar Kuh—JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI. The task of harvesting the wheat and barley crop from more than 10,000 hectares [ha] of the rich land in the deprived area of Abar Kuh has begun.

Engineer Farahmand, an official at the Center for Agricultural Services in the municipality of Abar Kuh, announced the above at a press conference. He said: With the arrival of the wheat harvest season in the Abar Kuh area, the task of harvesting this strategic crop from a 9,000-ha area has begun with the use of 100 reapers and three combines, and it will continue until late in the month of Tir this year [22 Jun-22 Jul 1993].

He noted: The deprived area of Abar Kuh is considered one of the active agricultural centers in the province of Yazd, and despite the fact that the Abar Kuh area is a desert area, it can be claimed that the hard working and toiling farmers in this deprived area are achieving self-sufficiency in the production of agricultural crops and are playing a worthy role in improving the nation's economic situation. For example, the wheat harvest has already begun in this area, and more than 5,000 farmers are working to gather this crop, and this is testimony to that claim.

Continuing the interview, the official from the Abar Kuh Center for Agricultural Services discussed the desirable and valuable effects of the major project to improve the planting and growing of wheat in the Abar Kuh area. He said: This project has been effective in raising wheat production, saving water, and lowering the costs of planting, cultivating, and harvesting.

Of the 9,000 ha of land being cultivated with wheat in the current agricultural year in the Abar Kuh area, more than 5,500 ha has been mechanized, and 2,000 ha has been partially mechanized by 3,000 farmers. The remaining scattered areas are being cultivated in the traditional way, and compared to last year this figure represents a 20-percent increase.

He emphasized: For every hectare being cultivated under the major wheat project, an average of 4.5 tons of

wheat is harvested, but from this same amount of area under cultivation in the traditional way, 3.5 tons of wheat is harvested.

Among the other means provided to farmers by the major wheat project in this area, the official from the Abar Kuh Center for Agricultural Services mentioned the distribution of agricultural supplies for the wheat harvest, such as 275 tons of chemical fertilizer, 170 tons of Qods and Roshan seeds, 1,500 kg of pesticides, and 8,000 spindles of reaper twine.

He discussed the education of farmers and observing the principles of wheat cultivation. He said: In this regard 32 classes have been held on mechanized wheat planting in which 700 farmers have received the necessary training.

As another of the activities of the Abar Kuh Center for Agricultural Services, he cited the creation of 13.5 ha of exhibition fields in the Abar Kuh area.

At the end of this press conference Mr. Farahmand said: In order completely to supervise the wheat harvest, this year a committee called the Harvest Committee was formed composed of various offices such as the Abar Kuh Center for Agricultural Services, the district office, the police force, the fire department and the reconstruction crusade, which will exercise full supervision of the harvest of this crop.

Increase in Fertilizer Sales Reported

93LA0130H Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI
in Persian 19 Jun 93 p 13

[Text] With the new adjustment in the price of chemical fertilizer, demand by farmers to buy this agricultural item has increased in the municipality of Saveh.

Hasan Rastkar, executive director of the Municipality of Saveh Rural Cooperatives Union, told IRNA's correspondent that in the last week more than 170 tons of chemical fertilizer was distributed among farmers and that demand to buy this agricultural supply item continues to increase.

He added: The high cost of chemical fertilizer in the last two and one-half months led to a lack of farmer demand, yet in the same period the previous year more than 1,100 tons of various types of chemical fertilizer were distributed among farmers in the municipality of Saveh.

He announced that consumption for one agricultural year in the municipality of Saveh is 131,000 tons.

Despite the new adjustment in the price of chemical fertilizer, this product still reaches farmers at a price five last year's price. The prices of some chemical fertilizer fertilizer items are as follows:

Type of Fertilizer	Price in rials		New Price
	Last Year	This Year	
50-kg phosphate bag	1,100	14,500	5,500
50-kg nitrate bag	875	8,500	4,375
50-kg uric bag	950	11,600	4,750

Resources Threatened by Soil Erosion

93LA0115H London KEYHAN in Persian 15 Jul 93 p 4

[Text] One-eighth of the 16 billion tons of annual soil erosion on the Asian continent occurs in Iran, which is the largest percentage of soil erosion in the world.

IRNA's correspondent reports from Mashhad that Dr. Mehdavi, a member of the UN Hydrology Committee and a professor at the University of Tehran gave as the reason for this erosion the existence of erosion agents, the physical characteristics of the soil and water and soil management. He said: Our country is in the most undesirable situation because of these conditions.

He emphasized that the failure to contain floods and the conversion of pastures to agricultural land is a disaster for the nation's natural resources. He said: If the current plant cover in the foothills of the Alborz range and Atrak River basin is compared with the past, the importance of this will be demonstrated.

He mentioned the 170 centimeters of soil erosion that has taken place in 1,000 years in the municipality of Gonabad, and said: This is 1.7 times the world's average soil erosion.

He discussed the damaging effects of soil erosion. He said: For example, every year 50 million tons of soil is washed into the Sefidrud Reservoir as sediment, and in the near future this will cause this huge dam to be full.

He said the annual precipitation in the country is 300 billion cubic meters and said: Of this amount, 265 billion cubic meters is stored.

Dr. Mehdavi, who was speaking in Mashhad at a specialist academic conference on water resource and pasture management, said that the nation has a total of 100 billion cubic meters of surface water and that its underground water totals 35 billion cubic meters. He said: About 70 percent of this water is wasted.

At this one-day conference, attended by a number of professors and experts on water resource management, he said: Water will be an important issue for the world in the future.

He also discussed the large 30-billion-cubic-meter Ataturk dam in Turkey. He said: With the construction of this dam, Turkey will become a water power in the future.

Government's Projects To Guarantee Water Use, Price

93LA0126E Tehran SALAM in Persian 7 Jul 93 p 14

[Text] Economic Service. With the completion of the Tehran Comprehensive Sewage Project, 98 percent of Tehran's consumer water, which is about 1 billion cubic meters, will be reused for agricultural purposes.

Mirdavud Milani, general manager of the Water Office of the Plan and Budget Organization, gave a press conference in which he announced the above. He added: The first phase of studying the Tehran Comprehensive Sewage Project has been completed and the second phase has begun, and parts of it are ready for implementation. In the beginning the aforementioned project will remove the sewage from 15,000 hectares [ha] of land in Tehran, and will include a treatment plant, and in the subsequent phase it will cover all of Tehran.

Continuing, he said: On the one hand, Tehran's sewage must be studied as a matter of sanitation and of collecting refuse water, and on the other hand it must be studied as a source of water for agricultural uses. Already the price of a dam that could store 1 billion cubic meters of water is more than 12 billion tomans. Therefore the implementation of the Tehran Comprehensive Sewage Project is significant from any point of view.

Concerning dams and building dams in the country, he said: We already have 20 dams being built in the country, and when they are completed the volume of the nation's controlled surface water will increase from the present 26 billion cubic meters to 40 billion cubic meters per year. In addition to obtaining the water deficit for 1.2 million ha of lands under cultivation, 600,000 new ha of cultivated land will also be covered.

He emphasized that water projects use very little foreign exchange and that this is a strong point for the water sector. He said: We must move in a direction where dam building is done for multiple purposes. As other countries do, from the very beginning we must plan dams from the technical standpoint in such a way that in addition to uses such as the production of electricity and potable and agricultural water, we will also be able to control floods.

The general manager of water for the Plan and Budget Organization discussed water losses in Tehran. He said: We are already losing 30 percent of the water because of Tehran's rotting water pipes, which have an average age of 30 years. Another 5 percent is also lost through unauthorized consumption, and the total water waste in Tehran is 35 percent.

Continuing, he said: The pipe network must be rebuilt and repaired to prevent water waste. For this purpose, recently the Tehran Water Organization has procured suitable high-caliber meters to measure precisely the amount of water lost in various locations. In this way agents will easily be able to identify areas with water loss and take steps to rebuild and repair them.

Concerning water consumption in the country, Mirdavud Milani said: In the Rio Conference Resolution last year, 5 liters of water in a 24-hour period was considered sufficient for personal consumption. In Tehran this figure is now 120 liters, which is a very high figure.

The monthly consumption of each customer (constituting five people) increased from 31 cubic meters in the year 1343 [21 Mar 1964-20 Mar 1965] to 74 cubic meters in the year 1369 [21 Mar 1990-20 Mar 1991], yet only 25 cubic meters is enough to meet the needs of the customer. These things show the country's uncontrolled consumption of water.

To economize on water consumption, prevent waste, and prevent the nation's land from becoming saturated, in the Second Five-Year Plan the price of water will be set based on its aggregate delivery. Likewise the rate of the sale of water will be set in the framework of the government's general policies on a regional basis in the provinces and cities, with the use of increasing tariffs in such a way that it will cover all the costs of maintenance and utilization.

Continuing, he said: In the first two months of this year [21 Mar-21 May 1993] we had 6 to 11 percent increased consumption on some days compared to the same period in the year 1371 [1992]. If this continues, despite this year's favorable rainfall, we will have water shutdowns on some summer days.

The director of water for the Plan and Budget Organization discussed the credits allocated to the water sector for the current year. He said: This year 855 billion rials credit has been provided for water projects, including the four sectors, dam construction, irrigation and drainage networks, water delivery networks for urban water, and research and study.

In conclusion, Mirdavud Milani discussed the most important water sector policies in the Second Five-Year Development Plan. In the Second Five-Year Plan, in view of the priorities for incomplete projects, studies will be done on starting large new water projects only after the design of the water management project and the necessary studies above the dam, the design of projects that pertain to its irrigation and drainage projects, how it is to be distributed among the fields and the system for its maintenance and utilization are completed.

With regard to projects already in operation, the program for water management above dams as well as the system for utilizing and maintaining networks below the dams must be amended or designed with a network and special attention to the use of pressurized irrigation systems and through the establishment of a personal system.

Priorities will be given to the implementation of small projects, which necessarily have technical and economic justifications. In these cases priorities will go to projects that have the possibility of financial participation by private users.

As needed, executive projects will be designed for river engineering and flood control, with priority for border rivers, in such a way that by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan the organization of all shared rivers will be completed.

Lack of Conservation Could Lead to Water Shortage

93LA0113E Tehran SALAM in Persian 27 Jun 93 pp 1, 3

[Text] News Service. This year Tehran's water consumption increased 10 percent and reached 30 meters per second. If this continues and if the people do not conserve, Tehran will be faced with a water shortage.

Engineer Gholamreza Manuchehri, deputy minister of energy for urban water and sewage affairs, announced the above yesterday morning at a gathering of news reporters. He added: Currently one-third of Tehran's consumer water comes from underground water and deep wells, and with the digging of several groups of water wells in various parts of Tehran this year, 60 million cubic meters of water was added to Tehran's water capacity.

He said the reason for the increased water consumption in Tehran is the failure to increase the price, insufficient propaganda about conservation, consumption of urban gas, population growth, the wearing out of pipes, and damage to pipes caused by the gas company.

The deputy minister of energy for urban water and sewage affairs, speaking on the occasion of Water Conservation Week, discussed future measures and programs in the area of urban water and sewage throughout the country.

He said: The project to procure water for about 100 cities in national projects and for 100 cities in province projects is being implemented. Studies are under way or have been completed in a number of cities for the procurement and distribution of water.

He also said: Currently 92 percent of the entire urban population is directly covered by urban water networks, and the total number of service lines is in excess of 5.5 million.

The deputy minister of energy discussed the fact that this year more than 400 million cubic meters of water is being procured. He added: The total national and province credits this year in the water sector is about 250 million rials, which shows a significant growth.

Engineer Manuchehri discussed water delivery projects in the nation's cities. He said: The first phase of the project to deliver water to Esfahan and 20 other cities and villages in this province has gone into operation, and water for the large cities of Na'in and Najafabad is also procured from Esfahan.

He said the credits for the project to deliver water to Esfahan and 20 other cities in this province was 350 million tomans last year. He said: This year credits for the Esfahan water delivery project increased to 1.2 billion tomans.

He added: The shortage of water in Shiraz was alleviated with the digging of 30 wells. The water problem for the cities of Semnan and Kermanshah was also solved. The preliminary work on the Minab to Bandar 'Abbas water delivery project has also been completed and the work to deliver water to the cities of Rasht and Bandar Enzeli is being done.

Concerning the project to deliver water to Tabriz, Engineer Manuchehri said: With credits in excess of \$100 million and with a short-term and a long-term project, water will be procured for the city of Tabriz.

He discussed the spread of sewage projects throughout the country. He said: Sewage projects are being carried out in 26 cities in the country, and likewise sewage study projects are being carried out or have been completed for 60 meters in the country. The cities of Tabriz, Shahr-e Kord, Borujen, Mashhad, Kuhpayeh and Shahr-e Reza, Shiraz and Marvdasht are ready for service lines.

The deputy minister of energy for urban water and sewage affairs discussed the fact that this year 500 km of sewage pipes have been laid in the country. He said: Sewage projects have begun this year for the cities of Khoei, Bandar 'Abbas, Mashhad and Arak.

Continuing, Manuchehri said: The nation's annual rainfall is 400 billion cubic meters, of which only 30 percent, meaning about 140 billion cubic meters, remains as surface or underground water, and the rest evaporates.

He also said: Of some 45 billion cubic meters of underground water and 100 billion cubic meters of surface water, 100 percent of the underground water is taken and 60 billion cubic meters of the surface water is taken.

He said: 5 percent of all the nation's water is used for drinking and 95 percent is used for agriculture.

In conclusion, he added: To make the best use of the water in the country, a consumption pattern has been prepared, to be announced by the president of the republic, which includes reforming and monitoring water consumption, the use of dual-network systems to procure drinking water and washing water, using limiting devices on washing faucets, reducing loss in the water network by repairing the pipe network, where unfortunately at the present time 150 million cubic meters of water is lost annually in the city of Tehran, the use of a drip irrigation network, increasing public awareness, developing and establishing industries that use little water, using water from polluted wells for green space, preventing urban population growth, increasing the water price in some parts of the country, and establishing an increasing water rate.

Water Network Allocated 1.9 Billion Rials

93LA0120H Tehran KEYHAN-E HAVA'I in Persian
30 Jun 93 p 11

[Text] Dehloran—KEYHAN Correspondent—1 Tir [22 Jun]. A credit of 1.9 billion rials [Rls] to rebuild the water delivery network and purify the water in the cities of Dehloran, Musian and Mehran will be given to the

water and sewage companies of the aforementioned cities out of reconstruction credits.

Mohammad Hasani, deputy from Dehloran, gave a press conference in which he stated the above. He discussed this region's position in the province and the problems arising from the shortage of manpower in this sector. He said: The development of the cities and the unbridled population growth not only has failed to solve the water shortage problem, it has also increased the problem.

He added: Experts in this area believe that the underground fresh water tables in Dehloran and Mehran have come into contact with the brackish water tables.

Hasani was asked about the fact that a number of emigrants have returned to the original homeland, but they have not yet been able to get the seven basic goods. He answered: According to the executive guidelines for Note 31, 150,000 tomans cash is to be provided in place of the seven basic goods for emigrants who have not obtained the goods.

In conclusion he said: In general, people who have been unable to obtain construction materials to rebuild their homes will receive Rls600,000 this year in addition to the difference from Rls2.5 million credit.

Rials Totaling 9.5 Billion Allocated to Esfahan Water Projects

93LA0113T Tehran SALAM in Persian 28 Jun 93 p 14

[Text] The sum of 9.5 billion rials [Rls] has been allocated for the province of Hamadan's water delivery projects.

Engineer Asadollah Shokuhi, director of water affairs for the province of Hamadan, announced yesterday in an interview with IRNA's correspondent that about Rls2.5 billion of this amount will be obtained from province credits, and the remainder will be obtained from the national budget.

He said: Rls5 billion of the credits for the year 1372 [21 Mar 1993-20 Mar 1994] for water affairs in this province will be spent on developing the water delivery networks in the cities of Molayer, Asadabad, and Hamadan.

He added: Important water projects for the year 1372 [21 Mar 1993-20 Mar 1994] in the province of Hamadan include continued construction on the Abshineh Dam, dredging the Akbatan Dam in the municipality of Hamadan, a drinking water network for the cities of Nehavand and Kabutar-ahang and the project to procure agricultural water in various parts of the province.

Ilam's Drinking Water To Be Guaranteed Next Year

93LA0113D Tehran SALAM in Persian 26 Jun 93 p 10

[Text] With the utilization of the large diversionary Chamgardan dam in the Malekshahi district in the province of Ilam, next year drinking water will be procured for the citizens of Ilam.

This statement was made in an interview with IRNA's correspondent by Davud Aqajani, executive director and chief of the board of directors of the Western Regional Water Corporation, who had gone to Ilam to study water problems. He said: With the utilization of this dam, with a water capacity of 1,200 liters per second, Ilam and its district will provide water to more than 6,500 hectares [ha] of fruitful and productive land in the province.

He said: With the utilization of these water delivery projects, in addition to procuring drinking water for some of the nation's western cities, more than 62,000 ha of productive agricultural land in the western part of the country will be brought into irrigated cultivation.

He said: With the utilization of diversionary dams and reservoirs, in addition to preventing the loss of surface water, this will add to the volume of underground water in this area.

Since the beginning of the triumph of the Islamic revolution, more than 60 diversionary dams have been built on the border and nonborder rivers in the province of Ilam, and every year this prevents the loss of millions of cubic meters of water.

Currently the project to complete 12 diversionary dams is being carried out in the province of Ilam by the Office of Water Affairs and the Agriculture Organization, and by the end of the current year, six diversionary dams will go into operation.

Discontent in Qom With Water, Powdered Milk Shortage

93LA0126J Tehran SALAM in Persian 7 Jul 93 p 19

[Text] The lack of sufficient distribution of powdered milk in the pharmacies of the municipality of Qom has left those with ration coupons with nowhere to go.

IRNA reports that last year 60,000 coupons for powdered milk were distributed by the Qom Office of Health Care and Treatment, but a significant part of these coupons was never used because of the shortage of powdered milk.

On the other hand, problems with importing pharmaceutical items, a group in which powdered milk is included, have caused the distribution of powdered milk in the pharmacies of Qom to decline considerably.

The news agency's interviews with officials in Qom pharmacies show that deliveries of powdered milk by the Iran Pakhsh-e Qasem Company only meet 20 percent of the demand from ration coupons.

The deputy official for drugs in the Qom health-care network emphasized the existing shortages and said this is a national issue. He said: The reduction in powdered milk imports has caused these problems, but it is not such an acute problem to get this item in Qom.

The official from the Amir Kabir Pharmacy in Qom said: Formerly, we delivered 25 cartons of powdered milk every two weeks, but that number has now fallen to 12 cartons.

A consumer who calls himself a simple worker asked officials to help solve this problem. He told our correspondent: Currently each can of milk sells on the free market for 4,500 rials, and it is hard for the working and oppressed classes to obtain it.

Shortage of Drinking Water in Babol

93LA0113W Tehran SALAM in Persian 28 Jun 93 p 15

[Text] Babol—SALAM Correspondent. The municipality of Babol is one of the most populous cities in the province of Mazandaran. For several years it has been faced with a severe shortage of drinking water due to the population increase.

Our correspondent reports that most places in the city of Babol are faced with water cutoffs for four to 10 hours every 24 hours. Low water pressure keeps water from reaching buildings with several stories, and it is only possible to transfer water to buildings with several stories by installing pumps. In addition to the city, most of the villages of Babol also lack piped and sanitary water.

According to Engineer Nariman, deputy from Babol, based on a report from the Plan and Budget Organization in the province of Mazandaran, in terms of piped water the villages of Babol are the most deprived villages in the province of Mazandaran.

Majidi, governor of Babol, discussed the procurement of consumer water for the people of Babol. He said: Engineer Manuchehri, deputy minister of power for water and sewage, promised verbally that as soon as possible, meaning after the election for president of the republic, work will begin on installation of a new pipeline transferring water from Amol to Babol. In view of the summer days, it is quite necessary to expedite this project.

Azərbayjan Water Organization Fined Rls20 Billion

93LA0126M Tehran SALAM in Persian 7 Jul 93 p 19

[Text] Because of the loss of 20 million fish and fry in Shakheh Nashur, Chu Chu, Zarrinrud and Miyan-e Doab, the West Azerbaijan Regional Water Organization was ordered to pay a 20-billion-rial [Rls] fine.

Mahmud Sa'dabadi, West Azerbaijan general manager of environmental protection, gave an interview to IRNA's correspondent. While announcing the above, he added: With the draining of the Miyan-e Doab plain, the water of Shakheh Nasur in Zarrinrud was stopped, and as the result of that 20 million fish and fry were lost. The drainage operations began in the year 1365 [21 Mar 1986-20 Mar 1987].

He added: Likewise the Miyan-e Do Ab Sugar Cube Factory and the 'Abbasi hospital in this municipality were ordered to pay a fine of Rls5 billion, 90 percent of which has already been deposited into the government's account, for polluting the environment with sewage.

He discussed another part of the measures taken for preservation by the West Azerbaijan Office of Environmental Protection. He added: Last year 17 brick and

asphalt factories were moved outside the province's residential areas, cities and villages, and this year also all the polluting units will be moved from residential areas out of the cities.

The general manager of environmental protection praised and thanked the judicial authorities for their cooperation and for their decisive dealings with violators of environmental regulations.

Mazandaran Facing Drinking Water Shortage

93LA01241 Tehran SALAM in Persian 6 Jul 93 p 11

[Text] This year the province of Mazandaran is faced with a shortfall of 20 million cubic meters of drinking water.

Engineer Parviz Qolizadeh, executive director of the province of Mazandaran Water and Sewage Company, said in an interview with IRNA's correspondent: Based on existing statistics, the amount of drinking water distributed in the province of Mazandaran is 100 million cubic meters per year, yet the amount of water needed is 120 million cubic meters per year. He announced that the amount of water wasted and lost in the province is 30 percent.

Engineer Qolizadeh noted that 94 percent of the province's drinking water comes from wells, and the rest comes from unreliable rivers and springs. He added: The number of active drinking water wells in the province is 223, and there are 28 inactive wells.

He discussed the total volume of stored drinking water from wells and springs. He said: The capacity of the province's water reservoirs, at 284,000 cubic meters, is quite low, and this is considered one of the reasons for the shortage of water in the province.

He cited equipment that is inappropriate for wells, the lack of capacity of pipes to transfer water, the low capacity of pumps installed at the stations, the impracticality of the distribution network and in general the worn-out state of equipment and installations as other major factors in the water shortage in the province.

The executive director of the Water and Sewage Company discussed the decisive measures taken by this company to alleviate the water shortage. He said: To procure the drinking water needed by the citizens of Mazandaran, water in the cities is cut off and stored at night on a regional basis, and then is consumed during the day.

He added: To rebuild and repair the water distribution networks, this year 780 million rials [Rls] has been provided from government development projects, and Rls2 million has been provided from bank credits.

Concerning the problem with sewage in the province, he said: Because of the high level of underground water and the impenetrability of the soil, the sewage situation in this province is most undesirable and 90 percent of the cities in the province lack sewage installations.

Government's Plans for Mining Sector Viewed

93LA0130B Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 17 Jun 93 p 13

[Text] During the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan, the use of mines in the copper belt throughout the country will increase.

Engineer Kolahduz, deputy minister of mines and metals for nonferrous products, gave an interview to IRNA's correspondent in Kerman. While announcing the above, he said: During this plan the government will try to increase the use of mining resources as much as it can, and in this regard it welcomes investment from the private sector. He said: In accordance with planning that has been done, serious activities have already begun to put into operation as quickly as possible the Mazraheh Copper Mine in Azarbaijan and the Kar-e Kafi Mine in Sirjan and Darrehzar.

He added: With the implementation of infrastructure work, during the Second Five-Year Plan the Iran National Copper Company will be able to increase annual copper production to 200,000 tons with an increase of 55,000 tons. The annual nominal capacity of this product is 145,000 tons.

He said: The government has decided to help the private sector buy mining products in order to encourage specialists, experts and investors and to make them want to invest in the nation's mines.

He said: In the implementation of this program, already the private sector is actively participating in the operation of the Semnan Copper Mines, and this process has also begun in Kerman.

The deputy minister of mines and metals discussed the subject of research. He said: An effort is being made so that applied research will rediscover its proper place and in this regard a number of engineers and specialists in assembly fields have begun this task from the beginning.

He said: In this regard the Copper Industries Company has been able for the first time in Iran to obtain gold at Sar Cheshmeh from the copper mud.

Shares of Cement Complex Transferred to Workers

93LA0120G Tehran KEYHAN-E HAVA'I in Persian 30 Jun 93 p 10

[Text] Tehran—31 Khordad [2 Jun]. More than 370 shares of the Fars and Khuzestan Cement Complex valued at 1.592 million rials [Rls] were transferred to the workers for these two units.

Mehdi 'Ali Akbar, chief of the Production Units Ownership Organization affiliated with the Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs, gave an interview to KEYHAN's correspondent in which he discussed the above. He said that these measures were aimed at giving workers a share in the ownership of factories and production units. He said: The shares were transferred on the basis of measures enacted by the Production Unit

Ownership Expansion Council in previous years with credits allocated by this organization in the name of the workers. In view of the repayment of the value of the allocated shares from the annual profits of this unit and the payment of the remainder by the shareholding workers, the council came out with decisive approval of their ownership and thus more than 1,400 workers from the huge Fars and Khuzestan Cement Complex, including 11 production units from this complex in various municipalities in the country, acquired shares in the ownership of this unit.

He added: In the first three months of the current year, counting the shares transferred from the Fars and Khuzestan General Cement Corporation, in implementing its responsibilities and duties this organization has transferred 741,287 shares from the 14 production units belonging to it, including the Butan General Industrial Corporation, Behshahr Industries and the investments of the Ardel Industrial Group and Kuhfar Industries, valued at Rls2,572 million, to 2,820 workers from these units and other production units.

Textile Company Distributes Millions Among Workers

93LA0120M Tehran KEYHAN-E HAVA'I in Persian 7 Jul 93 p 11

[Text] Athens—IRNA—12 Tir [3 Jul]. The Egypt and Iran Thread and Cloth Weaving Company announced that it will distribute 14.2 million Egyptian pounds (\$4.7 million) of this company's profits for this year among its 4,000 Egyptian workers.

The Egyptian newspaper AL-AHRAM, in publishing this report, quoted 'Abd al-Hakim Hajaj, president of the board of directors of the aforementioned company. It wrote: This company's profits last year were 436,000 Egyptian pounds.

This year this company produced 110 million Egyptian pounds in goods, an increase of 20 million Egyptian pounds over last year.

According to this report, in the aforementioned period this company exported about \$35 million in textiles to new markets in Bulgaria, Norway, the Dominican Republic, Jordan, South Africa, and Ghana.

The Iranian members of the board of directors of this company, who are from the private sector, went to Cairo last week.

The next meeting of the board of directors will be held in October (Mehr and Aban) of this year in Tehran.

This company was established in the year 1974 with 54 million Egyptian pounds capital, and Egypt owns 51 percent of the shares.

It is worth mentioning that Egypt is one of the world's largest exporters of cotton and textiles.

Over 650 Tribal Reconstruction Projects Operational

93LA0120N Tehran KEYHAN-E HAVA'I in Persian 7 Jul 93 p 11

[Text] Tehran—1 Tir [22 Jun]. Six hundred fifty three projects in the areas of livestock and pastures, water procurement, and also the construction of development centers were put into operation last year with credits of 9 million rials in tribal areas.

The Public Relations Office of the Ministry of the Reconstruction Crusade, in announcing the above, added: In the year 1371 [21 Mar 1992-20 Mar 1993] the Iran Tribal Affairs Organization carried out 114 projects in implementing the Livestock and Pastures Project, including 14 livestock veterinary clinics and one livestock watering trough.

Concerning the procurement of water needed by the tribes last year, the Iran Tribal Affairs Organization completed 252 projects, including the improvement of 41 springs, the digging of 29 deep and semideep wells, and the procurement of five water tankers.

Javanrud Reconstruction Jihad Activities Detailed

93LA0113K Tehran SALAM in Persian 27 Jun 93 p 10

[Text] Last year credits in excess of 1.5 billion rials [Rls] were allocated to the reconstruction crusade, and this figure for the current year is 1.5 times the amount of the previous year.

Engineer Amiri, chief of the Javanrud reconstruction crusade, in announcing this, added: In the area of rural roads, construction was completed on 33 km of rural roads, two bridges and 14 10-meter spans, a water delivery system to eight villages with 400 families, and more than 15 km of pipe, two rural baths, a morgue, a health clinic, and a flood breaker. Along with these projects work continued on several large water delivery projects including 11 villages.

He added: In the area of electrical service, electrical service was provided to 12 villages including 300 families, and likewise construction was completed for a 33-km medium-pressure line in the deprived area of Salas Babajani, three rahnema'i schools and an elementary school.

In conclusion he said: In the area of rural resources, along with the issuance of 17 agreements in principle and 174 identification cards for rural workshops, assistance was given with the reconstruction and sanitation of 30 flour mills, and 16,208 kg of iron implements were distributed among rural workshops. The sum of Rls10.2 million in damages was paid to the owners of rural workshops who suffered losses in the war, the sum of Rls7.7 million in bank loans was paid to the owners of rural workshops, and a lime kiln cooperative company was formed.

Twenty-Five Percent of Construction Material Wasted Yearly

93LA0113G Tehran SALAM in Persian 27 Jun 93 p 10

[Text] Every year about 25 percent of the construction material produced in the country, along with the capital to produce it, is wasted.

The director of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Construction's permanent construction materials exhibit, Engineer Arash Najafi, in stating the above, said: This is continuing because of the lack of awareness on the part of builders of single-unit projects.

Speaking in an interview with IRNA, he added: 300,000 housing units should be built in the country annually, but due to the shortage of construction materials and the unbridled increases in their prices, there are about 175,000 to 180,000 fewer housing units per year.

He said that it is important to transfer land to specialist individuals and to use standard construction materials to create sturdy housing units.

He continued: The use of quality construction materials will increase the construction of housing units by 25 to 30 percent, but continuing this will spread the culture of using desirable construction materials.

The direction of the permanent construction materials exhibit said: Many factories in the country produce non-standard construction materials. He added: To increase the useful life of housing units, these kinds of producers should be dealt with legally.

He noted: The standard life of a housing unit is at least 50 years, and in Iran this figure is 20 to 25 years.

Elsewhere in his talk, Engineer Najafi criticized the work of the Tehran mayor's office in changing the base of the sidewalks. He said: Due to the failure to make use of desirable construction materials, this project does not have a useful life and the proper technology for producing this base must be used.

Concerning the work of the permanent construction materials exhibit, he said: It has been almost two years since this site began operating. In the last five months, about 8,000 people have visited this exhibition, and in this period 2,000 students became familiar with the latest standardized products of domestic factories.

The director of the construction materials exhibition said: This exhibition has been able to influence 5 percent of Iran's home construction system, and it has also played a role in making producers and consumers aware of desirable construction materials.

He discussed the fact that the exhibition has an area of 850 square meters. He said: When the exhibition began, 45 companies participated, and now 70 companies are members at this site. If the new hall is built, with an area of 2,000 square meters, it will be possible to bring in more than 250 companies.

He said that the creation of a construction materials information bank, to which 500 producing factories contributed information, was a very important step by the exhibition.

In this regard he said: In the aforementioned information bank, all the information from the member companies has been collected, and in the month of Shahrivar this year [23 Sep-22 Oct] this bank will go into service.

Fifty Billion Rials Allocated for Reconstruction

93LA0113M Tehran SALAM in Persian 27 Jun 93 p 11

[Text] Gachsaran—SALAM Correspondent. This year a total of more than 50 billion rials [Rls] in development credits in the form of province development credits, money from notes, and money for unexpected disasters was spent in the Province of Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad.

The governor-general of the province of Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad announced the above at a press conference. He said: Credits in the development sector for the year 1372 [21 Mar 1993-20 Mar 1994] for more than Rls32 billion were allocated in the Budget Law under the title of "Province Development Credits," and this figure will only be part of the province's development credits. Another part of the development credits is allocated in the form of funds for unexpected disasters, of which so far Rls4 billion in credits has been allocated, and another part of it was allocated as funds from Note 37. The other credits under Note 37 will be given to us gradually, and its projects have been designated. A total of more than Rls50 billion in development credits in the form of province development credits, money from notes, and money for unexpected disasters was spent in the province of Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad.

Sufi added: The higher education sector, the construction of the Shahreza to Behbahan road and the construction of the airport have their own special credits, the executive organizations such as the communications, water and electrical companies have their own credits, and if we added all these and announced the total, it would be a very high figure. The governor-general of the province of Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad said: In view of the goals to alleviate deprivation set forth every year in Note 37 of the Budget Law and also Note 5 of the First Five-Year Plan, these funds must be allocated for alleviating deprivation in the four areas of education and training, health care and treatment, water, and suitable rural roads, so that at the end of the year 1372 [21 Mr 1993-20 Mar 1994] the deprivations that exist in the deprived villages will be alleviated.

Continuing, he added: The share of these credits in the various organizations include Rls1.154 billion for education and training, for which 46 proposed education and training projects have been allocated. The next portion of the credits has been allocated for health care and treatment in the amount of more than Rls1.830 billion.

Engineer Sufi said: Most of our credits for the current year are allocated to the roads sector, for deprivation in roads is deprivation of infrastructure and it is basic. Credits in this sector are divided into three parts, completion projects, executive projects, and tribal projects, and we are now implementing a total of 20 projects in this area.

He said: Rls100 million has been allocated to physical training, which will be spent on building and also expediting the construction of sports facilities.

In conclusion he said: Another part of our credits is allocated for water and soil, for the reconstruction and revitalization of pastures and forests, and for flood prevention, all under the category of water management, for which about Rls450 million has been allocated.

Official on Refurbishing of Old Factories

93LA0113C Tehran SALAM in Persian 26 Jun 93 p 10

[Text] Tehran—IRNA. The fundamental reconstruction of old units and factories was emphasized by Engineer Ne'matzadeh, our country's minister of industries.

At the opening ceremonies for the form-making units of the Sa'di tile and ceramics factories, the minister of industries said: The factories must be rebuilt and made to conform to science and technology so they can produce the best products.

He said: While in the past Iran was a leader in industry and especially handicraft industries, it is also unique in its variety of handicraft industries.

In another portion of the opening ceremonies, Engineer Sadrzadeh, executive director of the Sa'di tile and ceramic factories, discussed the role of tile and ceramics in securing environmental sanitation and beauty, and the need to change the consumption pattern for tile and ceramics.

He said the major goal of the reconstruction and new construction project is to improve the quality of the final product, reduce losses, increase man-hour productivity, reduce the cost of final production, create a basis for competitiveness on the domestic market, obtain markets outside the country and make it possible to achieve long-term and continuous competitiveness with rivals.

He then emphasized the need to expand tile and ceramic exports. He added: The added value of foreign exchange arising from the export of a square meter of tile compared to its consumer foreign exchange value is about 6 percent.

The reconstruction and new construction this unit, which entails the replacement of equipment, press and printing units and the enameling line, will cost 198 million rials.

The production levels for the Sa'di tile and ceramic factories, which is a company under the mantle of the Iran National Industries Organization, was more than 4,826 square meters in the year 1371 [21 Mar 1992-20

Mar 1993], of which 682,400 square meters were exported at a value of more than \$2 million.

The minister of industries also discussed the preliminary measures for building the cotton ginning, carding, and "open-end" wick shops for the Weaving Company, which was done with the aim of making a sound work environment and achieving desirable products.

In the year 1371 the Weaving Company, which is a company under the mantle of the National Industries Organization, exported \$190,000 in products it produced to Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Nigeria, and Turkey.

Safety Glass Factory Becomes Operational

93LA0113J Tehran SALAM in Persian 27 Jun 93 p 10

[Text] A factory to produce unbreakable safety glass with an annual capacity of 250,000 square meters was put into experimental operation in Semnan.

IRNA's correspondent reports that this factory, which was built with capital of 2.583 billion rials [Rls] in the industrial city of Semnan, will employ 94 people.

The province of Semnan General Office of Industries also announced that with an investment volume of more than Rls13.32 billion, it has created 23 new production units in this province.

These units, which received agreements in principle last month, were created in various production sectors and after they go into operation 659 people will be employed.

Likewise, with Rls1.725 billion in credits, three production units including an automated packaged plaster plant with a capacity of 150,000 tons, a plant making various kinds of paper napkins with production of 600 tons, and a plant making various kinds of belt buckles and cummerbunds with production of 1 million per year were put into operation last month in this province.

In these units 54 people were employed, and with the issuance of two permits to build by the Semnan Province General Office of Industries, two units, one producing macaroni with a capacity of 2,000 tons per year and another producing unbreakable safety glass with a capacity of 250,000 square meters, were put into experimental operation in Semnan.

These units were created with capital of Rls2.846 billion and they employed 119 people.

Over 200 Projects Implemented in Esfahan's Deprived Areas

93LA0124L Tehran SALAM in Persian 6 Jul 93 p 11

[Text] Esfahan—IRNA. The sum of 1,720,000 rials [Rls] has been provided from Note 35 of this year's Budget Law to implement 232 projects in the deprived areas of Esfahan.

The official in charge of the secretariat of the province of Esfahan Commission on Special Deprived Region Affairs said at a meeting of this commission: This year Rls1.652 million has also been given to the office of

Deprived Areas Affairs from the funds in Part 1, Paragraph A, Note 6 for the implementation of 32 projects.

He said: Of these, 16 projects have been allocated with credits of Rls1.04 billion for the construction of cultural and religious complexes and factories in deprived areas.

Seven Industrial Units Become Operational in Hamedan

93LA0126L Tehran SALAM in Persian 7 Jul 93 p 19

[Text] Hamedan—SALAM Correspondent. During the first three months of the current year [21 Mar-21 Jun 1993], the province of Hamedan General Office of Industries issued permits to operate for seven production and industrial units in the province of Hamedan. These units include an electrical wire and cable unit with an annual capacity of 5,500 tons and capital of 1,170,000,000 rials [Rls], a [?kalaktur] unit with an annual capacity of 30,000 items and capital of Rls79 million, a unit producing melamine containers with a capacity of 140 tons per year and capital of Rls160 million, a unit producing vermicelli with an annual capacity of 825 tons and capital of Rls125 million, a milk and dairy products factory in Hamedan with annual capacity of 190 tons per year and capital of Rls1.27 billion, a unit producing tile and ceramics in Molayer with annual capacity of 60,000 cubic meters and capital of Rls75 million, and a salt-pounding unit in Asadabad with an annual capacity of 1,000 tons and total capital of Rls26 million. When these units go into operation a total of 268 people will be employed.

Our correspondent reports that in addition to the agreements in principle, during the period mentioned the province of Hamedan General Office of Industries also issued permits for the construction of 25 various production and industrial units with capital of more than Rls10 billion and permits to build 10 production units in the food, chemical, textiles, leather, and cellulose industries with total capital of Rls3.9 billion in the province of Hamedan.

Fisheries Invest 3.5 Billion in Research

93LA0120D Tehran KEYHAN-E HAVA'I in Persian 23 Jun 93 p 10

[Text] Tehran—IRNA—26 Khordad [16 Jun]. So far 60 percent of the programs of the nation's First Five-Year Economic, Social, and Cultural Development Plan have been completed in the area of fisheries research and education.

Dr. Gholamreza Amini, chief of the Fisheries Research and Education Organization, announced the above at a gathering of reporters. He added: Since the year 1368 [21 Mar 1989-20 Mar 1990] to the end of the year 1371 [20 Mar 1993] a total of 82 research projects have been completed, and by the end of the nation's First Five-Year Economic Development Plan this figure will increase to 120 projects.

Continuing, Amini said: From 1368 to the end of the year 1371 2.3 billion toman credits has been spent on

research, education, to equip centers and to build and complete these centers. By the end of the nation's First Five-Year Economic Development Plan, meaning the year 1372 [21 Mar 1993-20 Mar 1994], this figure will have reached 3.5 billion toman.

In conclusion, he said: As the result of the research by the experts in the Center for Fisheries Research, it has been proved that some of the sharks in the Persian Gulf have scales, and there are plans to make sausage out of the meat of some of these sharks and sell it on the consumer market. Likewise the skin and legs of shrimp, which are considered waste and amount to 400 tons per year, will be used in the manufacture of decorative materials.

Fisheries Gradually Transferred to Private Sector

93LA0129D London KEYHAN in Persian 29 Jul 93 p 4

[Text] On Monday 21 Tir [12 Jul] Engineer 'Abdol-Hamid Kavusian, deputy manager of Iran Fisheries for projects and planning, said that all activities in the category of fisheries with the exception of the production and distribution of caviar, are gradually being turned over to the private sector. He added that in the year 1371 [21 Mar 1992-20 Mar 1993] eight institutional units, a canning factory, a factory making fish powder, an aquatic farm, a fish canning factory and several other units were turned over to the private sector and by the end of the current year 20 more units will be transferred to this sector.

Eng. Kavusian added that according to the First Five-Year Plan the catch for caviar-bearing fish was to reach 316 tons per year, but because of the uncontrolled fishing in the newly independent nations to the north of the country, they are selling their caviar at about one-fourth of Iran's price.

The deputy manager of Iran Fisheries for projects and planning answered a question from correspondents about transferring the export of caviar to the private sector. He said: In view of the very good foreign exchange earnings from caviar, the policy is that as before caviar will be controlled by the government. Kavusian added that the distribution of caviar outside the country is being done by representatives of Iran Fisheries, and inside the country it is being done by a private sector company called Zist Mahi, which is an agency for the Fisheries Company.

In conclusion, Kavusian said that in the year 1371 [21 Mar 1992-20 Mar 1993] the entire catch of the nation's aquatic life was about 340,000 tons, of which about 250,000 tons was caught in the southern waters, and the rest was caught in the nation's northern waters.

On the other hand, the INTERFAX news agency reports from Moscow that based on an exclusive contract, the Republic of Azarbaijan has transferred the sale of 150 tons of black caviar over the next five years at \$160 to \$190 per kilogram to an American company. Based on this contract, Azarbaijan has the right to sell 10 percent of its caviar on the domestic market.

Neka Electric Power Station Energy Output Increases

93LA0128A Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 12 Jul 93
p 4

[Text] Economic Service. With the procurement of the necessary credit, the Neka Power Station is producing 2,800 megawatts [MW] of electricity, and this figure is unprecedented for its kind.

The Neka Power Station procures 20 percent of the nation's electrical power.

With the construction and completion of the power plant's water collection project, by the fall of this year the problem with blackouts caused by ruined filters in this plant will be solved.

Engineer Seyfollah 'Ali Asghari, executive director of the Neka Electrical Production Management Company, gave an interview to our correspondent. He discussed the project to expand this power plant and the latest energy production situation at the Neka Power Plant.

He began by saying: The Neka Power Plant now has the ability to produce 2,000 MW of electricity, and about 20 percent of the nation's consumer electricity is procured through this power plant.

Neka is now considered the nation's largest power plant, and in view of the fact that its transfer lines, in addition to the current 2,000 MW, are capable of transferring an additional 800 MW of produced electricity, the construction of two 400-MW units (a total of 800 MW) and increasing the Neka Power Plant's production capacity is economical from any point of view, because if another power plant were built with this same production capacity, we would also have to accept the cost of antennae and cable for the transfer lines, and this is in no way economical.

He added: In this regard, talks have been held with the officials involved and we hope that with the procurement of credits, we will increase the power plant's nominal capability from 2,000 MW to 2,800 MW.

Continuing, Eng. 'Ali Asghar discussed the problem with the power plant's filters clogging. He said: Since this power plant is on the coast of the Caspian Sea and its water comes from the sea, the water moved a quantity of trash and leaves into the filters of the units. This clogged the filters and ultimately caused several megawatts of electricity to go out of the circuit.

In this regard, with the procurement of 750 million tomans credit and with the cooperation of the Mana Company, affiliated with the Project Development Organization, and with the construction of a water collector next to the power plant controlling the water coming into the units, the entry of trash will be prevented. This project will be completed by fall and we hope that when it goes into operation, the problem of blackouts caused by clogged filters will be solved.

We note that in the second six months of last year [23 Sep 1992-20 Mar 1993], 500 million kilowatt [kw] less electricity than the necessary capacity was produced.

Discussing this power plant's units, he said: This project has four steam units, two gas units each with a power of 440 MW, one with a power of 137.5 MW, and one 30-MW unit.

The construction of a cycle turbine unit for the two gas units has also been proposed, and with the procurement of the \$137 million budget, this will add 137.5 MW to the power plant's nominal capacity.

He discussed the power plant's fuel, and said: Neka's main fuel is natural gas, which is procured from gas resources at Sarakhs and transferred to the power plant by pipeline. The power plant's second fuel is mazut, which is unloaded at the power plant by railroad at a station 20 km from the power plant.

When full, the fuel tanks at this power plant can store enough fuel to operate it for 14 days. There is therefore no problem with the procurement of fuel.

In conclusion, Eng. 'Ali Asghari said: Because of the importance of this power plant, the Iraqi regime bombed various parts of it three times. Each time damage was caused to the power plant and several of our honest workers were martyred. Because of the bombings of Iraq's aircraft, 9.5 billion rials damage was done to the power plant, and parts of it were destroyed. However, with reliance on our own reconstruction specialist forces, the damaged parts were rebuilt and the units were brought back into the circuit.

It is worth mentioning that this power plant's production for the year 1371 [21 Mar 1992 - 20 Mar 1993] was about 10.5-billion-kw hours.

Official Calls For Cleanup of Aluminum Waste

93LA0130P Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian
19 Jun 93 p 13

[Text] Arak—IRNA. The Central Province general manager of environmental protection called for the collection of aluminum waste in the vicinity of the city of Arak.

According to Ebrahim Esma'ili, this waste, which comes from one of the shops at the Arak Aluminum Factory, has been being dumped regularly for 20 years at a site near the factory.

He said: The dumping ground for the above waste was chosen by the Central Province Office of Roads and the Terminals Company (affiliated with the Ministry of Roads) for the construction of a loading terminal, and the dumped waste was scattered uncovered around Arak and near residential areas.

He said: Since this waste took the form of microscopic powder, it was blown by the wind into the city and is threatening the health of citizens.

He noted: This matter is being studied by judicial officials.

One Hundred Fifty Telephone Lines Distributed Among POWs

93LA0113R Tehran SALAM in Persian 28 Jun 93 p 4

[Text] News Service. This year 150 telephone lines were assigned at a discount on a priority basis to qualified veterans in this city.

The public relations office of the Foundation for the Oppressed and War Veterans reported that the cost of each telephone line, including the telephone company's discount for veterans, is 85,000 tomans, half of which is paid to the company as a cash advance, the balance in 10 payments.

Country's Rail To Be Equipped With Telephones

93LA0113B Tehran SALAM in Persian 26 Jun 93 p 10

[Text] With the implementation of the automatic train movement monitoring project and the national railroad wireless equipment project, railroad traffic safety will be increased.

IRNA's correspondent reports that Engineer Sadeq Afshar, deputy minister of roads and transportation and executive director of the Islamic Republic Railroad Company, said last Wednesday in Arak: This year the automatic train monitoring project will be implemented on the Tehran-Shahrud line.

He added: With the implementation of the above project, which will cost 45 million marks and will take two years, route changes and train entries and exits from train stations will be done by automatic systems and without human intervention.

He said: This year the project to equip trains and stations with wireless equipment will be implemented at a cost of \$13 million.

He noted: Currently the stations and trains can communicate at short distances with handheld wireless equipment, but in the new system the entire railroad network will be covered by wireless equipment and every train will be able to establish contact with the center and with other trains at any time.

According to him, with the construction of a new line on the Tehran-Qom route, the distance on this route will be reduced from 180 km to 130 km.

He noted: This year 40 new locomotives, 70 passenger cars, and 900 freight cars will be added to the nation's rail fleet.

He said: In view of the centralization of industrial units in Arak and passenger travel to this city, especially industrial experts, in the next month a high-speed train will go into operation on the Tehran-Arak route.

On his trip to Arak, the executive director of the Islamic Republic Railroad Company introduced Qodratollah Afzali as the new general manager of the railroad in the Arak area, and he praised the efforts of Hoseyn Farzad, former general manager of this region.

Abar Kuh Telephone Expansion Plan Completed

93LA0130I Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 15 Jun 93 p 11

[Text] Abar Kuh—JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI. In ceremonies attended by Mr. Sefid, deputy governor-general of Yazd for finance, administration, and planning, Mr. Pahlavani, general manager of communications for the province of Yazd, two deputies from the Islamic Republic of Iran Communications Company, Mr. Fallah, governor of Taft, the district governor, and several office officials, communications workers, people of Abar Kuh and clerics from this area, the Abar Kuh Automatic Telephone Center Expansion Project was put into operation.

Our correspondent reports that when this project went into operation and 1,000 telephone numbers were added to the telephones of the municipality of Abar Kuh, the number of assigned telephones in this municipality reached 2,000, of which 1,749 have been made operational and turned over to the public, the offices and the organizations. The remaining telephones are in the process of being transferred. The cost of this project was more than 1 billion rials, which was provided and paid from credits for the Communications Company.

Likewise, in the implementation of the project to add 1,000 telephones to Abar Kuh, 2,609 meters of channels were built and 487,744 meters of cable were laid, and long-range communications for Abar Kuh were provided with a 300-channel radio, of which 120 channels are ready to operate. In the Phase Five Long-Range Expansion Project, 140 megawatts from this center will be connected to the microwaves in Yazd by a digital and microwave system. It is worth mentioning that the Abar Kuh Automatic Telephone Center, with 2,000 numbers, has 24 incoming channels and 24 outgoing channels. By dialing the prefix 07244, compatriots can contact Abar Kuh. At these ceremonies, the general manager of communication for the province of Yazd discussed some of the communications services and the importance of communications. He expressed the hope that by the end of the current year [20 Mar 1994] the installed 2,000-number telephone center in Abar Kuh will reach 3,000 numbers.

The next speaker at these ceremonies was Mr. Ruhi, governor of Abar Kuh. In his talk he discussed the communications services in the Abar Kuh area since the triumph of the Islamic revolution, and he regarded this as attention by the government to the deprived areas.

Continuing his talk, he said: In view of the fact that Abar Kuh was formerly part of the province of Fars and the code for Abar Kuh (07244) is still part of the province of Fars communications network, I call upon communications officials for the province of Yazd to change the numeric prefix for this area.

As the ceremonies continued, after talks by the deputy governor-general of Yazd for finance, administration, and planning, the Communications Company deputy for projects and planning discussed the company's work

since the triumph of the Islamic revolution, and noted: The Communications Company is ahead of what it has been required to do in the First Five-Year Plan. He emphasized: Fifteen years after the triumph of the Islamic revolution, the Communications Company has increased the number of working telephones from 800,000 numbers to more than 3 million, and in implementing the government's Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan, compared to the 1.1 million telephone numbers it was supposed to install, it installed more than 2 million numbers, as well as 10,000 telexes. Likewise, compared to the 2,750 villages in the nation that were supposed to have telephone communications, more than 5,000 of the nation's villages have been given telephone communications and 5,000 international channels have been added.

The Communications Company deputy for projects and planning continued: In the government's Second Economic and Social Development Plan, more than 6 million numbers are expected to be assigned, and from the year 1373 [21 Mar 1994-20 Mar 1995] to 1377 [21 Mar 1998-20 Mar 1999] we will be installing 1.2 million telephones per year, and will be putting 1 million telephone numbers into operation. He said: It is expected that we will install 1 million telephones in the year 1372 [21 Mar 1993-20 Mar 1994].

Esfahan Governor-General Says Metro System Needed

93LA0130J Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 20 Jun 93 p 4

[Text] Esfahan—JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI. The General Assembly of the Esfahan Area Metro Company met in the presence of the governor-general of Esfahan at the governor-general's assembly hall.

At this meeting, which was attended by the deputy governor-general for development, the mayor of Esfahan and members of the Board of Directors, Engineer Jahangiri, governor-general of Esfahan, discussed the population of Esfahan and described the metro project as one of the government's important projects, calling it a necessity for alleviating traffic problems. He said: With the implementation of this project, many of Esfahan's transportation and traffic problems will be solved.

Continuing, he emphasized the need for an active and comprehensive metro network and called for industries to participate in the procurement of its credit resources.

As the meeting continued, the chief of the Board of Directors approved the financial and budget accounts proposed for the year 1372 [21 Mar 1993-20 Mar 1994], and they discussed and exchanged views on the company's executive policies to procure financial resources and solve the problems with land along the route.

Thousands of Meters of Tunnel Along Mashhad-Sarakhs

93LA0126A Tehran HAMSHAHRI in Persian 6 Jun 93 p 3

[Text] Municipalities Service. The project to electrify the Mashhad-Sarakhs rail line, with a length of 165 km, began in the middle of last year [23 Sep 1992] with 325 billion rials [Rls] credit and \$150 million in foreign exchange. It is proceeding rapidly and is expected to go into operation in the second half of the year 1375 [23 Sep 1996-20 Mar 1997].

Engineer Hoseyn Tehrani, manager of the project, announced: Credits approved for the current year are Rls39.370 billion. In view of the pressing nature and importance of the project, the budget can be increased up to Rls110 billion to buy rail travel equipment.

He said: In implementing this project five tunnels will be built at a length of 6,000 meters, along with 308 large and small bridges and nine stations for temporary stops. According to the aforementioned project's executive officer, every year 3 million tons of freight and 500,000 passengers will travel on the Mashhad-Sarakhs line.

Vehicle Prices Increase 198 Percent

93LA0115J London KEYHAN in Persian 15 Jul 93 p 4

[Text] In an issue during the month of Tir [22 Jun-22 Jul] the newspaper SALAM, quoting a report from the Islamic Republic of Iran Central Bank Statistics Office, wrote that in the year 1370 [21 Mar 1991-20 Mar 1992] 90,500 automobiles were sold for 627.4 billion rials by manufacturing and importing companies.

In the year 1370 automobile sales in the country increased 95.2 percent in numbers and 198.5 percent by amount compared to the year 1369 [21 Mar 1990-20 Mar 1991].

In the year reported, the number and amount for automobiles sold (with the exception of jeeps, station wagons and ambulances, whose numbers declined 7.2 percent) increased. Most of the increase in terms of numbers and amount pertains to mini-buses, which were 256.2 and 377.3 percent, respectively.

In the year 1370 the largest group among the types of automobiles sold (47.9 percent) was passenger automobiles, and it also had the largest figure in terms of amount (40.7 percent).

It is added: In the year 1370 domestic automobiles sold accounted for 98.1 percent of the total value of all automobiles sold.

This report adds: In the years 1359 [21 Mar 1980-20 Mar 1981] to 1370, automobiles were sold for cash, and no kind of automobile was sold on credit by manufacturers or importers.

Number and Amount for Automobiles Sold in Years 1369-1370
(millions of rials)

Automobile Type	Year 1369				Year 1370				Percent Changing	
	Number	Amount	Percent	Distribution	Number	Amount	Percent	Distribution	Number	Amount
Passenger	16,413	61653.8	35.4	29.3	43,398	255119.6	47.9	40.7	164.4	313.8
Bus	10.74	15,510.9	3.3	7.4	2,521	50269.7	2.8	8.0	134.7	224.1
Minibus	1,897	17947.8	4.1	8.5	6,857	85665.4	7.5	13.6	256.2	377.3
Trucks and Tankers	6,276	47447.8	13.5	22.6	9,408	94323.5	10.4	15.0	49.9	98.8
Jeeps, Station Wagons and Ambulances	4,908	26,197.2	10.6	12.5	4,556	37988.0	5.0	6.1	7.2	45.0
Pickups and Small Haulers	15,787	41417.0	44.1	19.7	23,860	104051.2	26.4	16.6	51.1	151.2
Total	46,355	210174.5	100.0	100.0	90,500	637217.4	100.0	100.0	95.2	198.5

Travelers Allowed \$10,000 in Foreign Currency

93LA0113H Tehran SALAM in Persian 27 Jun 93 p 10

[Text] Tehran—IRNA. The amount of foreign exchange allowed to be taken out of the country by the holder of any visa has been set at a maximum of \$10,000 in currency notes, traveler's checks or a combination of the two.

Yesterday in guidelines addressed to banks, the public relations office of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran announced: The export of foreign exchange in excess of the aforementioned amount must be done only in the form of drafts or bank checks issued by the national banking system.

The Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran made this decision to clarify the amount of foreign exchange a passenger is allowed to take out of the country under guidelines issued on 3/23/1372 [13 Jun 1993] under the title "Customs of the Islamic Republic of Iran."

International Ticket Prices Up 46 Percent

93LA0113F Tehran SALAM in Persian 27 Jun 93 pp 1, 2

[Text] News Service. Tickets for flights abroad are increasing 46 to 47 percent, and the exact date will be announced soon.

Engineer Seyyed Hasan Shefati, executive director of the Islamic Republic of Iran Airline HOMA, gave a press conference yesterday morning in which he announced the above. He said: HOMA's ticket price increases are approved by the Economic Council and the guidelines must be prepared by the National Airline Organization and the Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs. As of this moment these guidelines have not been given to HOMA. He said: A 46- to 47-percent increase in the price of tickets for foreign flights is expected.

Continuing, he said: In operations to transport pilgrims, the Islamic Republic of Iran Airline HOMA has been recognized as exemplary by Saudi officials.

He said: In this year's pilgrim transportation operations, counting the empty flights, 1,566 flights were made from six airports in Tehran, Mashhad, Esfahan, Shiraz, Ker- man, Tabriz, and Ahvaz.

He announced that the passenger luggage weighed 3,600 tons and added: Each pilgrim carried an average of 31 kg of luggage, which is a striking decrease compared to last year, and this decrease in freight caused Iran not to use cargo planes this year.

He said: The lack of cooperation by the police at the Jeddah airport and the Saudi visa office caused crowding and short delays on this year's flights.

In this same regard he said: Delays this year were at their lowest level in the history of pilgrim transportation operations. Ninety-three percent of the departing flights for pilgrims left on time, and 80 percent of the return flights left on time.

He said that the period of transporting the Iranian pilgrims including the number of days transporting pilgrims among other countries is 22 days, and on average every 24 hours 5,270 pilgrims visited the House of God.

Engineer Shefati said: The Islamic Republic of Iran Airline transported 17.5 percent of the 654,786 pilgrims from more than 20 Islamic nations and a number of non-Islamic nations who took part in the pilgrim transportation operations.

Continuing, the executive director of the Islamic Republic of Iran Airline added: The Iran Air Tour Airline Company, with an average of five flights per day, handled some of the pilgrim transportation operations on the Mashhad-Jeddah route.

Continuing his press conference, Engineer Shefati discussed the fact that after the completion of the pilgrimage operations, based on the nation's needs in the network, the Islamic Republic of Iran Airline is increasing its domestic and foreign flights. He said: On the domestic network, three flights are being established on the Tehran-Abadan route, three flights on the Tehran-Bushehr route, four flights on the Tehran-Kermanshah route, two flights on the Tehran-Mashhad route, four flights on the Tehran-Shiraz route and seven flights on the Tehran-Tabriz route.

In the same regard he said: There are two flights per week on the Tehran-Urmia route, and this will increase to five flights early next fall.

According to the executive director of the Islamic Republic of Iran Airline, there will be one flight per week from Mashhad to Bahrain and back beginning on 10 Tir [1 Jul].

He said: The flight from 'Eshqabad to Dushambah will remain on HOMA's program as before, and when the necessary cooperation is obtained from the officials of the Republic of Tajikistan, this flight will begin.

Engineer Shefati also said: HOMA's fifth flight to Frankfurt will be made on 15 Tir [6 Jul], its second flight to Hamburg will be made on 10 Tir, and its third flight to London will be made on 12 Tir [3 Jul].

The executive director of the Islamic Republic of Iran Airline said: HOMA's flights to Canada remain suspended because of political problems, and flights to Muscat, Tashkent, Madrid, and Seoul are also being studied.

Aslanduz Border Customs House Closes

93LA0130L Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 17 Jun 93 p 13

[Text] Until further notice, the Aslanduz border station of Moghan has been closed as announced by the Islamic Republic of Iran Customs.

Quoting the governor's office of Parsabad of Moghan, IRNA reports that with the closing of the Aslanduz customs office, travelers will cross the border at the Bilehsavar of Moghan land border and vehicles shipping and hauling merchandise will cross the border at the Khoda Afarin Customs Office.

The Aslanduz of Moghan border point is 40 km to the west of the municipality of Parsabad of Moghan, across from the city of Fazuli in the Republic of Azarbaijan.

This customs station was created last year with the beginning of traveler traffic between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Azarbaijan.

Registration Problems Caused by Lack of Manpower

93LA0113L Tehran SALAM in Persian 27 Jun 93 p 11

[Text] Kerman—SALAM Correspondent. Registration problems for the people are the result of a shortage of manpower and resources, and when these problems are solved the registration problems of the people will be solved.

Mr. Zavareh'i, deputy minister of justice and chief of the National Registry and Deeds Office, gave a press conference in which he announced the above. He said: In terms of law the amended Articles 147 and 148 were unable to provide means for the people. In the area of manpower equipment, 1,100 trained people were employed and were given authorization for employment. Another 1,000 persons were also hired, and in addition to this several contracts were signed with various colleges to train manpower.

He said: The excessive expectations of the people from the registry has to do with several problems we have experienced, and some of it also has to do with demanding individuals who want to be in front of everyone.

He also said: Concerning worker welfare measures, an extra technical and overtime project as well as a working project are being studied and implemented.

Zavareh'i said that the registry's revenues last year were about 194 million rials [Rls] and added: This figure shows an increase of Rls34 billion compared to last year. He said: Concerning the tariffs of the official documents offices, we sought to make them such that the heads of the offices would not have problems. In conclusion he asked the people to obtain receipts for the funds they pay at the documents offices.

Our correspondent also reports that at a presentation ceremony, Seyyed Reza Zavareh'i, chief of the National Registry and Deeds Office, introduced Sadiq Ghaffari as the new general manager of the Kerman Province General Registry Office, and he praised Seyyed 'Ali Hasani, the former general manager, for his work.

Likewise, a report from IRNA's correspondent states: Following the trip Wednesday by Zavareh'i, chief of the National Registry and Deeds Office, to Kerman, a group of residents of this city gathered in front of the headquarters of this organization in Kerman and demanded investigation of their files.

In their protests to the chief of the National Registry and Deeds Office, they demanded that means be created so that they can obtain deeds for their residential units as quickly as possible.

One of the protestors told IRNA's correspondent: We have been unable to get our deeds of ownership for about 12 years. Because the protestors did not receive a satisfactory answer, a clash ensued and the protestors dispersed after police intervention.

Currently about 20,000 people in the city of Kerman are waiting to obtain deeds of ownership, and when this city grows the number of owners without deeds will increase.

In answer to the protests from the people, Zavareh'i told IRNA's correspondent: The people must know that the issuance of deeds does not just involve the registry office. Other factors in this matter are the legal problems and the failure of judges to attend the meetings.

He implied that the gathering of these individuals was not unrelated to a series of political matters and said: The people are happy with the work of this organization in the

country, and we, in view of our small resources, are unable to do any more than this to solve the problems of the people.

Kerman Official Details Law Enforcement Activities

*93LA0130R Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI
in Persian 16 Jun 93 p 12*

[Text] Kerman—JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI correspondent. General Asadi, commander of the Kerman Police Precinct, announced at a press conference: In continuing the relentless campaign against the merchants of death and armed insurgents in the desert areas of the province of Kerman and in operations, which have been carried out recently by the Revolution Guards in the Sur and Lakarkuh heights north of Kerman, heavy blows were dealt to the narcotics smugglers.

He said: In carrying out this operation, areas contaminated with narcotics, where narcotics smuggling caravans have been crossing for 15 years, have been completely cleaned up so that complete security has been established in the area.

He said: Already the entry points for narcotics into the province of Kerman are under the control of military and police forces.

The commander of the police force in the Kerman Police Precinct said: The very effective cooperation and coordination between the Revolution Guards and the police force, the office of intelligence and the air force have reduced the insurgencies in the area and in the last year, with numerous operations and in 150 clashes with insurgents, 80 leaders of smuggler caravans and their colleagues were killed, and likewise during this period, in addition to wounding and arresting 34 narcotics smugglers, 6 tons of narcotics, 347 small arms, 8,000 rounds of ammunition, and 14 advanced wireless computer devices were seized from them by police personnel.

He said: The accomplishments and decisiveness of the police, the military, and the Air Force were so effective battering the smugglers, especially in the Jiroft and Kohnuj areas, that it caused almost 100 of them to turn themselves in to competent centers and to receive letters of safe passage in return for surrendering their weapons.

He discussed the accomplishments of the police and the military in the municipalities of Jiroft and Kohnuj. He said: Praise God, through the efforts of the police and military forces, complete security has been established in these areas and in this regard, last year the killers of Hushang Madahi, chief of the Office of Islamic Guidance and the teacher of Martyr Ashraf Ganju'i, who was martyred in a dastardly act in Jiroft, were killed.

The commander of the police precinct added: Likewise, last year the members of several gangs of kidnappers who intended to kidnap in Kerman, Zarand, Bardsir, and Rafsanjan, were destroyed and all the members of these gangs were arrested.

He said: With the coordination and unity of the forces, every kind of instigation by the insurgents in the remote

parts of the province was put down, and the transport of narcotics within the province was practically reduced to zero.

He added: This year, in operations by the Revolution Guards at one of the southeastern borders, a narcotics caravan was surrounded and completely destroyed just as it entered the country, and planning has been done so that the points of crossing in the the provinces of Sistan va Baluchestan and Khorasan will be blocked to prevent the entry of these kinds of caravans.

In conclusion he called upon the people to give the necessary cooperation to the intelligence staff or the Police Public Relations Office in order to advance the programs that are under way, and not to pay attention to rumors from people who have agendas to pursue.

Combat Against Social Corruption Planned

*93LA0130K Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian
20 Jun 93 p 3*

[Text] News Department. With the mobilization of all the police forces under the command of the Greater Tehran Police Precinct and with the completion of the preliminary steps, the new project to combat social corruption by the Greater Tehran police forces began at the beginning of the month of Tir [22 Jun].

Under this project, all public places, guilds and moving vehicles will be required more than before to observe Islamic mores and to refrain from serving vagrants and badly veiled women. At the same time, when observed in the city, all badly veiled women will be arrested by the police and turned over to the judicial authorities.

Officials of the greater Tehran police precinct have the duty of legally prosecuting violators of this announcement and turning them over to the appropriate judicial authorities.

In view of the days of mourning for the commander of the martyrs, His Holiness Aba 'Abdollah al-Hoseyn, it is hoped that all respected citizens will cooperate with their servants in the police forces, so that we can work as in the past to create security and peace of mind for our dear ones.

Number of Shantytown Dwellers Increasing in Tehran

*93LA0129H London KEYHAN in Persian 29 Jul 93
p 12*

[Text] Makeshift hovels are still widespread in Tehran, and the remaining shantytowns and shack dwellers of greater Tehran continue their sad lives in the city's 13 areas. Apparently the mayor's office has counted 13,000 shantytown dwellers, but reporters who have visited the lives of the residents of this area think the their numbers are higher than the announced figure.

Most of the capital's shantytowns are in the Abrisham and Javanmard Qassab areas. These people, who have migrated from every part of the country to this area, lead lives devoid of kindness without basic urban services, especially drinking water. People living in shantytowns usually do not have specific employment and work at pitiful and low-paying

tasks, earning only a bare subsistence. Since they lack the necessary qualifications, they are also unable to obtain the ration coupons they need, and therefore, despite their great poverty, they are forced to obtain the goods they need on the free market.

The extent of malnutrition among the shantytown dwellers is regrettable. Malnutrition, especially among the pregnant women in this area, is clearly evident.

The shantytown dwellers have told reporters: We have nothing to say to you. Actually they do not consider us to be ordinary citizens. What surprises us is that the government takes in and assists refugees from other countries, but it ignores us.

They also said: The promise that the metro would come here brought us to this area. The Metro Organization promised to give us homes in 45 days, but for five years there has been no sign of this promise being kept. One of the shantytown mothers said: The people ridicule us. They do not know our pains and they humiliate our children in the schools.

A young girl told reporters, my mother killed herself under the pressure and because of the extreme shortages.

In the midst of this, the municipality of Tehran considers the expansion of the shantytowns to be the result of several factors: uncontrolled emigration to Tehran, centralization of industrial and economic centers and education and health care in the capital, the lack of employment resources in the cities and remote villages, the presence of false employment in the city, and finally the hope of taking possession of a piece of land that has been occupied.

The circulation of smuggled narcotics and unauthorized goods among the shantytowns is quite common, and at the same time it is worth mentioning that destruction of the shacks and hovels has been of no use in eliminating the shantytowns.

Sociologists say: Shantytowns have their roots in social problems, and they must be solved. Concerning the shantytowns in districts 16 and 20, the officials in the mayor's office say: If the growth and expansion of the shantytowns is not stopped, not only will Tehran's problems increase, but it will also damage the government's prestige.

In general, the shantytowns are in very undesirable circumstances and are considered a serious danger.

The Abrisham area has hovels housing 1,000 families, and the Javanmard Qassab area also has about 100 shacks.

Sociologists believe that the main reason for rural emigration to the cities is weak urban management and the lack of social, economic and cultural planning by the mayoral offices and the Ministry of Housing. The creation of production, health care and educational resources in the rural areas will reduce emigration by their inhabitants.

One of the shantytown complexes at the old 'Azizolmalek palace was recently destroyed after years because of problems that had arisen for the residents in the vicinity. The 'Azizolmalek palace was 50 years old. Although it had

belonged to 'Azizolmalek, it was taken over by Vosuq al-Dowleh. Later, a group of people serving as peasant labor there built clay brick and earthen rooms in the vicinity of this palace, making a residential area for themselves. After several years Vosuq al-Dowleh's heir divided this palace into various parts and turned them over to numerous people such as a livestock keeper, a foundry and others. After the revolution the residents of the palace claimed ownership of the areas where they lived and began buying and selling them. A number of them also bought and sold livestock in such an area. Another group started an industrial factory.

In short, conditions arose inside this palace that created discomfort for the residents of that part of Tehran and consequently the mayor's office paid them their due, ejected the residents and destroyed the palace.

Plans Afoot To Exempt Publications from Taxes

93LA0128C Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 10 Jul 93
p 4

[Text] The general manager of domestic press affairs for the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance announced in Rasht: The proposal to exempt publications from taxes and to give support to reporters and writers will soon be submitted to the Council of Ministers.

Governor-General of Gilan's Remarks

At this meeting Engineer Taha'i, governor-general of Gilan, emphasized the importance of culture and the necessity to preserve its valuable legacy for future generations. He described the role of the media in this regard as sensitive and said: One of the weaknesses of our mass media today is that it only pays attention to part of the people, and does not include the common people.

The governor-general of Gilan discussed selected parts of His Holiness the late Imam's political and divine will. He said: That holy man said: The news organizations must not stray far from the interests of Islam.

As this meeting continued, the chief jurisconsult's representative in Gilan and Friday imam of Rasht discussed the responsibilities of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. He said: This ministry must itself make policy, and not follow the policies of others.

He explained that after the Islamic revolution the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance did not have the ability to make films acceptable to the people, and for this reason it was forced continually to use foreign films. He called this a weakness for this ministry.

Rasht Friday Imam's Remarks

Hojjat ol-Islam val-Moslemin Ehsanbakhsh also criticized the media. He said: The newspapers today are thinking more about revenues than about the message of Islam. Of course the problem of high prices does beset them, and subsidies should be paid to them as before for the procurement of paper and resources.

He said: Useful investment in the area of children's literature and promoting Islamic ethics can train the next generation for the Islamic revolution.

Remarks by Manager of General Domestic Press Affairs

Based on another report, Engineer Hamadani, executive director of domestic press affairs for the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, attended a meeting in conjunction with this seminar with the managers of local publications in Gilan. He said: Based on decisions made in the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, the needs of the press in the provinces will be met by the general offices of Islamic guidance.

He added: This step is being taken to make things easier for our press colleagues in the provinces. In addition to promoting good work, it will prevent referrals to the center.

He said: In this regard, resources and aid will be distributed based on existing concessions and in accordance with the factors given in the law, so that justice can be achieved.

Engineer Hamadani noted: Proposals to increase rates for government advertisements, to exempt publications from the payment of taxes and to support reporters and writers are ready to present to the Council of Ministers, and after approval they will be implemented.

At this meeting Hojjat ol-Eslam Reza'i, managing editor of the weekly publication NAQSH-E QALAM, said: Usually decisions concerning the local press are made in Tehran, yet it would be better, prior to any decision, if there could at least be coordination or an attempt to get the views from province press officials.

Mr. Taheri, managing editor of the weekly publication KADEH, said: I am opposed to the distribution of resources through the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. It would be better if these resources were distributed through the press or the Ministry of Commerce.

He emphasized the need to train reporters to improve the quality of their work.

Jaktaji, manager of the monthly publication KILEHVA, discussed the need to publish this kind of publication, which affects the culture of the people, and he asked for the procurement of paper and for solutions to printing problems.

Nava'i, manager of the weekly sports publication AVA-YE SHOMAL, discussed the fact that the aforementioned publication has the highest circulation of all the nation's local publications. He said: If even 50 percent of the paper needed by AVA-YE SHOMAL were obtained, it would be praiseworthy.

The managing editor of the weekly publication TAHAVVOL also emphasized the need for a just division of classified advertisements, and asked for control of this problem.

Nation's First Cardiac Research Center Inaugurated 93LA0130Q Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 17 Jun 93 p 4

[Text] Esfahan—JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI. The Esfahan Medical Sciences University Center for Cardiovascular Research has opened and started operating as the nation's first center for cardiovascular research.

This center was built by a philanthropist on an 850 square-meter site with a 1,500-meter foundation in three stories with credit expenditures of 350 million rials, and turned over to the Esfahan Medical Sciences University. It has wards for pediatrics and pathology, a laboratory, a computer center, an epidemiology group, a nutrition group, groups for psychiatry, sports and electrocardiographs, and a scientific library.

Our correspondent reports that the ceremonies opening this research center were attended by the representative from the WHO in the Islamic Republic of Iran, His Holiness Ayatollah Hashemi, His Holiness Taheri, a representative from the Assembly of Experts, the Friday imam of Esfahan, province officials, and officials from the Esfahan Medical Sciences University.

The chief of the Esfahan Medical Sciences University and the acting deputy minister for research for the Ministry of Health Care and Treatment spoke concerning the importance and role of research in identifying and treating diseases.

As the meeting continued, Mr. 'Omar Soleyman, representative of the WHO in the Islamic Republic of Iran, spoke on the place of research in medical sciences.

This report states that Mr. 'Omar Soleyman said on his trip to Esfahan: After studying the situation with the Esfahan Center for Cardiovascular Research, if it has the necessary qualifications, this center will be selected as a base for coordination and cardiovascular training for the nations in the region.

Three Tehran Health Centers Open 24 Hours 93LA0113P Tehran SALAM in Persian 28 Jun 93 p 2

[Text] The deputy director for health care for the Tehran Province Regional Health Care and Treatment Organization said that three health care and treatment centers in Tehran will be open 24 hours.

Based on this measure, the 12 Bahman Health Clinic located on Khorasan Square on Khavaran Street across from Atabek Street, the Farmanfarmayan Clinic on Azarbaijan Street just before the Bastan intersection, and the 15 Sha'ban Health Clinic on Shahrak-e Qods, Qel'eh-ye Hasankhan will henceforth be open 24 hours.

These centers have sections for injections, bandages, vaccinations, health care and family planning and pharmacies, and throughout the 24-hour period general physicians will be treating the patients who refer to them.

Diet Contributing Increasing Heart Disease*93LA0129G London KEYHAN in Persian 29 Jul 93
p 12*

[Text] In Iran physicians have warned that the consumption of vegetable shortening severely threatens the health of society. In other words, this shortening is deadly.

In recent years, due to the shortage of foodstuffs and the high price of good oils, the people turned to solid vegetable shortening. This oil, because of the way it is produced, the increase in the amount of hydrogen and the use of nickel in its preparation, is causing disease in the country.

Based on statistics obtained, every year thousands of people are hospitalized in hospital cardiovascular wards with heart disease caused by fat consumption. Research by the Ministry of Health Care and Treatment has also shown that 38 percent of these diseases are circulatory disorders.

In the year 1369 [21 Mar 1990-20 Mar 1991] alone, about 824 million prescriptions were given for cardiovascular patients, and the patients paid 895 million rials to buy these drugs. Physicians say that the important factor in heart disease is solid vegetable oils, which is found and consumed in abundance in Iran.

Production of solid vegetable shortening in Iran's factories last year reached 608,484 tons, and the rest of the solid vegetable shortening needed by the public was imported. Physicians believe that to whatever extent there is an increase in the consumption of solid vegetable shortening, there is an increase in deaths due to cardiovascular diseases, so that the number of deaths due to cardiovascular diseases in the year 1369 [21 Mar 1990-20 Mar 1991] increased 38 percent compared to the year 1365 [21 Mar 1986-20 Mar 1987]. Studies have proved that to whatever extent the consumption of solid vegetable shortening has increased, so has the consumption of cardiovascular drugs and the number of patients in hospitals and health clinics increased.

An important question is why, at a time when the consumption of solid vegetable shortening has been prohibited in the developed nations, is it still common in Iran, and why the 31 factories in Iran that produce solid vegetable shortening in Iran are not equipped with new technology.

Actually, health care has been described by the WHO as the complete bodily, psychological and social health of human beings. Therefore, the mere absence of disease and the lack of disabilities and bodily deformities is not a criterion for individual health and health care. In this description, deviation from health is not the only thing under consideration. Also of concern are sound psychological and social health.

The physicians say: The consumption of these kinds of vegetable shortening must be prohibited because it damages the overall health of society, and at the same time, with the increase in the number of sick people in the country the labor force is gradually exhausted. On the other hand, with the departure of the sick person from the

cycle of production, health care and treatment costs naturally increase. In short, economic losses also increase the number of sick people.

In the view of the experts, due to the consumption of disease-causing oils in Iran, the consumption of drugs from other countries also increases. For example: the per capita consumption of drugs in Iran is \$26, in Turkey it is \$2, and in Pakistan it is \$4.

These statistics are quite evocative and descriptive. If about 5 percent of the people in Iran become ill each year, the cost that will be imposed on the gross national revenues through drug consumption will be about 10.066 billion tomans.

Link Between Industries, Research Centers To Expand*93LA0126K Tehran SALAM in Persian 7 Jul 93 p 19*

[Text] Tehran—SALAM Correspondent. The first international congress to develop contacts between industries and educational and research centers opened at Unity Hall at Tabriz University.

At this congress, first Ayatollah Malakuti gave a speech on the role of Islamic scholars, researchers and investigators in the advancement of science. He said this role is very important in the development of science. He discussed the unfortunate situation of the Islamic nations in the current era. He said: The science and technology in the current era is the result of the efforts of Islamic scholars and thinkers from the previous era.

Addressing scholars, professors, researchers and students, he said: The sacred government of the Islamic Republic of Iran expects you not only to do research and study to advance Iran, but also to advance the Muslim world, because Islam cannot advance without the economy, industry, science, and knowledge of the day.

At this congress, Dr. Seyyed Javad Azhari, deputy minister of culture and higher education for research, spoke about the exalted position of science and knowledge in Islam. He said: If we cannot keep up with the changes in science and technology and take the lead in knowledge, we are condemned to annihilation. Then we won't even have a chance to lag behind. He discussed the importance of the relationship between science and industry and the universities, and added: This relationship must become a national necessity and priority.

Dr. Azhari also discussed the government's role as supporter. He announced that industry and the university cannot have a useful relationship without the government. In this regard the government must play the role of supporter and organizer.

In conclusion, the deputy minister of culture and higher education for research said that last year 70 percent of research manpower was working in the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education. He announced: Now, 90 percent of the nation's research manpower is working in this ministry. He also added: More than 400 million tomans has been allocated for this purpose from Note 55.

As this congress continued, Engineer 'Abdol'alizadeh, governor-general of East Azarbaijan, explained that today in our country every building with a smokestack with anything besides steam coming out of it is considered a factory and an industrial unit. He said that a full explanation and justification of what constitutes an industrial unit and a factory would bring about a change throughout industry.

He announced that the relationship of research to industry, the economy, agriculture, and other sectors is vital to our country. He emphasized that industry must spend part of its income on education, research and study, and also that the doors of the factories and industrial units should be open to professors, students and researchers for research and education.

Likewise, Dr. Hoseyn Balazadeh-Bahar, secretary of the aforementioned congress, discussed the goal in holding the congress in an interview with SALAM's correspondent. He said: The main goal is to eliminate the existing education gap between the centers for research and education and industries. We hope that by holding this congress we will see an increase in relations between industries and centers for research and education in accordance with the needs of the time so that it will be able to answer to the rightful necessities and expectations of society and our country.

He also added: Of the 150 papers received at the congress office, 100 were selected. Of this number, 72 were presented at the congress.

He said: This congress will be held every two years in Tabriz.

It is worth mentioning that concurrent with this congress, which will run from 14 to 17 Tir [5-8 Jul], the province industrial products exposition, the East Azarbaijan Industrial-Commercial Exposition, including computers and other products, which will continue until 20 Tir [11 Jul], will also be held.

Technical, Vocational Centers Become Operational

93LA0113N Tehran SALAM in Persian 27 Jun 93 p 11

[Text] Hamadan—SALAM Correspondent. The task of building 12 technical and Vocational centers in the border provinces of Khuzestan, Kordestan, Ilam and Kermanshah, which were damaged in the war, has begun this year.

This statement was made by Engineer Siyahati, supervisor of the Ministry of Labor's Office of Technology and Education and manager of research for the Technical and Vocational Education Office in the Ministry of Labor, during an interview in Hamadan.

In part of this interview he said: Based on the new educational system approved by the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, as of this year all technical and Vocational instruction for students in the on-the-job training branch will be done under the full supervision of the Ministry of Labor's Technical and Vocational Education Organization. In this same regard he added: The midlevel three-year on-the-job training programs include a total of 94 theoretical and practical units, and the examinations for all technical and

practical lessons will be done under the supervision of the Ministry of Labor's system of technical and vocational centers.

Likewise, if they so desire, students in this branch can take one and one-half year technical and practical courses in these centers, which include 47 units. If they succeed in the pertinent examination and in the second theoretical examination to be given in the centers, they will receive a midlevel diploma.

Engineer Siyahati noted: As of the next academic year, students in the on-the-job training branch will be under the general mantle of the province technical and vocational centers. In this regard 400 people will go through the aforementioned program in the province of Hamadan Technical and Vocational Center. In conclusion he said: Currently the Ministry of Labor's technical and vocational centers have trained a large number of high-school graduates who did not pass the college admissions examinations, applicants for work, and individuals who have in some way broken contact with the education and training system and have stopped studying.

Shortages in Educational Material in Hamadan

93LA0113Q Tehran SALAM in Persian 28 Jun 93 p 4

[Text] Hamadan—SALAM Correspondent. Despite the shortage of manpower and classroom space in the province of Hamadan, the student dropout rate there has been held down more than other parts of the country. Yazdanpenahi, deputy for education at the province of Hamadan General Office of Education and Training, gave a press conference in which he announced the above. He said: In the 1370-71 [1992-93] academic year 89.2 percent of the elementary school students passed, 77.3 percent of those studying in rahnema'i schools passed, and 80.7 percent of those studying in middle school passed. Compared with the previous year these figures represent growth in educational advancement of 5 percent, 8 percent, and 7 percent, respectively.

He said the most important factor in the educational advancement of students is summer remedial classes. He said: Last year, with the formation of these classes, 7 to 8 percent of student dropouts were prevented. In the same regard he added: Also this year four-week summer remedial classes with one week of examinations will begin in the month of Tir [22 Jun-22 Jul].

Continuing, Yazdanpenahi discussed the new middle-school educational system. He said: There will be remedial classes for the new middle-school system, and these classes will last two months. Students who are lacking units and whose grades were not at the passing level can take an examination in the month of Mordad [23 Jul-22 Aug] after taking these classes, and if they do not pass, in the month of Shahrivar [23 Sep-22 Oct] they can take a new test.

In the same regard he added: Students who are traveling may take the remedial classes where they are living and take the examination in the same place, and they can

present their scores with the validation of the Office of Education and Training in that area to their own educational center.

Concerning the formation of model public schools, Yazdanpenahi said: Schools where 70 percent of the parents of the students are willing to pay school expenses will be made into model public schools. He added: At the elementary level, 70,000 rials [Rls] will be collected for each student, and students may register at the first classes in this school and other elementary schools who are born as early as the first half of the year 1362 [21 Mar-23 Sep 1983] and no later than 1 Mehr 1366 [23 Sep 1987]. Those who are born after 2 Mehr 1366 [24 Sep 1987] will not register.

He said the requirement for registering in the Shahed schools for ordinary students is the payment of Rls200,000.

Elsewhere in his talk, the deputy for education in the Hamadan General Office of Education and Training discussed the educational problems and shortages in this region. He said: In this province, at the elementary, rahnama'i and middle school levels a total of 660,451 students are studying in 10,572 classes. In this regard we have a shortage of 3,796 classes and 4,464 teachers and instructors.

In this regard he said: Most of the schools in the cities operate in two shifts, and this is to the disadvantage of the students. By alleviating existing shortages, officials must convert the schools from two-shift to full-time single-shift schools.

Eight Billion Rials Allocated for University Expansion

93LA0113V Tehran SALAM in Persian 28 Jun 93 p 14

[Text] Eight billion rials [Rls] credit has been allocated to complete and implement two development projects at Urmia University this year.

Dr. Rezavi-Rowhani, chief of Urmia University, gave an exclusive interview yesterday to IRNA's correspondent. He said: Of the projects mentioned, the buildings for the veterinary college, the veterinary clinic, the exercise hall for the Nazelu University Complex and the construction of a wall for the University Complex at the Nazelu site will be completed this year.

He said: The four projects mentioned on a 38,000-square-meter site are almost completed, and Rls4 billion has been procured to pay the cost of their completion. He added: The building for the teacher training college in the municipality of Urmia is also under construction, and if the project is completed and the equipment and resources are procured, 15 teacher training fields will be concentrated in this complex.

Continuing, he discussed the basic problems in the university, and added: In view of the increased rate of inflation and the unification of the foreign exchange rate, this university is faced with a decrease in per-student payments. This has created problems for education.

Classrooms To Be Built in Sistan Va Baluchestan

93LA0124G Tehran SALAM in Persian 6 Jul 93 p 11

[Text] With credit allocations of 20 billion rials [Rls], the completion and construction of 1,200 classrooms in various parts of the province of Sistan va Baluchestan began at the beginning of the current year [21 Mar 1993].

Engineer Gholamreza Sheykh, director of new construction, development, and equipment of schools in the province of Sistan va Baluchestan, announced the above yesterday at a press conference.

He said: Thirteen percent of the credits allocated in the first three months of the current year [21 Mar-21 Jun 1993] have been spent to complete and build educational projects and it is hoped that all the 1,200 classrooms will be delivered to the education and training offices by the end of the current year [20 Mar 1994].

He added: Last year, with the expenditure of credits of Rls15 billion, construction was completed on 180 educational projects, including 1,200 classrooms, nine multipurpose halls, and seven dormitories with a combined foundation space of 97,000 square meters and 20,000 meters of walls were put into service.

In this regard he said: Last year an average of 334 square meters per day of classroom space was built, and with the delivery of 405 classrooms during the Ten Days Dawn Celebration, the province of Sistan va Baluchestan obtained the highest indicator for classes delivered to the Ministry of Education and Training.

Continuing, he discussed the increasing construction of classroom space. He said: The projects being completed by the management of new construction, development and equipment of schools in the province of Sistan va Baluchestan were planned in the years 1370 [21 Mar 1991-20 Mar 1992] and 1371 [21 Mar 1992-20 Mar 1993] and yet the unfinished projects in the other projects may have been started as far back as 1362 [21 Mar 1983-20 Mar 1984].

Over 14,000 Participate in Qom Seminary Exams

93LA0130M Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 17 Jun 93 p 4

[Text] 14,703 seminary students participated in the examinations on primary and general studies at Qom Seminary.

The Central News Unit reports that the examinations for Qom Seminary students are being held from Level 1 to Level 9 in 27 sessions at the Qods prayer hall. Eighteen of the sessions will be devoted to primary studies and nine sessions will be devoted to general studies.

If the students participating in these examinations, which began on Tuesday, pass at any level, they will be promoted to the next level, and those who pass Level 9 will have passed the highest of the seminary's examination levels.

The number of participants in this round of examinations at Qom Seminary increased 30 percent compared to the previous round.

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